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Abstract 
 
In the eighty years between the passage of New Zealand’s first unified Electoral Act 
in 1927, and the passage of the Electoral Finance Act 2007, the New Zealand 
Parliament passed 66 acts that altered or amended New Zealand’s electoral law. 
 
One central assumption of theories of electoral change is that those in power only 
change electoral rules strategically, in order to protect their self-interest.1 This thesis 
is an investigation into the way New Zealand governments effect and have effected 
their desired changes to the electoral law through the legislative process, and the roles 
self-interest and the active search for consensus between political parties have played 
in that process.  
 
It argues that, while self-interest serves as a compelling explanation for a great deal of 
electoral law change in New Zealand, altruistic motivations and the development of 
parliamentary processes influenced behaviour to an equal, and perhaps even greater, 
extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey Karp, 'Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-
Interest, Values or Ideology?', The Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 2, May 2006, p. 434. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
In the eighty years between the passage of New Zealand’s first unified Electoral Act 
in 1927,2 and the passage of the controversial Electoral Finance Act 2007, the New 
Zealand Parliament passed 66 acts that, to varying extents and to varying ends, 
altered or added to the electoral law. These changes ranged from one-word technical 
amendments correcting a drafting error to the extension of the franchise to 18 year 
olds; from the prolongation of the parliamentary term during World War II to the 
introduction of computer technology in organising the electoral rolls; and from the 
regulation of election broadcasting to the change from First Past the Post (FPP) to the 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. Not one area of New Zealand’s 
electoral law remained unamended over the period. 
 
This thesis is an investigation into the way in which New Zealand governments and 
politicians effect their desired changes to the electoral law through the legislative 
process and the roles self-interest and the active search for consensus between 
political parties has played in that process. One central assumption of theories of 
electoral change is that those in power only change rules strategically, in order to 
protect their self-interest.3 I argue that, while self-interest serves as a compelling 
explanation for a great deal of electoral law change in New Zealand, altruistic 
motivations and the development of parliamentary processes and conventions have 
influenced behaviour to at least an equal extent.  
 
                                                     
2
 Until 1927, electoral law was contained in the various Electoral acts, Electoral Amendment acts, the 
Legislature Act 1908 and in various Legislature Amendment acts.  
3
 Bowler, Donovan & Karp, 'Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-Interest, Values or 
Ideology?’, p. 434. 
  
 
8 
The motivations behind the passing of each of the 66 amendment acts and the ways in 
which governments and parliaments went about the task are numerous. Some acts 
amended one area of the electoral law, while others served as omnibus acts amending 
multiple areas. Several acts were passed by Parliament in a single day under urgency, 
while the debates over others stretched into weeks of contentious parliamentary 
sittings. Some acts were arguably self-interested moves by governments seeking to 
enhance their own prospects of re-election or disadvantage their opponents. Other 
acts were the product of non-partisan select committees or governments that have 
sought consensus with the opposition to create durable and non-partisan legislation.  
 
The argument that changes to the electoral law should ultimately be consensual was 
raised by politicians from both of New Zealand’s major parties – National and Labour 
– throughout the period studied. The last act I consider, the highly contested Electoral 
Finance Act 2007, brought to the fore the argument that the alteration of the electoral 
law in New Zealand should ideally be carried out in a non-partisan fashion with 
consensus between government and opposition. It was expressed by both major 
parties in relation to the Electoral Finance Act. National Party Member of Parliament, 
Dr Wayne Mapp, argued during the debate that, “[i]n the past, this country has always 
created its electoral law on a consensus basis, but that did not serve the purposes of 
the Government this time, because it knows perfectly well that it wants its own law to 
suit its own purposes.”4 The argument was also expressed after the 2008 General 
Election by Labour Party leader, Phil Goff, who said “I don’t think the way the 
Electoral Finance Act was passed or necessarily its specific detail was as good as it 
                                                     
4
 644 NZPD 13532, 5 December 2007. 
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could have been ... Any matter that's constitutional or electoral, we should be seeking 
consensus for. We didn't have that consensus.”5 
 
It is important to define ‘consensus’ at the outset. The word can describe a process or 
an outcome. A consensual or co-operative legislative process does not automatically 
lead to an outcome of consensus and, more rarely, a unanimous outcome may arise 
from a contentious, non-consensual process. To make clear this distinction, where 
this thesis considers consensus, it considers outcome. It considers process in terms of 
contention or lack of contention. The role of consensus in changing the electoral law 
is an interesting area of investigation, especially because, in New Zealand, the 
convention of consensus that has arisen in the area of the electoral law stands apart 
from an otherwise adversarial legislative process. New Zealand has an adversarial 
legislative process and is, by its nature, a politically combative institution. Many of 
the procedures of the House are designed specifically to enable the House to 
scrutinise and control the government.6As David McGee outlines, “everything the 
House does potentially gives it the opportunity to probe and criticise the actions of 
the Government.” 7 This thesis finds that, overall, electoral amendment legislation 
provides no exception to the general adversarial nature of Parliament, although there 
are notable specific examples of areas where the House has worked together. 
 
As examined in Chapter Two, the electoral law forms part of the New Zealand 
constitution. Yet an exploration of the electoral law at a purely constitutional level is 
not the aim of this thesis. Its focus, rather, are the conventions, processes and 
                                                     
5
 Claire Trevett, New Zealand Herald, “Goff Admits Mistakes Over Electoral Law”, 13 November 
2008. 
6
 David McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, 3nd ed., Dunmore Press, Wellington, 2005, p. 
4. 
7
 Ibid. 
  
 
10 
motivations that characterised change in the electoral law over the eighty year period 
studied. The amendment and alteration of the electoral law is an area that deserves 
special attention. As Alan Robinson argued in 1970:  
 
Since electoral rules can have a major influence on the fortunes of the various 
contenders for political office, it is not uncommon in democratic countries for 
electoral reforms to be the subject of intense party controversy. New Zealand has 
been no exception.8  
 
 
Because a government’s electoral prospects can be directly affected by the 
amendments it makes to electoral legislation, there is arguably no area of legislative 
activity that provides as great an opportunity to study the interaction of self-interest 
and bi-partisanship, of ideology and pragmatism, and of party and principle in New 
Zealand politics.  
 
With a significant amount of legislation pertaining to electoral matters passed over 
the past eighty years studied (66 acts), it is important to define at the outset what the 
term ‘electoral law’ entails. The term is often narrowly defined. In his seminal work 
on the political consequences of electoral laws, D.W. Rae defines electoral law the 
following way:9  
 
Electoral laws are those which govern the processes by which electoral 
preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated into 
distributions of governmental authority (typically parliamentary seats) among the 
competing political parties.  
 
 
In order to avoid any oversight and to provide the fullest picture possible of the 
process of electoral law amendment in New Zealand, this thesis takes a wider 
approach in defining which legislation falls into the category of ‘electoral law’ and its 
                                                     
8
 Alan Robinson, ‘Parliament in New Zealand’, in The Reform of Parliament, John Marshall (ed.), 
New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington 1978, p. 142. 
9
 D.W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967, 
p. 14 
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reform. As a result, Rae’s definition forms only one part of the definition adopted in 
this paper. My definition includes the legislation that determines how a vote translates 
into the election of a representative (Rae’s definition), but also the laws governing 
electoral processes and regulations. Indeed, it is in this latter category that the most 
interesting case studies of consensus politics (and the opposite) occur. Accordingly, 
the definition adopted for the purposes of the following analysis includes not only the 
laws that govern the way in which a vote is transferred to a result but, for example, 
the laws that surround the election campaigns, election broadcasting, the rules that 
govern the franchise, or the eligibility of an elector to vote or to sit (or remain sitting) 
in Parliament. Overall, the focus of the investigation is process rather than outcome. 
Of course, the content of each electoral amendment act and its political outcome 
(intended or otherwise) forms an integral part of the following analysis, but only so 
far as it can assist in understanding the reasons behind the passing of each act and the 
process by which it was passed.  
 
1927 serves as a useful starting point for several reasons. First, New Zealand’s first 
Electoral Act was passed in 1927. Before 1927, New Zealand electoral law was 
spread over a number of different acts, the most important of which was the 
Legislature Act 1908. The 1927 Act amalgamated all existing electoral law and all 
subsequent electoral amendment legislation amended that Act until the passage of the 
Electoral Act 1956. Second, the Act preceded the emergence of the two-party system 
by only several years,10 and, during the period between 1927 and 1935, when the first 
Labour Government was elected, several highly controversial electoral amendments 
were passed under the Coalition Government and merit attention. Finally, there are 
                                                     
10
 The two-party system emerged after the election of the first Labour Government in 1935 and the 
formation of the National Party out of the old United and Reform parties in 1936. 
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three Electoral acts in the period studied. Alongside the 1956 and 1993 Electoral acts, 
the Electoral Act 1927 serves as a useful point of reference when examining a period 
that spans just under a century.  
 
The analysis is focussed solely on the electoral law passed by Parliament that affects 
Parliament itself. As a result, electoral acts passed by Parliament pertaining to local 
government are excluded. Also excluded are broader constitutional changes such as 
the 1947 Statute of Westminster, the 1950 abolition of the Legislative Council and 
the various acts pertaining to constitutional, but non-electoral, matters. In the cases 
where these acts overlap, such as in the Constitution Act 1986, the aspects of the act 
relating to the electoral law are included. A number of provisions in largely unrelated 
acts, which nonetheless amended or circumvented a piece of electoral legislation, are 
included. For example, several Finance acts in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
contained clauses exempting a Member of Parliament from disqualification under the 
Electoral Act for accepting honoraria. On several occasions discretion has been 
exercised and an Act that technically qualifies under the adopted definition of 
‘electoral law’ has been excluded. For example, the Licensing Amendment Act 1961 
contained a provision in its schedule that amended section 24(1) of the Electoral Act 
1956. The provision related to the licensing district arrangements for the Chatham 
Islands, was incidental to the Electoral Act and the amendment removing it was of no 
importance and received no debate.  
 
Hansard (the New Zealand parliamentary Debates or NZPD), the Journals of the 
House of Representatives (JHR) and Appendices to the Journals (AJHR) serve as 
major primary sources. In order to preserve a focus on process, Parliament and public 
argument, Hansard is the major source of information for chapters four to six, which 
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examine the passage of various pieces of legislation through the House of 
Representatives. In these chapters, I have included secondary sources only where they 
clarify ambiguities or add substantially to the analysis. Due to the large period of time 
covered by the thesis and a need to provide equal coverage to a number of acts, 
formal interviews were not undertaken. The collation of every piece of electoral 
amendment legislation over an eighty year period was a substantial task. Several 
checks of the indexes of every volume of Hansard published since 1927 were 
undertaken to ensure no Act or Bill has been omitted. All collected information 
concerning electoral legislation and failed electoral bills is tabled in Appendices A 
and B in the hope other scholars may use the primary research as a base on which to 
undertake further study. Analysis was, on occasion, hampered by the fact the 
proceedings of committee stages were not recorded in Hansard until 1995 and that no 
record is made of select committee proceedings.  
 
It remains to provide a structural overview of what is to follow. Chapter two provides 
an empirical and theoretical context to the thesis. It reviews relevant literature and 
places the thesis within the context of existing work in both areas. It also provides a 
background to the constitutional position of electoral law in New Zealand and the 
parliamentary processes used to change the electoral law. This section covers, among 
other things, the relevance of the select committee process to the amendment of the 
electoral law and the constitutional and conventional issues involved in the 
entrenchment of certain provisions of the electoral law.11 Chapter three sets out four 
legislative milestones in the eighty years studied and hypothesises the existence of 
three distinct ‘eras’ of electoral law change. Chapters four to six examine the history 
                                                     
11
 As discussed in chapter two, the reform of election law in New Zealand requires, on some issues, bi-
partisan consensus. The entrenched clauses of the Electoral Act 1993, and before it the Electoral Act 
1956, require 75 percent support to amend certain provisions. 
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of successful and failed electoral law change from 1927 to 2007. They consider the 
nature of changes to the electoral law and the process by which these changes have 
progressed through Parliament. The chapters are organised by subject matter. Chapter 
four considers the law relating to parliament and government formation. Specifically, 
it considers the length of the parliamentary term, the number of Members of 
Parliament in the House, the qualifications to be a Member of Parliament, formation 
of a government and the electoral system. The focus of chapter five is electoral 
boundaries, franchise, voter registration and method of voting, while chapter six 
looks at the rules surrounding electioneering, broadcasting and other electoral 
administration. Emerging findings and trends are discussed throughout. Finally, 
chapter seven correlates and compares various aspects of changing the electoral law, 
including contention, outcome and subject matter. It examines the dual explanations 
of self-interest and the search for consensus in electoral reform. Chapter eight 
concludes and explores where further work may be done on the questions raised by 
this thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
The Electoral Law in Context 
 
Before embarking on any investigation of the process by which the electoral law has 
been changed over the past 80 years in New Zealand, it is necessary to provide 
appropriate context in which to place the analysis that follows. This chapter 
comprises two parts. Part one provides an empirical background to the constitutional 
position of the electoral law in New Zealand and the parliamentary processes 
involved in changing it. It considers relevant literature in its analysis. Part two 
provides an overview of theoretical propositions advanced by scholars about 
assessing motivations behind changing the electoral law. 
 
Electoral Law and Parliament  
Recent literature on the New Zealand electoral system falls into three general 
categories. The first category centres on electoral outcomes and the operation of 
electoral processes. This includes analysis provided in major legal, parliamentary and 
constitutional texts. The focus here is often on the constitutional position of the laws 
and regulations through which the New Zealand electoral process operates. Books in 
this category include Philip Joseph’s Constitutional and Administrative Law in New 
Zealand, David McGee’s Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand,12 and Geoffrey 
Palmer’s Bridled Power. While Bridled Power and Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in New Zealand stand at present as the authoritative texts on New Zealand 
constitutional matters, the broad focus of these texts on the post-1993 era and on 
constitutional matters in general means any examination of the processes by which 
the electoral law is changed is very limited. While the Electoral Act 1956 and the 
entrenched provisions are discussed at length in Joseph as a topic of legal interest, 
                                                     
12
 McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand. 
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both books are strongly weighted towards the MMP-era. New Zealand’s current 
constitutional situation, and even aspects of its development, is often presented as 
something that simply happened. In these works, discussion about the constitutional 
intricacies of entrenchment precludes substantial discussion about the majority of 
provisions of the electoral law that are not entrenched. The focus of these works is a 
lofty constitutional one. The exceptions are older constitutional works, which 
provide, primarily now through their historical value, insight into the development of 
the electoral amendment process. Works such as K.J. Scott’s seminal 1962 work, The 
New Zealand Constitution, which argued the Electoral Act 1956 was the New 
Zealand constitution, provide a helpful context. These works can add depth to 
analysis when contextual secondary sources are often thin on the ground.  
 
The second category contains literature on electoral design and electoral outcomes. 
This literature often has a political science focus rather than a legal focus. Aside from 
Andrew Geddis’ 2007 book, Electoral Law in New Zealand, which focussed solely 
on the electoral law while retaining a legalistic viewpoint, much of the recent 
literature in this category centres primarily on electoral system change and the move 
from FPP to MMP.  
 
The third category contains empirical histories of the New Zealand electoral system. 
The primary academic focus of the second category of literature has been on electoral 
outcomes and electoral system design. This category includes the voluminous 
literature from the 1980s to the present concerning MMP and electoral reform. For 
the purposes of this thesis, this category has not been of great use. While the Electoral 
Act 1993 stands as one of the most important electoral acts in New Zealand history, it 
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is one act analysed alongside 65 others in this paper. The focus of the second 
category is design; the focus of this thesis is process.  
 
The third category of literature contains a smaller amount of material. Its focus is the 
legislative and governmental processes through which electoral reform has taken 
place. Into this category falls material such as the thoroughly useful Appendix to the 
report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 1986, which details the 
history of electoral amendments in some detail,13 and more recent books such as 
Atkinson’s History of the Vote in New Zealand. In this literature, process receives 
somewhat more attention than it receives in the other categories. Overall, however, 
parliamentary process is eschewed in favour of a primarily outcome-focussed 
analysis. Owing, perhaps, to a lack of scholarly attention to the topic, no major 
academic disputes exist between authors about the development of New Zealand’s 
electoral law. If consensus does not always exist among political parties on changes 
to the electoral law, broad consensus exists among academics on the place of the 
electoral law in New Zealand. 
 
While the definition of the words ‘New Zealand constitution’ has been substantially 
broadened in recent years, it has always been widely acknowledged by modern 
constitutional scholars that the electoral law forms an important part of the New 
Zealand constitution. Like the United Kingdom, New Zealand does not have a single 
document which acts as a written constitution. Instead, the New Zealand constitution 
is found across legislation, practice and convention.14 Dicey defines a constitution as 
                                                     
13
 B. Ritchie, & H. Hoffman, “The Electoral Law of New Zealand, A Brief History”, Towards a Better 
Democracy: Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Appendix A, Wellington, 1986; 
and K. Sorrenson, “A History of Maori Representation in Parliament”, Towards a Better Democracy: 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Appendix B, Wellington, 1986. 
14
 Geoffrey Palmer, Bridled Power, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2004, p. 5. 
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“all rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution of the exercise of the 
sovereign power in the state.”15 Geoffrey Palmer provides a more recent definition in 
Bridled Power when he says a constitution is “the system or body of fundamental 
principles under which a nation is constituted or governed... It is a set of rules – 
structures and procedures.”16 The electoral law is an essential part of either definition. 
Indeed, its role in the New Zealand constitution has been recognised for many 
decades. In his 1962 work on the New Zealand constitution, K.J. Scott argues that the 
constitutional importance of the Electoral Act means that, in the absence of a written 
constitution, it can be regarded as part of New Zealand’s ‘constitution’.17 However, 
while the electoral law may hold a special place in New Zealand’s constitutional 
framework, it does not, strictly speaking, stand apart from other statutes.  
 
Whereas many of the respective electoral laws of the United States and Australia are 
contained in a federal constitution, the New Zealand electoral law is more flexible 
and can be amended through Parliament’s ordinary legislative processes. Arguably, 
the only other Western country whose constitutional law is so flexible is the United 
Kingdom.18 D.W. Rae argues electoral law may be defined per genus et differentiam 
against other laws.19 This is not wholly accurate in the case of New Zealand. 
 
There is, however, one notable exception to this conclusion. In New Zealand, the 
entrenchment of several key provisions of the electoral law emphasises the important 
constitutional status of the electoral law and provides somewhat less flexibility than 
exists in the system closest to New Zealand’s – that of the United Kingdom. 
                                                     
15
 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed., Liberty Fund, 
Indianapolis, 1982, p. cxl. 
16
 Palmer, Bridled Power, , p. 4. 
17
 K.J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962, p. 6. 
18
 Ibid., p. 20. 
19
 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, p. 14. 
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Originally enacted in the Electoral Act 1956, and re-utilised in the Electoral Act 
1993, the entrenched provisions of New Zealand’s electoral law set it somewhat apart 
from other statutes by requiring a 75% majority of the House to amend certain 
provisions. With the exception of these entrenched provisions, Parliament amends, 
alters, or otherwise adds to the electoral law in the same way as any other legislation, 
by a simple majority – 50 percent of the House plus one.20 In the New Zealand House 
of Representatives, under normal circumstances, bills pass through an introduction 
and first reading before being considered by a select committee. On their return to the 
House they receive a second reading, consideration by committee of the whole House 
and a third reading, after which time, if passed, they receive the Royal Assent.21 All 
bills must have three readings before they are passed.22  
 
In 1956, entrenchment was at the time a constitutional novelty, apparently advocated 
within Cabinet by John Marshall, who was at the time Minister of Justice.23 The 
clause that entrenched several clauses in the Electoral acts 1956 and 1993 required 
the support of 75% of the House or a simple majority in a national referendum in 
order for those entrenched clauses to be altered. In doing so, the clause prevented a 
majority government (as all governments invariably were under FPP) from 
unilaterally amending or repealing certain parts of the electoral law. The entrenched 
provisions, however, were limited. Only six clauses were entrenched in the 1956 Act: 
 
• Section 12 relating to the duration of the House 
                                                     
20
 Speakers’ Rulings provide that the 75 percent vote on a reserved provision is required at the point at 
which the relevant clause is being considered in the committee of the whole house. A 75 percent vote 
is not required at any other stage of debate on the bill. See 433 NZPD 3513. 
21
 McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, p. 341. 
22
 Standing Order 269(1). 
23
 John Marshall in The Reform of Parliament, John Marshall (ed.), New Zealand Institute of Public 
Administration, Wellington 1978, p. 10. 
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• Section 15 relating to the Representation Commission 
• Section 16 and the definition of the term “European Population” relating to 
the division of New Zealand into European electorates after each census 
• Section 17 relating to the allowance for the adjustment of the quota.  
• Section 39(1) and the definition of the term “adult” in 39(2)(1), so far as those 
provisions prescribe 21 years as the minimum age for persons qualified to be 
registered as electors or to vote.  
• Section 106 relating to the method of voting. 
 
Furthermore, the provision that enabled entrenchment was not entrenched itself. In 
other words, it was not ‘doubly entrenched’. In 1956 this was considered by some as 
an omission or drafting error but it eventually became clear that single entrenchment 
was deliberate.24 K.J. Scott, who interviewed members of the Electoral Law 
Committee in 1956, revealed the Holland Government decided to leave this loop-hole 
in the Act to avoid the extension of the power of the judiciary in the case an 
amendment was made to an entrenched provision without the requisite authority 
provided by the terms of the entrenchment requirement.25 Any fears held by scholars 
and politicians in the 1950s that the entrenched provisions may eventually be undone 
by a simple majority proved unfounded by 2007.26 As shown in chapters three to 
seven, if there is one concrete rule that can be found in the history of New Zealand’s 
electoral law since the 1950s, it is that no government has ever attempted to 
circumvent the entrenchment clauses. In New Zealand, parliamentary or Cabinet 
                                                     
24
 Scott, The New Zealand Constitution, p. 7. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 As Philip Joseph points out, however, the legal situation in 2009 is markedly different to that in the 
1950s. Indeed, there is an opinion among many constitutional scholars that the courts could potentially 
strike down an amendment to the entrenched provisions passed by a simple majority of Parliament. See 
Philip Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, 3rd ed., Thomson Brookers, 
Wellington, 2007 
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process can often form part of a constitutional convention. As will be shown, there is 
a strong argument that 60 years of observation by governments of the entrenched 
provisions of the electoral law mean that that observation has become a convention.  
 
Before moving to the theoretical component of this chapter, it is necessary to provide 
a background to the increasing role of select committees, and particularly the 
electoral committee, in the New Zealand parliamentary process over the years. As 
covered in chapters four to seven, select committees played a major role, especially in 
the second half of the period studied, in the reform of New Zealand’s electoral law.  
 
Much of the intensive work of the House occurs in select committees.27 Their duty is 
to carry out work on behalf of the House and to communicate their conclusions to the 
House in the form of reports.28 Standing Orders mandate the automatic establishment 
of a number of select committees at the beginning of each Parliament.29 In addition to 
these committees, the House is able to set up “ad hoc” committees for specific 
purposes.30 From 1981, electoral matters were always considered by a select 
committee. Between 1981 and 1999 an ad hoc Electoral Law Committee was 
established in each Parliament.31 From 1999, electoral matters were considered by the 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee, automatically established at the beginning of 
a new Parliament.  
 
Electoral Law Committees existed in New Zealand, however, since the creation of 
the Electoral Act Committee to consider the Electoral Bill 1956. These committees 
                                                     
27
 McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, p. 236. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Standing Order 185(1),(2). 
30
 Standing Order 185(1),(2). 
31
 McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, p. 8. 
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stand apart from other committees, automatic or ad hoc, in that many were created to 
consider a bill before introduction. Rather than consider legislation introduced by a 
government, select committees were at times actively involved in making 
recommendations to governments for legislative implementation. As covered in 
following chapters, the two most significant examples of select committees that 
operated in this manner were the 1973 Electoral Act Committee and the 1979 Select 
Committee on the Electoral Law. The 1973 Committee, set up to “consider possible 
amendments to the Electoral Act 1956”, consisted of three high-ranked members 
from both major parties, including their leaders.32 It produced two reports, an interim 
report in 1974 which unanimously recommended the voting age be reduced to 18 – a 
recommendation then introduced in legislation by the government – and a final 
report, some of whose more controversial recommendations were implemented in the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975.  
 
The 1979 Select Committee on the Electoral Law was appointed by Parliament in 
August 1979 against a background of concerns about the operation of the law 
governing general elections, which had come to a head during the 1978 General 
Election.33 The Committee was charged with examining the findings of a committee 
of inquiry into the administration of the Electoral Act and the Supreme Court’s report 
to Parliament about the Hunua electoral petition, and to develop legislative and 
administrative improvements relevant to both areas.34 The Committee was re-
appointed on three occasions to “consider fully certain longer term substantive issues 
and other matters which had emerged in the course of its investigations.”35 After that, 
                                                     
32
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the establishment of an ad hoc electoral committee became standard until Standing 
Orders established a permanent Justice and Electoral Committee in 1999.  
 
Theoretical Literature 
An important aspect of examining consensus and contention in the context of the 
New Zealand electoral law is motivation. What makes parties and Members of 
Parliament behave in either a partisan or non-partisan manner on the amendment of 
the law? As chapters three to seven show, the New Zealand experience presents 
numerous examples of both types of behaviour. With the empirical background in 
place, it is necessary to provide a theoretical context for the analysis. One central 
assumption of theories of electoral change is that those in power only change rules 
strategically, in order to protect their self-interest.36 This thesis argues that, while self-
interest serves as a compelling explanation for a great deal of electoral law change in 
New Zealand, altruistic motivations and the development of parliamentary processes 
and conventions have influenced behaviour to an equal, and perhaps even greater, 
extent. Much of the theoretical material about self-interest in politics concentrates on 
electoral system change. Often, electoral system analyses use the word ‘electoral’ to 
refer to electoral system change. A typical example of this is Dunleavy and Margetts’ 
conclusion that change in election rules is a relatively rare event in established 
democracies.37 As is shown in chapters three to six, however, change to New Zealand 
election rules in the period studied was frequent. Indeed, electoral system change, 
while perhaps the most important change, formed but one part of electoral law change 
in New Zealand.  
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Generally, literature on self-interest can be divided into two categories: the literature 
arguing that self interest forms a major factor in electoral law change and the 
literature arguing it does not. The central assumption of the first category is that those 
in power only change rules strategically, in order to protect their self-interest.38 Boix 
argues that “[a]nticipating the coordinating consequences of electoral rules, any 
current government (provided it has the monopoly over electoral rulemaking) shapes 
the electoral rules to its advantage.”39 Benoit is less equivocal than Boix in his 
conclusion, but identifies a number of possible explanations for political parties' 
preferences for electoral design.40 Two of the most important are office-seeking and 
personal gain. In the first category, parties seek to implement changes to the electoral 
law in order to maximise the chance of a successful election result. As Benoit 
outlines:41 
 
The office-seeking model… posits both direct and indirect utility from holding 
office. Direct utility might be partisan power or representation of one’s own 
constituency; indirect utility might be gains from additional shares of allocative 
resources determined by the balance of legislative seats, including (but not 
limited to) policy. 
 
 
The second category outlines the influence of individuals on the electoral amendment 
process. Benoit states:42 
  
A personal gain model might explain parties’ preferences for electoral 
alternatives based on the expected personal gains for key individuals associated 
with the alternatives. Party leaders may favor a particular electoral alternative in 
order to maximize their personal power. 
 
He concedes the personal gain explanation raises questions as to whether parties are 
behaving as unitary actors. This thesis does not delve into the theoretical detail on this 
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point. It assumes that parties behave as unitary actors, but that individual actors wield 
differing levels of influence within the larger, party unit. At the other end of the 
spectrum, other academics argue uncertainty in outcome precludes self-interest from 
serving as a major factor in decisions surrounding electoral reform. Andrews and 
Jackman argue that, while party leaders attempt to behave strategically, it is not clear 
how they can do so effectively when they are faced with uncertainty about 
outcomes.43 There is also an argument for something of a middle ground. Bowler, 
Donovan and Karp conclude that rational self-interest is a major feature of parties’ 
attitudes to electoral institutions, but that attitudes about democracy and political 
ideology also have a role to play.44 Benoit, too, posits an alternative to the pure self-
interest explanation:45 
 
Parties may also rank alternative institutions according to their preferences for 
institutional outcomes that affect the general, rather than partisan, interest. Just 
as the framers of the US constitution debated passionately over the merits of a 
federal versus a confederal design, parties may struggle to implement competing 
institutions on the basis of their different preferences for collective political 
outcomes. This may be a social concern such as fairness or representation, a 
concern with producing good Government, safeguards against 
hyperconcentration of power, and so on. 
 
 
Chapters four to seven assess the history of change in New Zealand’s electoral law 
against this theoretical background and find that a middle path is the best description. 
While it is often difficult and speculative to identify on which occasions self-interest 
has played a role, it is possible to infer through a wide lens that both self-interest and 
altruism have each played a role in electoral change in New Zealand. In light of the 
New Zealand example, both ends of the theoretical spectrum could be said to be 
lacking explanatory power. 
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Chapter three now examines the ‘big picture’ of electoral law change between 1927 
and 2007, and identifies several milestones around which analysis of the wider period 
can be based. 
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Chapter Three 
Milestones: Three Eras of Electoral Amendment? 
 
Between 1927 and 2007, the New Zealand Parliament passed 66 separate pieces of 
electoral or electoral amendment legislation. Under the two party and subsequent 
MMP system,46 Parliament enacted a similar amount of electoral legislation under 
National and National-led, and Labour and Labour-led, governments. To allow 
thorough analysis, each piece of legislation has been classified in each of a number of 
categories.47 All distinctions are made on the basis that a full analysis of amendments 
to the electoral law must take into account not only content, but process.  The first 
concerns the effect of the Act on existing electoral legislation. Most Electoral 
Amendment acts passed between 1927 and 2007 altered existing legislation. Several 
acts, such as the Electoral Act 1927, amalgamated existing legislation. Other acts 
prevented the operation of existing legislation, such as the Finance Act 1960, which 
retrospectively prevented the disqualification of a Member of Parliament. Finally, 
some acts were substantially original, such as the Electoral Act 1956, which repealed 
the Electoral Act 1927 and introduced a large amount of new law. 
 
Table 1 - Effect of Electoral Amendment Legislation 
 
Amalgamating The Act amalgamates existing electoral legislation into a new statute. 
 
Amending The Act primarily amends existing electoral legislation. 
 
Circumventing The Act prevents operation of existing electoral legislation. 
 
Original The Act is wholly or substantially original in nature (may also amend 
existing law). 
 
                                                     
46
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Legislation is also categorised by subject area. This category is determined by the 
primary area or areas of electoral law affected by each individual Act. Due to the 
substantial volume of subject matter covered in some acts, grey areas exist around 
whether particular legislation falls, or does not fall, into a certain category. The rule 
in deciding whether a piece of legislation should be included in, or left out of, a 
category is the extent to which its inclusion will assist coherence and quality of 
analysis.  
Table 2 - Subject Area of Electoral Amendment Legislation 
 
Administration 
 
The administration of elections, including scrutineers; the printing and 
compilation of electoral rolls; special votes. 
 
Boundaries 
 
Any matter pertaining to electoral boundaries or the Representation 
Commission. 
 
Broadcasting 
 
The rules regulating the use of broadcast media in election campaigns. 
 
By-Election 
 
Any matter pertaining to the holding or postponement of a by-election or by-
elections. 
 
Constitution 
 
Constitutional matters pertaining to the conduct of elections or the period 
between an election and the formation of a government / sitting of the 
House. 
 
Electioneering and 
Finance 
The rules surrounding the conduct and funding of election campaigns and 
the funding of political parties. 
 
Electoral System The system by which Members of Parliament are elected. 
 
Franchise and 
Registration 
The rules surrounding who can vote and/or how they must register to do so. 
 
Maori Electoral matters solely affecting Maori, particularly franchise issues. 
 
Method of Voting Any matter pertaining to the way a vote is cast, e.g. the form of the ballot 
paper or proscribed method of marking that paper. 
 
MP Qualification The rules relating to a person or existing MP’s eligibility to be a Member of 
Parliament. 
 
Number of MPs Any matter relating to the number of members in the House of 
Representatives. 
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Referendum Any matter relating to the holding or result of a referendum on an electoral 
issue. 
 
Technical Any procedural, incidental or corrective measure amending an existing piece 
of electoral legislation. 
 
Term Length 
 
The length of the parliamentary term. 
 
To aid analysis about the role of consensus, examined in later chapters, acts are also 
classified by the amount of debate generated in Parliament. Each falls into one of four 
categories ranging from high to none. 
 
Table 3 - Level of Contention over Electoral Amendment Legislation 
 
High The bill is strongly contended in most or many areas. 
 
Moderate The bill creates a moderate amount of contention. 
 
Low Disagreements are minor. 
 
None Largely non-contentious discussion. 
 
 
As described in chapter one, a search for consensus does not always result in an 
outcome of consensus. Furthermore, a contentious parliamentary process occasionally 
results in a consensual outcome. For this reason, acts are also classified by outcome. 
A distinction is made between the unanimous passage of an act and the unopposed 
passage of an act. Oppositions may not oppose passage of an act but may not actively 
support it. Occasionally, this distinction is hard to draw. In drawing the distinction, I 
make a subjective assessment based on the level of contention, any original 
opposition from the Opposition, and whether divisions were called in any stages of 
the bill. Another category, ‘opposed only by minor parties’, is used in analysing acts 
passed by Parliaments elected under the MMP system. As discussed in chapter seven, 
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on a number of occasions the National and Labour parties have joined forces to pass 
legislation opposed by minor parties. 
 
Table 4 – Outcome of Electoral Amendment Legislation 
 
Unanimous Bill passed with full support from opposition and government 
 
Not Opposed Opposition does not oppose the bill but unanimity is either absent or 
indeterminable. Bills that receive no division on their third reading and have 
not been proactively supported by the opposition fall into this category. 
 
No Multi-partisan 
Support 
The major parties (National and Labour) are unanimous. Minor parties are 
opposed. 
 
Opposed Bill passed by majority vote, opposed by the major party not in government. 
 
Defeated 
 
The bill is defeated in a vote. 
 
Lapsed 
 
The bill does not proceed, falls off the Order Paper, or does otherwise not 
proceed. 
 
 
The final category considers the importance of a bill in terms of the scope and effect 
of each Act in comparison to other electoral bills. This delineation is necessitated by 
the large variation in scope and impact of various bills. The Electoral Amendment 
Act 1945, for example, abolished the country quota, while the Electoral Amendment 
Act 1972 disallowed a candidate from standing for election under a newly-adopted 
name.  
 
Table 5 – Class of Electoral Amendment Legislation 
 
Milestone The Act stands as a milestone in New Zealand electoral law, and makes a 
substantial and significant change to an area or areas of the electoral law. 
 
Major The Act makes a substantial change to an area or areas of the electoral law.  
 
Minor The Act makes a small change to an area or areas of the electoral law.  
 
Incidental The Act makes a very small and insignificant change to an area or areas of 
the electoral law. Often split from a Statutes Amendment Bill. 
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With this classification system in mind, we turn to the history of the 1927 – 2007 
period. As is evident from the discussion in the following chapters, Parliament 
amended every part of the electoral law during the period studied. There is variety not 
only in the areas of electoral law amended, but in the relative importance of those 
areas and the scope of the amendments themselves. The changes ranged from full 
electoral system change to the amendment of a mistake made in the printing of an act. 
Large or small, however, the changes all altered or circumvented the Electoral Act 
1927, 1956 or 1993. If, as established, the Electoral Act can be considered a part of 
the New Zealand constitution, even minor changes can have constitutional 
importance and are thus deserving of analysis. 
 
While chapters four to six, which examine in detail the majority of electoral 
legislation, are thematically organised, if there is any point to begin an examination of 
co-operation and controversy in New Zealand’s electoral law it is with the three 
Electoral Acts that have served as New Zealand’s electoral rulebooks for various 
periods between 1927 and 2007. In addition to these acts, this chapter discusses the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975, whose outcome serves as the antithesis, as such, of 
the Electoral Act 1956. These acts serve as useful points of context in an analysis that 
covers a large amount of time. Even alone, the Electoral Act 1956 and Electoral 
Amendment Act 1975 serve as milestones in the history of the electoral law in New 
Zealand. One was passed with the full consensus of the House; the other was passed 
with the House divided on a number of key issues. Each heralded a new era of 
electoral law amendment: the 1956 Act an era of consensus; the 1975 Act a move 
away from the search for consensus.  
 
  
 
32 
First, however, some basic figures. As set out in table 6, similar amounts of electoral 
legislation were passed by National or National-led, and Labour or Labour-led, 
governments over the 80 years covered by this thesis. When classified by class of 
importance, the numbers are comparable. 
 
Table 6 – Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts passed by National or National-led and Labour or 
Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 
 
 
National or 
National-
Led 
Labour or 
Labour-
Led 
TOTAL 
Milestone 2 1 3 
Major 11 11 22 
Minor 10 12 22 
Incidental 9 7 16 
C
la
ss
 
TOTAL 32 31 6348 
 
Parliament passed 32 electoral related acts under National and National-led 
governments, and 31 under Labour and Labour-led governments. 
 
As set out in table 7, there are only several notable differences between the subject 
matter of legislation passed by different National and National-led, or Labour and 
Labour-led, governments in New Zealand. Labour and Labour-led governments 
passed more legislation relating to the length of the parliamentary term, the 
qualifications for being a Member of Parliament and broadcasting. National and 
National-led governments passed more measures affecting administration, 
boundaries, franchise, referenda legislation and technical amendments. While 
National and Labour governments passed the same amount of electoral amendment 
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legislation, National and National-led governments oversaw the passage of more 
omnibus electoral acts. This is evident in the subject category figures, which are 69 to 
54. This number must be contextualised, however, by the fact National spent slightly 
longer in government than Labour during the 80 years in question: 38 years to 34 
years. 
 
An investigation of these figures must start with the Electoral Act 1927. While a non-
contentious, purely amalgamative Act, it was New Zealand’s first consolidated 
Electoral Act, and the starting point for our analysis. The Act was entirely a 
consolidating measure,49 which amalgamated the existing electoral law from the 
Legislature Act 1908 and several other acts. The impetus for its introduction came 
from the Electoral Department rather than the government. Mr McLeod, Minister for 
the Electoral Department, apologised to the House for troubling it with the measure.50 
The Labour Opposition concurred with the measure; its leader Henry Holland agreed 
consolidation was “very necessary”.51 No other Members rose to speak on the bill,52 
which three days later received its second and third readings with no further debate.53 
Nor did any debate arise in the Legislative Council; its leader, Sir Francis Bell, 
declared the bill “a matter affecting entirely the privileges of the House” to be passed 
without debate and sent back to the other chamber.54 
                                                     
49
 215 NZPD 590, 3 November 1927. 
50
 215 NZPD 590, 3 November 1927. 
51
 215 NZPD 590, 3 November 1927. 
52
 215 NZPD 435, 31 October 1927. 
53
 215 NZPD 592, 3 November 1927. 
54
 215 NZPD 721, 8 November 1927. 
  
 
 
 
Table 7 – Electoral Law Changes introduced by National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927 – 2007 by Subject55 
 
 
Category 
 
Admin. Bound. Broad. By-Election Constit. 
Election. 
& 
Finance 
Electoral 
System 
Franch. 
& Reg. Maori 
Method 
of 
Voting 
MP 
Qual. 
Number 
of MPs Ref. Tech. 
Term 
Length TOTAL 
National 14 7 1 2 2 7 1 10 8 4 5 1 3 4 0 69 
Labour 9 1 5 2 1 7 0 7 6 2 9 0 1 1 3 54 
TOTAL 23 8 6 4 3 14 1 17 14 6 14 1 4 5 3  
 
 
                                                     
55
 Note that, as many acts are categorised in multiple categories, the sum of category totals exceeds the total number of electoral amendment acts passed. 
The Electoral Act 1956 Act, which replaced the Electoral Act 1927, consolidated or 
substantially amended every piece of existing New Zealand electoral law. Until 1993, 
it served as the primary legislation amended by all amendment acts passed by 
subsequent governments. While its scope was extensive, the process by which it was 
passed and conventions it created were arguably more influential. Geoffrey Palmer 
has referred to 1956 as “an epoch-making time in the electoral law of this country”.56 
Indeed, the example of the Electoral Act 1956, although now replaced, retains 
significant influence in constitutional debate in the present day.57 The Act was the 
first comprehensive revision of the electoral law ever made in New Zealand.58 The 
Department of Justice spent over half a year developing the bill, whose stated objects 
were “removal of the many uncertainties that arise in determining the law within the 
main Act of 1927 and its numerous confusing amendments; improving and 
simplifying procedures, while preserving proper safeguards; and providing better 
enrolment and voting facilities.” 59 
 
There is a question as to why the Act came about. One interpretation is that the 
Electoral Act 1956 was a response to partisan electoral amendments made by the 
Forbes administration in 1934 and the Fraser Government in 1946, discussed in 
chapters four and five. A.C. Brassington argues that “appreciation of these events had 
brought our legislators to the point of defining the arena in which the political parties 
were in future to deploy their forces.”60 This latter point may have been a result of the 
Act, yet it was probably only one motivation behind the Bill’s introduction. Keith 
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Jackson states that the primary motivation behind the Act was National Prime 
Minister Sidney Holland’s attempt to appease his critics within the National Party 
over the abolition of the second chamber.61 Five years after the abolition of the 
Legislative Council, Holland, whose dislike of the upper house was the major reason 
behind its abolition, found himself under pressure to institute a new senate. Holland 
had promised at the 1955 National Party Conference to undertake legislation to 
“safeguard the existing rights of the people to elect the Government of their choice”.62 
The electoral legislation was a way of averting a course of action Holland did not 
want to take: restoration of the upper house. It is paradoxical, perhaps, that the Act 
that set the non-partisan tone of electoral law debate for the next two decades was 
introduced as a somewhat self-interested action by a Prime Minister under pressure 
from sectors within his own party.  
 
The major innovation of the Electoral Act 1956, and the feature that allowed Holland 
to claim the Act stood as a constitutional safeguard (akin, he argued, to that provided 
by an upper house), was the introduction of entrenchment, discussed in chapter two. 
While the passage of the entrenched provisions was the result of a unanimous 
Parliament agreeing on a “fair and impartial method of protecting the electoral 
system”,63 their inception was primarily the work of John Marshall, then Minister of 
Justice.64 Marshall believed the provisions represented “a major advance in the 
progress of democratic Government in New Zealand” and a “genuine... successful 
attempt to place the structure of the law above and beyond the influence of 
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Government and Party.” 65 Likewise, Labour leader Walter Nash saw entrenchment as 
ensuring “democratic principles would prevail in the determination of who should 
write the laws.” 66 
 
Two points are important to note on the subject of the 1956 entrenched provisions. 
First, they were not the only important provisions present in the Bill. Other 
provisions, while not similarly entrenched, were arguably of equal constitutional 
importance.67 The clauses relating to the Maori seats, for example, were left 
unentrenched and thus alterable by any majority government. Alan Robinson notes a 
second ballot or preferential voting system could be introduced by a simple majority 
of the House, as the sections of the Electoral Act relating to the voting system were 
not entrenched.68 As Scott points out, however, “[t]he entrenched sections... cover 
amongst other things the only constitutional subjects on which there has been bitter 
party controversy during this century.”69 Ultimately, six sections were entrenched. As 
discussed in chapter two, the entrenchment clause was not entrenched itself. So the 
entrenched provisions were – theoretically, at least – able to be amended by a 
government that repealed the entrenchment clause first. The entrenchment clauses, 
however, were as much about creating a conventional duty as they did a statutory 
duty. The language of those who wrote or spoke about the Act at the time centred on 
the word ‘moral’. Marshall said the effect of the entrenched provisions is not their 
“legal force to bind future Parliaments but... their moral force as representing the 
unanimous view of Parliament”.70 This view is echoed by Scott:71 
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Though the entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act have no superior legal 
sanctity of an effective nature, they have a superior moral sanctity. The Act was 
passed unanimously, and registers an agreement between the parties that neither 
party will employ a bare majority to amend or repeal any of the entrenched 
provisions in defiance of the ostensible intention of section 189. 
 
 
So future governments had a ‘moral’ duty to adhere to the consensus reached between 
National and Labour in 1956. Parliament may not have been, in the strictest sense, 
binding its successors, but it was imposing a series of expectations on their future 
behaviour. 
 
The process by which the Electoral Act was passed was unlike the partisan processes 
of the previous two decades. Indeed, at the time it was passed, the Electoral Act 1956 
was unique. Not only did government and opposition engage to produce New 
Zealand’s first totally bi-partisan piece of major electoral legislation, but much of this 
engagement occurred not in the House, but at the Electoral Bill Select Committee, 
instituted especially for the task. This committee consisted of ten Members, six from 
government and four from opposition – the usual distribution of members under First 
Past the Post, the system by which Members of Parliament were elected until 1996.72 
The Committee met six times in nine days before reporting back to the House. Both 
parties found the other willing to compromise and shared a primary aim of reaching 
consensus.73 The Committee reached what Marshall described as “almost complete 
unanimity on the Bill and on the amendments made in the committee.”74 Scott, who 
in the course of writing his 1962 work on the New Zealand constitution, had access to 
a number of people who had served on the 1956 Committee, outlines the precise 
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detail of how consensus was reached.75 Four provisions in the Bill were in dispute 
between the government and opposition. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all four provisions 
related to boundaries and the Representation Commission – matters that had been 
modified extensively and controversially in the 1945 Electoral Amendment Act, 
discussed in detail in chapter five. Ultimately, two provisions were settled in line with 
the National Party’s position and two in favour of the Labour Party’s position.76 
 
Labour raised concerns about the composition of the Representation Commission. 
Labour Member Arnold Nordmeyer said National’s most recent appointments to the 
Commission were “very much to the advantage of the present Government” and 
allowed “the commission to make a very big difference in the size of electorates”.77 
Nash wanted “the power to be taken away from any Government to determine 
electoral boundaries... If the boundaries could be fixed by an independent 
commission it might be more helpful.”78 The situation as it stood, however, only 
existed due to the changes introduced by the previous Labour Government in the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1945. As Atkinson argues, “the decisions of the National-
appointed Commission in 1952, which the opposition alleged had prejudiced the 1954 
election in the Government’s favour, had now convinced Labour of the evils of its 
own partisan model.”79 
 
The alteration by the 1956 Act of the Representation Commission was substantial. 
The government-appointed majority was removed and an impartial board put in 
place. This consisted of the Surveyor-General, Government Statistician, Chief 
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Electoral Officer, and the Director-General of the Post and Telegraph Department. 
One government and one opposition representative were appointed and the chair 
nominated by the Commission itself. The Labour Party’s advocacy of a reformed, 
impartial, Representation Commission was the reverse position to that taken by the 
previous Labour Government and a tacit acknowledgement that the politicisation of 
the Commission in 1945 had been an error. The tolerance by which electorates may 
vary from the electoral quota was also reduced from 7.5 percent to 5 per cent. 80 
National got its wish for electoral boundaries to remain based on total population 
basis (the change made in the Electoral Amendment Act 1950) instead of total adult 
population (the change made in the Electoral Amendment Act 1945) and for the 
Representation Commission’s terms of reference to remain unmodified.81  
 
While these major issues were resolved, some others were not fully agreed upon and, 
instead, set to one side. The issue of the voting age was left unresolved. Nash was 
uncertain if 21 was the age when “democracy commences” but nonetheless supported 
entrenchment of the voting age at 21.82 Marshall said in the House that Opposition 
members wanted to be able to canvass outside voting booths, but this was nonetheless 
banned by the Act.83 On other issues (including some that would, in later years, 
become areas of disagreement), both parties were agreed. On the franchise, for 
example, Nash supported the government’s provisions on restricting the vote to 
British subjects.84 With nearly all disagreements resolved in the Select Committee, 
most debate in the House concerned minor points or technicalities. For example, 
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would offering a cup of tea count as ‘treating’?85 Or would a seaman who had resided 
in an electorate for the required three months but spent part of that period at sea still 
qualify?86 
 
Overall, both government and opposition saw the passage of the Act as a resounding 
success. Nash did not think “the attempt to put forward the best possible Bill could 
have been improved... The objective on both sides was the same.”87 National Member 
of Parliament Ralph Hanan hailed “a splendid Bill, almost a historic piece of 
legislation in which two political parties have got together to make a major change 
that will help to preserve the constitutional rights of the individual to exercise his vote 
and preserve his sacred right of the secrecy of the ballot”.88 It was, overall, the 
consensual spirit in which the government and opposition operated that made the 
Electoral Act 1956 such a success, entrenching both the Act’s statutory provisions 
into law, and the process by which the Act was passed as a burgeoning political 
convention. Ralph Hanan asserted during the debate that “the only possible way to 
satisfactorily make a major change in the electoral laws is where you have an element 
of agreement between the political parties”.89 It was agreed by both sides that the 
1956 Act was a satisfactory change. Ultimately, it was Marshall who described most 
succinctly the convention created by the 1956 Act – a convention that would dictate 
the process by which electoral amendment would occur over the following two 
decades, and a convention that, as evident from the comments of Wayne Mapp and 
Phil Goff noted in chapter one, still holds sway today:90 
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As a general rule, major decisions touching the institution or procedures of 
Parliament are not imposed by the majority party. They are usually bi-partisan 
decisions reached after much discussion and often by way of compromise.  
 
 
It is evident in the following chapters that the Electoral Act 1956, which followed two 
decades of partisan amendment to the electoral law, set a non-partisan tone for the 
following two decades. Before considering any other electoral amendments in detail, 
however, it is useful to examine the first Act to depart from the convention of 
consensus that had been established and followed since 1956.  This Act was the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975, passed under the Labour Government led by Bill 
Rowling. The Act contained a range of amendments to various provisions of the 
Electoral Act. While it is not the aim of this thesis to write a full history of the Act, a 
number of its amendments were notable for either their influence or the controversy 
they caused. These changes included the extension to permanent residents of the right 
to vote, allowing Maori to choose between the Maori roll and the General roll, and 
removing the disqualification provisions that prevented prisoners from voting. The 
Act changed the residential requirement of the Electoral Act from three months to one 
month and allowed any eligible person to vote on Election Day whether or not he or 
she was enrolled as an elector. As it was accepted by both sides that Labour was 
advantaged by a shorter period, and National by a longer period, and that Labour was 
advantaged by late or no registration, and National the opposite, accusations of self-
interest flew from opposition to government for supporting the change and from 
government to opposition for opposing it.91 Interestingly, the National Opposition did 
not make a great deal of comment on clause 17 of the Electoral Amendment Act 
1975, which removed the requirement of being a British subject to vote. Any 
discussion of this substantial amendment to the electoral law was overtaken by the 
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shrill debate that ensued on the matters of disagreement. The extension of the 
franchise to prisoners roused the most debate and attempts to mobilise public opinion 
against the government. 92 
 
Despite the government’s subsequent defeat on several key provisions, the process 
through which the Bill was developed and introduced started in a relatively 
consensual and consultative manner. The House instituted an Electoral Act Select 
Committee in November 1973 to consider what amendments were necessary to the 
Electoral Act.93 While the government held a majority on the Committee (as, indeed, 
was the norm), the institution of a select committee before an electoral amendment 
bill was even drafted was an innovation and perhaps boded well for a bi-partisan 
legislative process. In addition, there was a concerted effort to involve the public in 
the Committee’s deliberations. Advertisements were inserted on two occasions in the 
daily newspapers inviting those interested to make submissions. Thirty-four 
submissions were made and most of those making submissions were asked to appear 
before the Committee. Eighteen of the organisations or individuals did so. 94 The 
Committee met on 12 occasions between 1973 and 1975 and issued several interim 
reports. Its interim report to the House on 17 September 1974 unanimously 
recommended the voting age be lowered to 18,95 and this recommendation was 
carried out in the Electoral Amendment Act 1974, discussed in chapter four. 
Altogether, out of 55 recommendations for the 1975 Act, the Committee unanimously 
recommended 45 and ten were recommended by the government’s majority on the 
Committee.96 Several clauses in the Bill, however, attempted to amend or repeal 
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entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act 1956. Ultimately, however, not all of these 
provisions passed. Some did not attain the required 75% support of the House and 
were removed from the Bill during the Committee of the Whole House stage. This is 
the first example of the defeat of parts of a government bill through the entrenchment 
clause of the Electoral Act 1956.97  As the government realised, and Minister of 
Justice Martyn Finlay said in the House:98 
 
When the committee was set up it was hoped by this party, and I suspect by the 
Opposition, that the recommendations produced would be agreed to by both 
parties. Unfortunately this did not eventuate... some, and many of the most 
important, recommendations were made by a majority only of the members of 
the committee. Normally this does not matter, because in the House the majority 
rules; but in the Electoral Act six matters are reserved and may be changed only 
by 75 percent of the membership of the House...  
 
 
It was at this stage in the process that the government took a different path from that 
taken by the then National Government in 1966, when that government realised 
Opposition support for a change to an entrenched clause would not be forthcoming.99 
Then, the Holyoake Government had withdrawn its bill. The Rowling Government, 
however, decided to continue with the bill as drafted and not remove the proposed 
amendments to the entrenched provisions that the Opposition did not support.  
 
During the debate, Marshall said he hoped the clauses could still be discussed and 
that some compromise could be reached.100 However, another National MP (and later 
Prime Minister) Robert Muldoon said in the same debate that the Opposition would 
oppose the provisions on which the Committee divided. Those that were entrenched 
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would simply fail.101 Nonetheless, the Opposition offered full support to the 
remaining 45 clauses, and Muldoon assured the government that the Bill would be 
passed “to some extent at least.” 102 
 
It was not long, however, until a level of acrimony arose in the debate on the 
contested clauses, and this acrimony spilled over into the debate as a whole. The 
Electoral Amendment Bill was characterised by the Opposition as “a Labour Party 
Bill”,103 and “gerrymandering of the worst order”.104 It was argued that “the 
Government [was] insisting on trying to amend the Electoral Act so that it will 
electorally favour the Labour Party, and for no other reason.”105 Labour MP Jonathan 
Hunt, who had chaired the Electoral Law Select Committee, countered that there 
“will be no overall advantage to either side. I challenge anyone to produce any figure 
which would prove that, throughout New Zealand, there will be any advantage to 
either side.”106 But the government was especially vulnerable to accusations of self-
interest in its changes to the election law because 1975 was an election year. It seems 
the government was conscious of this problem. On introducing the bill, Dr Finlay 
(Minister of Justice) was “most concerned to see that [the bill] is introduced into the 
House this week, before Parliament goes into recess... I think it is important that we 
should let the people know the intentions of the Government as long as possible 
before the election this year.”107 
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For the opposition, the fact it was an election year allowed it to promise to maximum 
political advantage that, if elected, it would change the law. On a number of 
occasions during the debate, Muldoon promised the contested changes would be 
repealed and replaced by the existing provisions in the event of a National victory at 
the 1975 election.108 After an extensive committee stage in which the Opposition 
attempted to obstruct passage of the bill through numerous amendments, the House 
divided 42-28, along party lines, on the Bill’s third reading. The proposed changes to 
the entrenched provisions were defeated in the committee stages and removed from 
the final bill. The vote saw the end of the most contentious debate on electoral law in 
decades. The Electoral Amendment Act 1975 and, indeed, the new National 
government’s subsequent repeal of much of the Act, marked the end of two decades 
of consensus on the amendment of the electoral law. 
 
Ultimately, the entrenched provisions, which were not doubly entrenched themselves, 
worked (as intended) to prevent a disunited Parliament from amending certain 
provisions. While Marshall, the architect of the provisions, expressed relief they had 
not been trampled upon by the government,109 there was never any question of this 
happening.  By 1975, the entrenched provisions were firmly ensconced as an 
influential part of New Zealand’s constitution. In terms of process and consensus, 
John Marshall believed 1975 had lacked “the spirit of compromise” that had existed 
in 1956:110 
 
As a result of the changes introduced by the Government in this Bill the stability 
of our electoral law is likely to go by the board in several important respects. 
This could mean... that whichever party becomes the Government there are likely 
to be some changes in that electoral law. So we will now have the unsatisfactory 
                                                     
108
 397 NZPD 1072, 2 May 1975. 
109
 397 NZPD 1072, 2 May 1975. 
110
 298 NZPD 2097, 12 June 1975. 
  
 
47 
situation where the electoral law means one thing when one Government is in 
office and another thing... when another Government is in office. 
 
 
Marshall’s contention was at least partially accurate. Whether it was the fault of an 
unmovable government, an unmovable opposition, or some combination of the two, 
the “spirit” of 1956 had not been present in the debate of 1975.  
 
It remains to mention the Electoral Act 1993. The Act was a complete rewrite of the 
Electoral Act 1956, written to incorporate the MMP system. It was passed but only 
came into effect when the public voted for MMP in the 1993 Referendum, provided 
for in the 1993 Electoral Referendum Act. The Bill also included provisions for a 
Senate, which could be introduced if the public voted to retain FPP. These provisions 
were split into a separate bill before the Act was passed and ultimately lapsed. On this 
occasion, the Electoral Law Committee engaged in one of the most extensive 
consultation processes undertaken by a parliamentary Select Committee. The 
Committee considered the bill for six months and considered 430 written and 167 oral 
submissions in six different centres.111 Committee chair, National MP Murray 
McCully, summarised the process of consensus and compromise that had occurred on 
the Committee:112 
 
The proposal that I report back to the House today does not represent the ideal 
model of any individual member of the committee. There are respects in which 
each of us would prefer something different. However, members of the 
committee decided that they had a duty to the House, and, indeed, to the country, 
to forge a consensus that would enable us to fashion a workable and consistent 
model of an MMP system, acceptable in all its key components to the majority. 
In that respect the Bill has seen quite an unprecedented level of consultation by 
select committee members with their parliamentary colleagues. 
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There was some dissent over whether the compromise in the Committee had in fact 
been excessive, and that the committee had not produced the best possible form of 
MMP.113 In the second reading debate the government announced it would not seek 
closure motions in the second reading, committee stages, or the third reading, in order 
to allow the topic to be exhaustively debated. The House divided a number of times 
during the Committee stage on whether individual clauses stand part and whether 
amendments to clauses be accepted. This was the first truly bi-partisan, non-party, set 
of voting in Parliament on an electoral matter in NZ’s history. Labour and National 
MPs mixed in the Ayes and Noes lobbies according to their consciences. At the end 
of the committee stages, the electoral reform bill was divided into the Electoral Bill 
1993 and the Electoral Referendum Bill (No 2) 1993 and both were passed without 
the taking of a division. At the time of the third reading, Parliament had spent an 
unprecedented 30 1/2 hours debating the issue in the House.114 
 
The acts of 1956, 1975 and 1993, while all broadly different in scope, subject matter 
and motivation, can be viewed as milestones in New Zealand’s electoral law in the 
period studied. After the Electoral Act 1927 set up the unified Act; the 1956 Act 
instituted the entrenched provisions and a preferred process for amendment of the 
electoral law more generally; the 1975 Act tested the entrenchment process and broke 
the mould of consensus in amendment of other areas of the law; and the 1993 Act 
saw Members of Parliament from all parties voting on conscience, rather than party 
lines, on electoral system change – the most significant of all areas of electoral law 
reform. Together, the acts form a useful structure for analysis. Chapters four to six 
now proceed to fill in the gaps. 
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Chapter Four 
Parliament and Electoral Rules  
 
This chapter and the two that follow it cover the various parts of the electoral law 
amended by Parliament between 1927 and 2007. This chapter examines the law 
relating to Parliament and the formation of a government. Specifically, it considers 
the length of the parliamentary term, number of Members of Parliament in the House, 
the qualifications to be a Member of Parliament, formation of government and 
legislative proposals for alternative electoral systems. 
 
It is appropriate, perhaps, to start with one of the most controversial changes to the 
electoral law: the Electoral Amendment Act 1934. 
 
Term Length 
The length of the parliamentary term rarely arose throughout the 80 years studied. On 
the two occasions a proposal for a longer term went to a referendum it was rejected 
soundly by the public. The general unpopularity of the idea led to discussion of the 
term only coming up on a sporadic basis over the years. 
 
Term length, however, is the area of the electoral law that saw perhaps the most self-
serving move of a government in the history of New Zealand’s electoral law when, in 
1932, the Forbes Coalition Government inserted into a Finance Act a clause that 
extended the life of the current Parliament from three to four years. In 1934, the 
Labour Party opposition sought to undo the relevant clauses of the Finance Act 1932 
and bring the current Parliament to an end at the end of the three years for which it 
had been elected. The Private Member’s Bill introduced by Labour Leader Michael 
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Joseph Savage was ruled out of order as involving an appropriation.115 Later that year 
the Coalition Government, led by George Forbes, successfully introduced an act that 
applied the four year extension of the current parliamentary term to all future 
parliamentary terms. The opposition to the bill, eventually passed by a simple 
majority, was notable in that it employed a number of arguments which would 
become common arguments used by oppositions opposed to particular electoral 
legislation over the next eighty years. 
 
The first of these arguments was an assertion that the government was acting out of 
self-interested motives. While Forbes’ response to accusations of self-interest was 
that “[t]he question of the unpopularity of a Government does not enter the 
matter”,116 Labour members claimed the government’s actions stemmed from “the 
danger that if there was a general election this year the Opposition might win”, 117 and 
that the real reason for the government’s action is that “it has grave reasons to fear the 
result of facing the people”.118 The Government had, however, already prolonged its 
own term in the Finance Act 1932. A future Labour Government had as much to gain 
from the Electoral Amendment Bill 1934 as did the incumbent government. Against 
this, however, was the lack of public support for a four-year term in the first place. As 
Labour Member Bob Semple said, the 1934 Act was “an action which the people will 
resent with the bitterest antagonism”.119 In this sense, the government was taking a 
risk from which, by 1934, it stood only to lose. 
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While the extension of the current term of Parliament through the Finance Act 1932 
was arguably self-interested, ascertaining the true motive of the Coalition government 
in passing the Electoral Amendment Act 1934 is a difficult task. Mr Stallworthy, a 
Labour MP, claimed the bill was to “cover up, in some degree at least, its sordid 
purpose in extending its own life and the life of this Parliament only.”120 Indeed, Mr 
Kyle, later National MP for Riccarton, later publicly regretted his former party’s 
decision to lengthen the term:121  
 
Sometimes I almost wish, for the Labour party’s sake, that we had not made that 
Parliament a four-year Parliament. The Labour party then would not have come in 
at such a flourishing time, when the whole of the trade and commerce had been 
practically restored to beyond what it was before the early slump.  
 
 
The second argument made by the Opposition against the bill also received multiple 
airings in the decades after 1934. This was that the government had no mandate from 
the public to make such a significant change to the electoral law. This was an 
argument that, for the first time, recognised the special nature of the electoral law, by 
emphasising the role of public consent in its amendment. In light of the lack of public 
consultation or notification, Labour Members called the bill “a breach of faith”,122 
and “a flagrant breach of the constitutional British practice.”123 There was 
recognition, then, that the electoral law was law that perhaps required special 
treatment. On this count, two criticisms by Labour Members are of particular interest. 
The Labour Leader, Michael Joseph Savage, said “[t]he correct procedure would be 
to introduce the Bill after having consulted the people. This appears to be acting first 
and asking authority afterwards, surely not the correct procedure at all.”124 Bob 
Semple, another Labour Member, said “this Parliament has no constitutional nor 
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moral right to interfere with the law which has governed this country for many, many 
years. It certainly has a right, a duty, to consult the people on the question.”125 So the 
position of the Opposition was that, while there was no doubting the government’s 
discretion to introduce such legislation, in matters of electoral law, a mere right did 
not necessarily constitute the correct way to go about legislating. Indeed, the 
government had a moral obligation to seek public consent. Here can be seen in its 
infant stages what would, in the 1950s, emerge in the entrenched provisions of the 
Electoral Act 1956. 
 
The final feature of the debate over the Electoral Amendment Bill 1934 would also, 
over the following years, become a common aspect of electoral law debate. This was 
the threat by the Opposition, during debate, to repeal the legislation when it next 
formed a government. On this count, Savage said:126 
  
It does seem to me to be a remarkable move on the part of the Government, 
because if it is not here next time – and I sincerely hope it will not be – the next 
Government can repeal the law at once, so there does not seem to be any reason at 
all for the Bill being here.  
 
 
This was an interesting comment which somehow avoided the more intriguing issue. 
Although a four year term would have benefited an incoming Labour Government, it 
nonetheless pledged to repeal the Act in the event of such a victory. The same 
approach was taken by the National Opposition in 2007 when it opposed the Electoral 
Finance Act. In spite of the substantial advantages the Act conferred on an incumbent 
government, the National Government, once in power, repealed the Act. There is an 
argument to be made, however, that oppositions that promise repeal are then 
politically bound to carry through on those promises. In both 1934 and 2007, both 
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opposition parties had already played an adversarial and partisan role, and made 
political capital out of unpopular moves by the government of the time. Once in 
power, they then had to follow their pre-election pledges. The 1934 Bill was 
ultimately passed by a simple majority along party lines,127 with the Opposition 
forcing divisions on most clauses.128 Despite the furore over the bill in the House, not 
one objection was raised against the Bill in the Legislative Council. It passed all its 
stages with a minimum of debate and no divisions. The only part of the debate of 
special note is an extraordinary closing statement from Mr Masters, the Leader of the 
wholly appointed Council, who said “I think that generally this provision will be 
welcomed by the people of the Dominion. We all know that general elections have an 
unsettling and disturbing influence upon the whole community.”129 When the Savage 
Government did repeal the law in 1937, the Opposition raised several points of 
contention but did not vote against the bill. Again, the Legislative Council proved 
itself merely an adjunct to the legislative process: it considered the Bill for around ten 
minutes on December 2, 1937 with no debate and passed it through all three 
readings.130 From 1937, the issue of the parliamentary term did not receive a great 
deal of debate in the House although, in 1941 and 1942, a House united by wartime 
passed two acts, each of which delayed the holding of the General Election by a year.  
 
Two acts legislated for referenda on the issue of the parliamentary term. The Electoral 
Poll Act was passed by the Holyoake Government in 1967 and the Term Poll Act by 
the Palmer Government in 1990. In one sense, these acts stand somewhat apart from 
other electoral legislation because they did not amend the electoral law themselves. 
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The 1967 Act, however, provides the first instance of a government proposing the 
amendment of an entrenched provision (the parliamentary term) by taking the issue to 
the public, where a 50% majority was sufficient rather than the 75 percent 
parliamentary majority required for a similar amendment. The referral of the length of 
the parliamentary term to the public directly, however, perhaps underscored the 
constitutional importance of the matter. As it happened, the proposal was defeated by 
a sizeable majority – 678,960 to 317,973.131 The 1967 Act is interesting for its 
process rather than its result. It provides an example of consensus politics around an 
electoral issue at work. While the bill did not directly affect the electoral law – and, 
indeed, this may be a primary reason behind the bipartisan way in which it was 
debated – it appears the government did attempt, at least, to make the process a 
consensual and open one. After referring the bill to the Statutes Revision 
Committee,132 the government acceded to the opposition’s suggestion for a 
publication to be prepared setting out the principal arguments both for and against the 
issue.133 Holyoake proposed that, to avoid a “suspect” statement from one political 
party, Parliament should issue a pamphlet.134 Most importantly, he said the 
government would consider the matter “in a bi-partisan way”.135 This was the first 
time the word bi-partisan was mentioned in a debate about the electoral law in New 
Zealand. The next proposal for a referendum on term length took place two decades 
later in 1990, when the Term Poll Act 1990 was passed as part of a broader Electoral 
Reform Bill introduced by the Labour Government, at that stage led by Geoffrey 
Palmer. This allowed for a referendum to extend the parliamentary term from three to 
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four years. The bill garnered no opposition from the Opposition and the proposal was 
defeated solidly at the referendum. 
 
While the topic of term length was at its most controversial during the 1930s, 
conversely, the issue of how many MPs should be in Parliament grew in its 
controversy over the eighty years studied. 
 
Number of MPs 
The issue of how many Members of Parliament should sit in the House was 
considered by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in 1986. Before the 
introduction of MMP, however, the most controversial change in this area occurred in 
1965. 
 
The Electoral Amendment Act 1965 gave effect to the National Government’s 
election promise to fix the parliamentary representation for the South Island at 25 
seats and establish a quota for the North Island seats according to population growth. 
Maori representation was left untouched.136 When passed, the Act increased the 
number of members of Parliament for the first time since it was settled at 80 in 
1900.137 The Bill had been signalled in the National Party’s 1963 election manifesto, 
and the ensuing debate was long, technical and occasionally furious. By the time the 
bill received its third reading, it had received five times as much debate as the 
Electoral Act 1956. Part of the reason behind the debate’s length was that the Bill was 
the first electoral bill to amend an entrenched provision of the Electoral Act, and so 
required the consent of three-quarters of the House. While the Labour Party 
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eventually supported the bill, it exercised the political weight conferred on an 
Opposition by the entrenched provisions to the fullest extent. 
 
The split between government and opposition occurred wholly around the question of 
whether the number of South Island seats should be raised to 25 or to 26. National 
had pledged 25 in its manifesto and Labour 26 in its manifesto. The parties were 
broadly in agreement that an increase in the number of MPs was called for, in order to 
provide a further range of “talent” available for Cabinet (an argument also put 
forward by proponents of the restoration of the second chamber) and to reduce the 
select committee workload of MPs. In line with the ‘spirit’ of 1956, Holyoake was of 
the view that “no changes [to the electoral law] should be made without the 
permission of and a mandate from the people.”138 As the change had been signalled in 
the National manifesto, Holyoake claimed the government had a mandate to make his 
changes. 
 
There was no real argument from the opposition on this point. Indeed, one of the 
major criticisms of the 1934 and 1945 Electoral Amendment acts was that the 
government did not have a mandate to make the changes. Yet in 1965 there was an 
added complication: several of the amendments proposed by the government affected 
entrenched provisions and, thus, required the support of the Labour Party in order to 
pass.139 Marshall claimed “because the Government has a mandate for an amendment 
increasing the South Island seats to 25, there is, I would say, a moral obligation on the 
                                                     
138
 343 NZPD 1661, 4 August 1965. 
139
 The passage of the Electoral Amendment Bill 1965 was further complicated by Holyoake’s 
interpretation of the 1956 Electoral Act clause requiring the support of 75% of members of the House. 
Holyoake said he wanted “60 out of 80 members”, meaning a House with a less than full attendance, 
voting on the bill, could make the job harder. 
  
 
57 
House to carry out that mandate.”140 In other words, the government’s position was 
that a mandate from the public overrode the moral obligation of a government to 
reach consensus with an opposition. It was the government’s extension of its 
‘mandate’ argument that roused an opposition generally supportive of the changes 
into opposition mode.  
 
In a sense, the government’s argument rested on an assumption that a government 
elected on a manifesto including a change to the entrenched provisions was equal in 
‘moral’ power to a simple majority gained in a referendum on the electoral laws – the 
other statutory way in which an entrenched provision could be changed. Opposition 
members rejected this logic, with many claiming the government had no mandate to 
change the law.141 Rather, the government had a “moral obligation” to “iron out 
differences.”142 Like the Electoral Act 1956, and unlike most electoral legislation 
passed before 1965, the 1965 bill was sent to a select committee. The bill’s referral to 
the Statutes Revision Committee was most likely governed by the government’s need 
to gain opposition support in order to amend an entrenched provision. It was after the 
Committee reported back to the House that friction between the two parties became 
apparent. Indeed, in the Statutes Revision Committee, no suggestion was made or 
amendments moved by Labour members that the number of seats should be 26 
instead of 25.143 In fact, the committee unanimously voted to send the bill back to the 
House without change.144  
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Nonetheless, despite the report of the Select Committee, and primarily in response to 
what Labour members viewed as arrogance from the government, the opposition 
adopted the line that consultation on the Bill had not been sufficient.145 As the bill 
progressed through its readings, Labour’s initial tacit support turned into deliberate 
obstruction. Numerous Opposition amendments were moved during the Committee 
stages to increase the number of seats to 26,146 and to amend the Bill to increase 
Maori representation to five seats.147 The aim was to draw out the debate and slow 
down progress. Most of all, however, it was to make a point. Labour’s aim was 
obstruction and protest at process rather than opposition to the bill itself. The fact that 
the government needed the opposition’s votes to pass the legislation placed the 
opposition in a powerful position. The opposition was the result of tactics rather than 
an ideological divide.  
 
The government’s response was to attempt to call Labour’s bluff; government 
members made repeated reference to the response of the electorate if Labour defeated 
the amendment.148 The bill was eventually read a third time under urgency and passed 
without a division being taken.149 While it did not vote against the bill, the opposition 
kept up its fight to the end.  The Third Reading debate became so heated that 
Marshall forced a return to a committee stage so the Prime Minister could respond to 
what Hanan called a “cheap political stunt... intended to destroy the character and 
integrity of the Prime Minister.”150 Labour MP (soon to be Labour leader) Norman 
Kirk’s response was to again move an amendment to change 25 to 26.151 Overall, the 
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debate ended up focussing more on what the bill did not include (26 seats and 
increased South Island representation) than anything else.  
 
After 1965, the issue of a reduction in seats arose only once in prospective legislation. 
The Electoral (Reduction in Number of Members of Parliament) Amendment Bill 
2006, a Private Member’s Bill from New Zealand First MP Barbara Stewart, 
proposed reducing the number of MPs from 120 to 100. It was referred to the Justice 
& Electoral Committee, although Labour (in government) voted against this 
happening. On report back from Select Committee, however, only ACT and New 
Zealand First supported the Bill. It was defeated. 
 
MP Qualification 
While the issues of term length and the number of MPs arose in a legislative context 
only on several occasions between 1927 and 2007, more frequent during the period 
were amendments to the laws that govern the requirements for a person to be eligible 
to serve as a Member of Parliament. Amendments to this area of the law have been 
made across the last eighty years. The Savage Government’s Electoral Amendment 
Act 1937 included a provision that raised the deposit to stand as a candidate to £10. 
Both parties agreed on the measure, as, under FPP, vote splitting by minor candidates 
could affect the entire outcome of an election. National’s Adam Hamilton wondered 
if £10 was high enough and whether a higher deposit would discourage people 
standing “merely for the sake of experience or for advertising themselves.” 152 In 
1940, both parties combined to pass the Electoral Amendment Act 1940, which 
preserved the rights of MPs and Legislative Councillors serving in World War II to 
retain their seats in the respective chambers. 
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Under the MMP system, several bills, including one successfully passed into law, 
sought to tie individual Members of Parliament to the party on whose list they were 
elected. The earliest example of this was the Electoral (Party Registration) Bill 1997, 
an ultimately unsuccessful private member’s bill in the name of Michael Cullen 
which sought to prevent ‘party-hopping’. It was referred to the Electoral Law 
Committee but the government on the committee ensured a recommendation that the 
bill not proceed. All parties in the House voted against the bill, with the exception of 
Labour and the Alliance. Four years later, however, largely the same bill was enacted 
into legislation as the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001. This Bill, 
introduced by Michael Cullen, attempted to prevent Members of Parliament from 
changing party while in the House. The House was split with Labour, Alliance and 
New Zealand First in support and National, ACT and the Greens opposed. The Select 
Committee was split evenly. The Bill passed over a year after it was introduced. It 
included a sunset clause (meaning the subsequent act would eventually expire) and 
ultimately expired. In 2005, as part of the Labour-led government’s confidence and 
supply agreement with New Zealand First, the government introduced another 
attempt at a ‘party-hopping prevention’ law. It became clear that the government 
would not be able to pass the legislation due to the tight margins it was operating 
under, and the Bill lapsed after its referral to select committee. 
 
One controversial aspect of the law dealing with the qualification for being an MP is 
the amount of retrospective legislation passed in this area. Between 1958 and 1963, 
several minor electoral amendment acts were passed exempting various Members of 
Parliament from disqualification under the Electoral Act 1956. Most related to a 
clause in the Electoral Act that automatically disqualified an MP who accepted fees 
from a government board in excess of £200. The first of these exemptions occurred in 
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1958, when the Nash Government appended a clause to the Finance Act 1958, 
retrospectively saving William Fox MP from disqualification in respect of “any 
remuneration payable to him as a member of the Workers’ Compensation Board in 
respect of any period before the first day of October 1958”.153 Fox, who was serving 
on the Board before the law was changed in 1956, consulted the previous National 
Attorney-General about the situation and was told everything was in order. When it 
emerged that the disqualification provisions did, in fact, apply to him, Nash consulted 
Keith Holyoake, then Leader of the Opposition, and inserted a clause in the Finance 
Bill to “put that matter right”.154 Nash’s consultation with the opposition before 
introducing the clause, combined with the circumstances of the law changing around 
Fox, rather than Fox directly contravening it, effectively removed the issue from 
partisan debate. 
 
Later that year, Parliament passed the Electoral Amendment Act 1958 in an attempt 
to tidy up the ambiguity regarding MPs’ earnings from outside politics. Introduced as 
part of a Statutes Amendment Bill, it made three small technical amendments to the 
definition of the term ‘contractor’ in the Electoral Act 1956. The Act set out a clear 
£200 limit for honoraria received for service on boards or in organisations.155 No 
debate arose on the measure which was passed alongside a number of other technical 
amendment acts. Despite the passage of the Electoral Amendment Act 1958, in 1960 
the Nash Government included another clause in a Finance Bill that saved an MP 
from disqualification. Reginald Keeling MP had received funds from public money 
for attending an International Labour Organisation conference in Geneva and had 
unwittingly breached the Electoral Act. No major objection was raised by the 
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opposition but questions were raised by several National Members.156 Finance 
Minister Arnold Nordmeyer defended the government, saying that “[i]t is, of course, 
no new thing for the House to be called upon to validate payments of this kind made 
by the Crown to members of Parliament who are required by Government to 
undertake certain responsibilities.”157 This was true: in 1958 the government had 
validated the payments made to William Fox. Yet that situation had been the result of 
the Electoral Act 1956 being passed during the MP’s service on the board. Further, 
the Electoral Amendment Act 1958 had been intended to clarify the situation. In any 
case, no real objection was raised by the Opposition; the situation had been caused by 
an MP ignorant of the rules surrounding his qualification to sit in the House. 
 
In 1961, the newly-elected National Government passed legislation to prevent a 
National MP from being disqualified in similar circumstances to Fox and Keeling. 
The government included in a Finance Act a similar provision to Labour’s 1958 and 
1960 Finance Act exceptions. The clause allowed William Brown MP protection 
from disqualification under the Electoral Act 1956, for honorarium received from a 
number of boards he had failed to resign from before he was sworn into Parliament. 
This was the third exemption clause inserted into a Finance Act since 1958. No 
debate arose on the matter. It was not until 1963 that the government made a statutory 
amendment to resolve what had become a recurrent issue. The Electoral Amendment 
Act 1963 further amended the troublesome clause of the 1956 Electoral Act to give 
an MP, upon his election to Parliament (and before being sworn in), one month in 
which to disclaim the contract and any payment made after that disclamation.  The 
bill received no debate or objection from the opposition and was passed without any 
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division. The next and final time a similar issue arose during the period studied was 
in 2003, which saw the passage of the first piece of retrospective legislation to excuse 
an MP from disqualification since the Finance Act clauses passed by Labour and 
National governments in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Harry Duynhoven, a 
government Minister, had been automatically disqualified from Parliament after 
applying for Dutch citizenship. The government claimed the law was unclear and 
introduced retrospective legislation to exempt him from disqualification. Roger 
Sowry, a National Member, called the bill “a cynical manipulation of Parliament… to 
allow a member who has broken the law to get off that breaking of the law”.158 
National also accused the Speaker of deliberately delaying declaring Duynhoven’s 
seat vacant so that the bill might pass the House. Labour, the Greens, United Future 
and Progressives voted for the Bill. The Spaker, Jonathan Hunt, abstained. It passed 
all of its readings in one night. The following year, the Electoral Amendment Act 
2004, legislation only “reluctantly supported” by National, made a number of 
technical changes to the Electoral Act as well as clarifying the situation regarding 
dual citizenship that had seen Harry Duynhoven disqualified and saved the previous 
year. 
 
Election of MPs and the Post-Election Period 
It remains in this chapter to examine the legislation pertaining to the election of 
Members of Parliament and post-election processes. While the focus of this thesis 
does not include broader constitutional matters such as the 1950 abolition of the 
Legislative Council, as established in chapter two, the electoral law forms part of the 
New Zealand constitution. Generally, throughout the 80 years studied, Parliament 
was unwilling to interfere with the multitude of conventions that govern the post-
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election process in New Zealand. The first example in Hansard is an ultimately 
unsuccessful Electoral Amendment Bill introduced by Labour Member Jonathan 
Hunt in 1976. This bill proposed lengthening the parliamentary session by requiring it 
to sit no later than 90 days after the return of the writs following an election. The bill 
also attempted to even out the House’s sitting schedule – to make it sit 90 days a year 
(three days every three weeks of every month). Other provisions extinguished the 
Governor-General’s powers to prorogue or dissolve Parliament without an absolute 
majority of the House – no doubt a reaction to the constitutional crisis in Australia. 
Much of the material in the bill was first suggested in the 1975 report of the Select 
Committee on the Electoral Bill. National had come to power in the interim. In 
addition to the Australian influence, the primary purpose of the bill – to call the 
House into session early – was driven largely by Labour’s reaction to Muldoon’s 
decision to suspend contributions to the Rowling Government’s superannuation 
scheme by decree, when legislation was in fact required to do so.159 Labour also 
hoped all the essential parts of New Zealand’s unwritten constitution could be 
consolidated in one act, which could be widely distributed amongst the public to 
inform them of their voting rights.160 National argued that the clauses regarding the 
Governor-General’s ability to dissolve Parliament removed a “substantial safeguard 
for the people.”161  
 
The debate also saw an interesting development of the ‘mandate’ argument. The 
government argued that, even though Labour had lost the election and there was no 
real prospect of Hunt’s bill passing the House, as Labour had not signalled the 
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proposed changes in its 1975 election manifesto, it breached convention for the bill to 
have been introduced.162 The government did not oppose the bill’s introduction “as a 
matter of courtesy”,163 and it was struck off the order paper on 25 August, after its 
second reading, as the Speaker declared it involved an appropriation. 164 The next 
electoral related constitutional issue to arise in a legislative context was the Electoral 
Amendment Bill 1986, split from the Constitution Bill 1986 on its third reading. The 
Act clarified the rules relating to transfer of power after an election in the light of the 
constitutional issues raised when Muldoon left office in 1984. No new electoral 
material was included and the bill passed with the support of the National Opposition. 
 
While Parliament exhibited reluctance to legislate on electoral-related constitutional 
issues between 1927 and 2007, legislation proposing changes to the electoral system 
was more abundant, although most of it was unsuccessful and introduced in Private 
Members’ Bills. In fact, the only successful electoral system change was the Electoral 
Act 1993, discussed in chapter three, which ushered in the MMP electoral system. 
Nonetheless, during the operation of the First Past the Post system, a number of 
private member’s bills were introduced attempting to change the system in some 
respect. There is record in Hansard of James McCombs, Labour MP for Lyttelton, 
introducing a Preferential Voting Bill as a Private Member’s Bill in 1929. No more is 
known about it; it received no introductory statement from its mover or subsequent 
debate and lapsed at the end of the term. McCombs was constrained by the Standing 
Orders of the time from speaking on the first reading, which traditionally was not an 
occasion for debate. This is a common problem in analysing a number of electoral 
amendment bills introduced in the early 1930s. 
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In the early 1930s, Cecil Clinkard, a Coalition Member of Parliament, twice 
attempted to alter the voting system to a simple form of STV. His 1931 Private 
Member’s bill garnered no reaction from the opposition or his colleagues – he was 
the only one to speak to the bill’s introduction. 165 It never progressed past its first 
reading. Apparently undiscouraged, in 1934 Clinkard re-introduced “a measure... 
identical with one which I introduced four years ago but which, unfortunately, went 
to the bottom of the Order Paper.”166 The only other MP who rose to speak was Peter 
Fraser, “merely... to express the opinion that if the honourable gentleman wanted to 
get opposition to his Bill he has gone the right way about it with the oblique style of 
reasoning he has indulged in.” 167 The bill, again, lapsed at the end of the session. 
Alongside Labour Member of Parliament Gerry Wall in the late 1970s, and whose 
prolific legislative efforts are examined in chapter six, Clinkard exemplifies the most 
active of a number of MPs who have introduced often quite complex changes to the 
electoral law through private members’ bills with no real chance of succeeding. The 
purpose of these bills was often to raise the profile of the issue involved or, in Wall’s 
case, attack the government by proposing a remedy or multiple remedies in order to 
point out defects. Having been defeated four times in his attempts to introduce 
legislation amending enrolment provisions, in 1980 Gerry Wall turned his attention to 
a private member’s bill proposing that, if an MP failed to be elected by a majority, a 
second ballot would be held the following Saturday between the top two candidates. 
The bill was defeated on introduction.  
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In the wake of the report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, and after 
the National Party announced it would pursue electoral reform as a priority, a number 
of private member’s bills were tabled between 1990 and 1993 seeking to force an 
early referendum so a new electoral system could be in place for the 1993 General 
Election. The first was the Proportional Representation Indicative Referendum Bill 
1990, introduced by Labour Member John Terris in the final days of the fourth 
Labour Government. It sought to hold a referendum on the introduction of MMP. For 
the first time on an electoral issue in New Zealand, opinion on the Bill was split along 
conscience rather than Party lines. The Bill was introduced 49 votes to 19 and 
referred to the Electoral Law Committee. It eventually lapsed after the report of the 
Select Committee and a brief second reading. Then NewLabour MP, Jim Anderton, 
made two attempts to introduce a bill that sought to hold a referendum on the 
introduction of MMP. His first attempt, the Mixed Member Proportional 
Representation Poll Bill 1990, was defeated on its introduction by a conscience vote. 
His second bill was introduced and read a first time in 1992. There was no division 
and the bill was referred to the Electoral Law Committee. The bill lapsed after it was 
referred; the committee did not report back in time for the 1993 General Election.  
 
The Electoral Referendum Act 1991, introduced as the Electoral Poll Bill, set the 
stage for one of the most significant constitutional changes in New Zealand’s history. 
It formed two parts: first, whether a change should be made from FPP and second, to 
what that change should be. The referendum was indicative only. The bill was 
introduced and referred to the Electoral Law Committee, which both sides agreed 
debated the issues in a non-partisan manner and came up with a solution agreed upon 
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by all sides.168 The Bill was read a second time under urgency (unopposed); it 
completed its committee stages and third reading with no division or further debate. 
The result of the referendum, held in 1992, led to a second referendum at the 1993 
General Election where voters were asked to choose between First Past the Post and 
Mixed Member Proportional. The result changed the course of New Zealand’s 
electoral history. In terms of legislation, only one attempt to provide for a further 
referendum on MMP was made after 1996. The Electoral Options Referenda Bill 
2002 was a private member’s bill placed in the ballot by Jenny Shipley and 
transferred to Simon Power after her departure from Parliament. It proposed two 
referenda on the electoral system. The government opposed the bill and it was 
defeated on its first reading.169 
 
It remains to mention by-elections. On a number of occasions, Parliament legislated 
to postpone by-elections – usually caused by the death of a member – until a General 
Election. The first of these acts was the By-elections Postponement Act, passed 
unanimously in 1943, which followed the Prolongation of Parliament acts, passed in 
1941 and 1942 due to World War II. No debate arose on the matter. Parliament again 
delayed by-elections in 1969 with a General Election looming. The government 
consulted with the leader of the Labour Party and the Leader of Social Credit before 
introducing the bill. Thus it was passed unanimously and without a great deal of 
debate.170 Likewise, in 1987, legislation was passed to prevent any seat which became 
empty before the general election from being filled before the general election in a 
by-election. It was unopposed and did not garner much debate. Legislation pertaining 
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to by-elections is a rare area of the electoral law that saw unanimous consent 
throughout the 1927 to 2007 period. 
 
This section has covered areas of New Zealand’s electoral law that affect the election 
of Members of Parliament and the functioning and structure of Parliament itself. Even 
in these areas alone, it is evident that amendment of the electoral law in New Zealand 
is distinct not only in the wide variety of the scope and import of the changes made 
by various governments, but in the range of ways in which governments have gone 
about making the changes and the attitude and response of oppositions to amending 
the electoral law. This chapter has covered both controversial and non-controversial 
changes. Chapter five now turns to two almost wholly controversial areas – franchise 
and electoral boundaries. 
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Chapter Five 
Boundaries, Franchise and Registration 
 
Electorate boundaries and matters concerning franchise and registration – the law 
relating to who can enrol to vote and how they are able to do so – were major causes 
of conflict between governments and oppositions between 1927 and 2007. This 
chapter examines both areas, beginning with the Electoral Amendment Act 1945, 
which abolished the country quota. 
 
Boundaries and Representation Commission 
The 1945 Electoral Amendment Act, which altered the formula by which electorate 
boundaries were calculated, stands as a significant moment in the history of New 
Zealand’s electoral law. If 1932 and 1934 were the times the Labour Party protested 
against the government’s ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘immoral’ alteration of the electoral 
law, 1945 saw the tables turn. Indeed, the Fraser Government’s move to abolish the 
country quota, alter the composition of the Representation Commission to include 
government appointees and alter the basis by which boundaries were calculated from 
total population to adult population, caused one of the most exhaustive and 
acrimonious debates over electoral law in New Zealand’s history. The level of dissent 
from the opposition would not be seen again until the debate over the Electoral 
Amendment Bill 1975. 
 
Setting aside a retrospective historical position which sees the country quota 
primarily as inequitable, the country quota had in 1945 formed a part of the New 
Zealand political system for decades. The fact it gave an inherent advantage to the 
party strongest in the provinces (the National Party) was the reason behind the 
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acrimony of the debate. The Electoral Amendment Act 1945 is unusual in the sense 
that there was no dispute that, in electoral terms at least, the National Party 
Opposition stood to lose from its passage and the Labour Government stood to gain. 
The government offered little defence of the bill during the debate, other than 
pointing out the electoral inequities generated by the country quota and the 
advantages conferred on the Opposition by the operation of the quota. Some 
government members linked the government’s move to the broader international 
efforts Fraser was making at the time. Dr Sullivan, Minister of Industries and 
Commerce, for example, claimed the bill was an indication of the government’s 
“faithfulness to the cause and principles of democracy in lining itself up with the 
other democracies of the world...” 171 
 
Opposition in the House followed the same lines of argument used by the Labour 
Opposition against the Electoral Amendment Bill in 1934. The major charge against 
the government was that of self interest. Speaking in the debate on the first reading of 
the Bill (an unusual move at the time, and forced by the opposition),172 the bill was 
variously described by opposition members as “a piece of political trickery, done to 
save the Government’s own skin”,173 the “Socialists’ Security Amendment Bill”,174 
and the work of the “Incorporated Society of Opportunists”.175 The height of the 
acrimony occurred when Matthew Oram, later Speaker of the House, said he believed 
the “nefarious Bill will take its place in history, along with the burning of the 
Reichstag, as one of the great political crimes of history.” 176 Even the usually sedate 
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and ineffective Legislative Council sprung into life in its debate on the bill, although 
its deliberations lacked the acrimony of the debates in the House.177 The government 
was not helped by statements from several of its members that suggested self-interest 
was, indeed, a motive. One Labour MP said “[t]he Labour party does not require the 
assistance of the country quota, either to win or retain power in this House.” 178 
Holland quoted an issue of the Labour Party newspaper, The Standard, which carried 
a speech from a Labour Member who said: “We will fix [the Opposition] with our 
new legislation. We will put all the coffin nails in them before long.”179 
 
The criticisms made of the 1945 Act did not only concern substance, but also process. 
Chief among the criticisms were the government’s failure to notify the opposition of 
its intention to introduce the bill,180 and its use of urgency to pass the bill through 
most of its stages.181 The bill received its third reading at 3:28am on a Saturday 
morning, three and a half hours after the parliamentary broadcast had finished.182 
Keith Holyoake set out the problem that would have most concerned the government, 
whatever its motives:183 
 
The sporting spirit of our people will be outraged to such an extent that the 
mathematical advantage the Government hopes it will gain will be more than 
outweighed by that revulsion of feeling... I am confident that there will be a 
revulsion of feeling not only against the Bill itself, but against the methods adopted 
by the Government in introducing it.  
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Perhaps the most important factor in the way a government’s changes to the electoral 
law are perceived by the public is the process by which it goes about changing the 
electoral law. The second argument made against the bill by the opposition was that 
the government had no mandate to pass the legislation. This had been the most potent 
argument made against the Coalition’s term-extension legislation a decade earlier, 
and was again the strongest criticism on this occasion. The government had not 
signalled in its 1943 election manifesto that it intended removing the country quota. 
Indeed, it had made a pledge that it would not remove the quota until a conference of 
the Labour Party had decided on the move and it had been put to the electorate.184 
This served merely to compound the accusations of self-interest being levied against 
the government.  
 
In response, Holyoake set out the doctrine that would later sit at the centre of 
National Party’s electoral reform programme throughout the 1950s and 1960s when 
he said that, “[w]hen we amend the Constitution of the country it should be done only 
after reference to the electors and with the approval of the majority of the electors. 
The Government has no such mandate.”185 Indeed, to summarise the content of 
opposition criticism on this point it is worth quoting in full a contribution to the 
debate made by Josiah Hanan in the Legislative Council.186 
 
In discussing this Bill and its merits or demerits, all consideration for party interest, 
and all regard for the instinct of party preservation, should be swept aside. We 
should consider this Bill as from a referee’s viewpoint. As referees, we are not 
concerned as to whom wins the game or the contest, but to see that the rules of the 
game are observed faithfully and strictly. I have always held – and so have all true 
Democrats – that before legislative enactments become law, there is demanded for 
their realization democratic methods and the consent of the people, from whom 
Governments derive all power. 
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The Electoral Amendment Act 1945 serves as an important point in the amendment 
of the electoral law. Although the principles outlined in opposition to the legislation 
would not be put into practice until 1956, it is arguable that the approach of future 
National Party Ministers such as Keith Holyoake, Jack Marshall and Ralph Hanan 
developed in reaction to the 1945 bill. Perhaps a corollary of the controversial nature 
of the Electoral Amendment Bill and the process by which it was passed, the debate 
also provides the first example in the two-party system of an Opposition adopting 
tactics to obstruct the debate and create publicity over a piece of electoral legislation. 
National did “everything within [its] constitutional powers” to halt the bill.187 
National members moved amendments attempting to introduce a referendum on the 
contents of the bill.188 Numerous amendments were proposed during all stages,189 and 
multiple attempts were made to refer the Bill to a select committee for 
consideration.190 Even Peter Fraser recognised the extent of the opposition put up by 
the National Party: “I have nothing but respect for those people who believe that the 
step taken by the Government is wrong and who have opposed it to the full limit of 
the rules of the House.” 191 
 
In 1950 the new National Government led by Sidney Holland reversed some of the 
changes made by the Fraser Government five years earlier. Primarily, the Act 
returned the population basis used for boundary calculations to total population from 
adult population, a change made by the 1945 Act. The government made no attempt 
to bring back the country quota. The quota was, like the Legislative Council which 
the National Government abolished in 1950, easily abolished but not so easily 
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brought back. In any case, the government may have faced a backlash from the urban 
electorates had it sought to bring back the quota which, in 1943, gave 9592 electors in 
Egmont the same voting power as 24513 in Remuera.192 The 1950 debate lacked the 
acrimony or intensity of the 1945 abolition debate. The changes proposed by the 
government had been well-signalled in National’s election manifesto. National 
members had promised to repeal the 1945 legislation ever since it was passed. While 
the opposition characterised the change from adult population back to total population 
as a ‘form of country quota’, the fact the government did not attempt to bring back an 
actual country quota blunted the attacks on the bill. Nor was the opposition able to 
claim an abuse of process. While the bill passed by a simple majority with the 
opposition voting against it on its second and third readings, there was a grudging 
acceptance that the government had the mandate to make its changes. 
 
The National Party had explicitly set out its intentions regarding the Electoral Act in 
its 1949 election manifesto.193 The government did not expect its changes to receive 
bi-partisan support. Its mandate came from its election. One government member said 
“I am amazed that the attack on this Bill has been so weak... I would like an 
Opposition member to get up and condemn the measure, if he can.”194 Ultimately, the 
1950 debate would be the last decidedly partisan debate on an electoral issue for two 
and a half decades. 
 
As in the electoral amendment act debates of 1934 and 1945, self-interest was the 
major accusation levelled by the opposition at the government. Labour members 
called the changes “a country quota in modified form” and argued the government 
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had introduced the bill for its own political advantage,195 and to “foster its political 
fortunes.” 196 For its part, the government argued the changes did not favour it to any 
“material extent”.197Furthermore, its opposition to the changes made in 1945 had 
been consistent; it was not seeking to restore the country quota, had signalled its 
intention to introduce the bill and was introducing the bill at the beginning of its term. 
These factors blunted the opposition’s attacks. Interestingly, the fact that the 
government was not seeking to restore the country quota was not raised in the House 
debates. The fullest examination of this point came, ironically, in the Legislative 
Council, which had been impotent over the Electoral Amendment Act 1945 and was 
about to be abolished. Mr Polson, the Leader of the Council, underscored the 
reasoning behind the government’s decision on the country quota:198 
 
I am not defending the country quota in what I shall have to say. Possibly the time 
has gone by for the country quota, and with the advance of democratic thinking, 
but certainly the time has not gone by for giving adequate representation to the 
population who dwell in the country. 
 
 
The Bill received its first, second and third readings in the Legislative Council with 
no divisions.199 The amendment was the last piece of electoral legislation the 
Legislative Council would debate. After the passage of the 1950 Electoral 
Amendment Act, the issue of the country quota faded into history, as did the 
Legislative Council. The level of acrimony that arose during the debate would not be 
seen again until the 1970s. 
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Other matters relating to electoral boundaries and the Representation Commission 
proved a source of controversy over the years. Another aspect of the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1945 that raised virulent opposition was the Act’s alteration of the 
composition of the Representation Commission. While retaining several impartial 
appointees, such as the Surveyor-General, the legislation allowed the government to 
appoint a majority of the nominees, giving government appointees an effective veto 
on the committee. The opposition received no representation. As outlined in chapter 
three, the Electoral Act 1956 settled this situation by providing for both government 
and Opposition representation on the Commission. The first time the 1956 
arrangement was challenged was in 1978, when Social Credit’s Bruce Beetham 
introduced a Private Member’s bill to place representatives from Social Credit and 
the Values Party on the Commission. The bill also contained a provision that any 
party enjoying support from at least five percent of the population would be 
represented on the Commission. Beetham’s bill, which affected an entrenched 
provision, never had any chance of passing but was intended to make a point about 
third party representation on the Electoral Commission and, indeed, in Parliament. 
The bill was introduced and read a first time without a division,200 and Beetham used 
his introduction speech to argue that the major parties were unfairly influencing 
boundaries.201 Both Labour and National Members opposed the Bill, calling it an 
“exercise in futility”202 and badly-timed,203 although Hunt supported Beetham to an 
extent when he said that Beetham had raised a point that “cannot be ignored.”204  Bill 
Birch claimed, rather unbelievably, that “never has it been suggested that boundaries 
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were altered to suit political parties.”205 Beetham’s bill served to unite the 
government and opposition against a common target: a third party. As Beetham 
said:206 
 
I have found it somewhat amusing that on one aspect of electoral matters, namely 
the state of the rolls, members on both sides of the House are to a man utterly 
opposed to each other, but on another aspect, namely my Bill, both sides of the 
House are utterly united in opposition, in preservation of their vested interest in the 
entrenched status quo.  
 
 
The Electoral Amendment Act 1981, introduced by the National Government, made 
substantial changes to the Representation Commission. Social Credit had been 
represented on the Electoral Law Committee and the Act as passed provided for the 
Representation Commission to invite submissions from any political party or 
independent MP without an official representative on the Commission. This 
concession to the minor party was agreed in the Select Committee. The Act also 
required the Representation Commission to publish the objections it had received to 
provisional boundaries and allow a period for the lodging of counter-objections. The 
bill received its third reading without a division. It was agreed that “no really 
dramatic changes” were ordered by the 1981 Bill.207 The small concession to Social 
Credit was, however, not enough for the party. In 1986, NZDemocrats (the successor 
to Social Credit) MP Garry Knapp introduced a Bill seeking to “allow the 
participation of all bona fide political parties in the process of setting electoral 
boundaries.”208 National and Labour were again united against the bill and it was 
defeated on introduction. The final attempt in the period studied to change the 
Commission to alter the position of third parties was a 1994 bill introduced by Jim 
Anderton. The bill sought to do the opposite to the Social Credit and NZDemocrats 
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bills and, instead, remove all political representation from the Commission. While the 
government indicated it did not support the bill, it was introduced and referred to the 
Electoral Law Committee and ultimately lapsed. It is perhaps surprising that a similar 
member’s bill was not introduced by a minor party in the period between 1994 and 
2007. As at 2007, the National and Labour Parties were represented on the 
Commission, but small parties were not. 
 
While governed by the Electoral Act 1993, the Commission as it stood in 2007 was 
shaped primarily by the Electoral Amendment Act 1991, introduced by the National 
Government led by Jim Bolger. That Act made a number of changes to the 
composition and procedures of the Representation Commission, in line with the 
recommendations made by the Electoral Law Committee in 1988 in its report on the 
1987 general election and the recommendations of the 1986 report of the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System. These included adding a Maori representative 
for both the National and Labour Parties, and allowing parties that received over five 
percent of the vote to make submissions. 
    
The government was required to seek consensus on the changes, as many of them 
affected an entrenched provision of the Electoral Act 1956. The Opposition pledged 
its support at the outset. The Bill was passed without division. The debate was 
notable as it saw a number of National Party Members affirm the importance of the 
bi-partisan approach to electoral reform, particularly in the lead-up to the referenda of 
1992 and 1993.209 From acrimonious beginnings, by the end of the century, consensus 
emerged between the two major parties on boundaries. 
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Franchise and Registration 
Issues of voter franchise and registration also saw their share of controversy over the 
80 year period studied. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the age of eligibility to vote 
was a source of contention between the National and Labour parties. 
 
In 1969, the Holyoake Government introduced a bill to lower the voting age from 21 
to 20. The Electoral Amendment Bill 1969 was introduced at the same time as a bill 
lowering the drinking age from 21 to 20.210 Advocates for lowering the voting age 
were found in both the National and Labour parties,211 although the Labour Party had 
been in favour of lowering the voting age for longer than National. In 1969, however, 
both parties were united on the desirability of doing so, if not on the specific age. 
 
The disagreement took place on an ancillary matter; Labour believed the bill did not 
go far enough and that the voting age should be lowered to 18. Its argument was 
bolstered by a petition received by the Petitions Committee, and signed by 11,000 
people, praying for an amendment to lower the voting age to 18 years.212 The 
government was not prepared to entertain this suggestion and, while Labour members 
ultimately voted for the age to be lowered to 20, they maintained throughout the 
debate that it should stand at 18. The opposition also criticised the government’s 
timing, arguing that the bill should have been introduced much earlier. Kirk accused 
National of attempting to win the next election by expanding the voting franchise just 
before the election, although he admitted at the same time that he believed Labour 
would benefit more than National from the addition of younger voters.213 
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Nevertheless, the government and opposition were in agreement on the bill and the 
Labour opposition supported an urgency motion to pass the bill, which occurred 
without the taking of a division. 
 
In 1972, during the final days of the National Government, Labour’s Colin Moyle 
introduced an ultimately unsuccessful Member’s bill which sought to lower the 
voting age to 18 years and allow the Chief Electoral Officer to actively enrol people 
to vote. While the Labour Party supported the Bill (and, indeed, passed a similar bill 
when it assumed government soon after), the National Party Government did not 
officially support the further lowering of the voting age. It was a debate the 
government did not want to have in the lead-up to the 1972 election and attempts 
were made to keep the Bill down the Order Paper. Indeed, Moyle stated at the outset 
that “[t]he Government has done everything in its power to keep [the bill] out.”214 
There had, however, been support within National for lowering the voting age to 18. 
A remit passed by the Auckland conference of the National Party had been narrowly 
defeated at the Dominion Conference that year.215 Muldoon even stated that he found 
himself “substantially in agreement with most of things that [Moyle] said, although 
that agreement did not go quite far enough to persuade me that his Bill is one that 
should be supported at present.” 216 
 
National’s primary argument against the Bill was that it would necessarily lead to the 
age for other things being lowered to 18 as well. This, Muldoon said, would pose 
difficulties for acts such as the Domestic Proceedings Act, the Guardianship Act and 
the Apprentices Act, the Juries Act and the Marriage Act. Labour Member Jonathan 
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Hunt countered that Great Britain, the United States and most states of Australia had 
already lowered the voting age to 18. 217 The issue was simply one in which a breach 
existed between the thinking of most National members and most Labour members. 
The Bill was read a first time but the government prevented it from being referred to 
the Statutes Revision Committee.218 While it received a second reading, the Speaker 
first ruled it out of order as involving an appropriation.219 Continuing a theme raised 
throughout debates on the electoral law, some accusations of self-interest were 
levelled. There was some discussion during the second reading debate about which 
party would benefit most from the bill; National Member Dan Riddiford claimed that 
National would benefit most.220  Whatever the parties’ perceptions, there is no direct 
evidence that Labour gaining more votes was one of the party’s motivations behind 
introducing the bill, nor one of National’s in opposing it. For Moyle, the proposal was 
about “com[ing] into step with the realities of the 1970s.”221 
 
Labour went into the 1972 General Election with a pledge in its manifesto to lower 
the voting age to 18. The Electoral Amendment Act 1974 fulfilled the promise. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, after its opposition to Moyle’s member’s bill in 1972, National 
offered practically unreserved support to the Electoral Amendment Bill. It could have 
blocked the bill if it had wished; the bill affected the entrenched provisions of the 
1956 Act and required 75 percent support. Part of National’s willingness to accede so 
readily to lowering the voting age to 18 (gone were all of its previous objections) was 
the death of Prime Minister Norman Kirk, who had died two and a half weeks before 
the Bill’s introduction. Obstructing the passage of a bill aimed to apply to his 
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Sydenham by-election (in which National ultimately did not stand a candidate) would 
have been politically counter-productive. As Martyn Finlay, Minister of Justice, said 
during the Bill’s introduction:222  
 
The reason for [introducing the bill] on this day and at this time is the unfortunate 
necessity to hold a by-election in Sydenham. A Bill of this nature would certainly 
have been introduced before the expiration of this Parliament, and in adequate 
time for the purpose of the Bill to be given effect to. It is unfortunate that we must 
do this in a rather more hurried manner than we would have wanted, and because 
of that I invite the House to give the Bill rather more expedition than normally 
attached to legislation. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the government still consulted with the opposition – although, in effect, 
it had to because of the entrenched provisions – and an informal agreement was 
reached. The bill had also been debated in a select committee in the week before its 
introduction.223 On 17 September, the Electoral Act Committee, chaired at that stage 
by Hunt, recommended unanimously that the voting age be reduced to 18 years.224 
The bill passed its second and third readings the next day, unamended, with National 
offering no objection or debate.225 From 1974, consensus existed between the two 
major parties that the voting age sits at an appropriate level. 
 
Enrolment and Eligibility to Vote 
In 1966, the newly re-elected Holyoake Government introduced what appeared to be 
a simple and non-controversial electoral amendment bill. The Electoral Amendment 
Bill 1966, however, was a rare example of a government electoral bill failing in the 
House. It was also significant because the cause of that defeat was the entrenchment 
provisions of the Electoral Act 1956 – the first time entrenchment had prevented a 
government from changing the electoral law. 
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The bill contained only one clause, providing that servicemen under 21 years of age 
would be qualified to vote at a general election if they are serving overseas in a 
special area, the latter term being defined by Order-in-Council.226 As was the case 
with the government’s 1965 Electoral Amendment Act, which also amended an 
entrenched provision, the 1966 bill was referred to a select committee so that the 
necessary consensus could be attained for its passage through the House. The Statutes 
Revision Committee heard representations from eight different sources but only one – 
the Returned Servicemen’s Association – offered support. The Constitutional Society 
and the Public Service Association opposed the bill,227 and several government 
members on the committee indicated opposition to it.228 While several amendments 
were agreed on in the committee, it was obvious when the bill was reported back that 
it would not pass. Labour members argued the bill remained too selective and 
technical,229 and Kirk said that it was “riddled with inconsistencies... a measure which 
has been promoted essentially for political and emotional purposes.”230 Realising the 
bill would probably not pass, Labour turned the committee report debate into a debate 
about lowering the voting age across the board.231 The debate was interrupted for the 
dinner break on 14 July and never resumed.232  
 
While in the case of the Electoral Amendment Act 1965 the government was able to 
use the power of its mandate and the fact both parties were agreed in substance on the 
content of the bill to amend the entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act 1956, 1966 
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presents a converse situation. In this case, entrenchment prevented the government 
from making a change that, while minor, did not have the support of the House, even 
after the government had engaged with the opposition to try to reach consensus. 
 
After the passage of the Electoral Amendment Act 1975, which made substantial 
changes to franchise and registration requirements and was discussed in length in 
chapter three, the National and Labour Parties generally divided over the issue of the 
day on which the electoral roll enrolment closes and the residential requirements for 
enrolment. In 1977 the Muldoon Government fulfilled National’s pledge during the 
1975 Act debate, and 1975 election manifesto, that it would repeal the sections of the 
1975 Act with which it disagreed.233 The most significant changes made by the 1977 
Act involved the two contested amendments made in 1975. The 1977 Act reverted to 
the pre-1975 status quo the provision that anybody qualified to vote but who had not 
registered could vote. The time required to be resident in an electorate returned to 
three months from one month. Labour called the move “a massive tightening” that 
would “disqualify up to 100,000 New Zealanders in the next election.”234 The 
franchise was also removed from prisoners. 
 
Much of the 1977 bill was debated under urgency, a move criticised by the 
Opposition.235 The procedure through which the bill was passed caused equal 
opposition from Labour as did the bill’s content. The House divided on party lines to 
introduce the bill and refer it to the Statutes Revision Committee. Jim McLay, as 
chair, arranged for the secretary of the Statutes Revision Committee to contact those 
who had made submissions to the previous select committee on matters covered by 
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the 1977 Bill to see if they wished to be heard again.236 He also invited the Social 
Credit and Values Parties to make submissions and provided copies of the bill to 
them. Values made submissions and its secretary appeared in support. 237 In all, five 
substantive submissions were received. 
 
Yet this initial move to consult widely with the public was constrained by the time 
limits imposed by the government on the Committee’s work. Submissions opened on 
4 November and closed on 16 November, giving less than two weeks in which to 
make a submission.238 The time frame led Labour Member of Parliament, Richard 
Prebble, who served on the select committee, to call it “one of the worst abuses of the 
parliamentary system I have seen.”239 Ultimately, questions of both process and 
content divided the Committee. And the bill was reported back without 
amendment.240 As McLay said:241  
 
[T]here are strong differences of opinion between members on each side of the 
House as to the necessity for these changes, and these divisions were reflected in 
the discussions, debate, and voting during the select committee’s deliberations. 
 
 
The Labour Opposition agreed that these problems had occurred, but wished the 
relevant provisions could have been amended “in a progressive manner rather than in 
the negative way the government has chosen to adopt.”242 This accusation 
emphasised the difference in approach between the government and opposition. 
National saw the pre-1975 status quo as preferable; Labour saw the steps it had 
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already taken as progressive, yet flawed. It wanted a progressive approach to fix the 
issue, the National Party a regressive approach.  
 
Just as accusations of self-interest had formed the majority of the argument against 
the 1975 Electoral Amendment Act, they played the same role in 1977. Labour 
members claimed the bill would “place opponents of the National Party at a 
disadvantage”,243 that the government was using “steamroller tactics to improve the 
climate for its re-election”,244 and that the bill “reek[ed] of political vindictiveness.”245 
In opposition to the bill, Labour’s David Lange criticised the impact of self-interest 
on electoral legislation. He said “it is our duty as Parliamentarians not to give the 
impression to the country that we as a Parliament are making the rules for our gain, 
irrespective of what party we are in. If ever a matter should be the subject of overall 
community participation, it should be the rules by which we are elected.”246 
 
The arguments made against the bill by Labour Members and the arguments made for 
the bill by government Members were virtually an inversion of the arguments made 
by each side in 1975. The parties had swapped sides in the House and seemingly 
swapped positions on the reform of the electoral law. From National’s perspective, 
the government was able to divert from reaching total bipartisan consensus on the 
bill, as it was simply setting back to pre-1975 conditions the result of Labour’s 
gerrymander in 1975. In this, it restored the state of play to the way it had existed 
during the pre-1975 ‘era of consensus’. Two interesting arguments were made by 
National Members. Mr Latter, the Member for Marlborough, pointed out that, as 
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National was mostly just repealing changes made in 1975, Labour Members could not 
argue the Bill was intended to advantage the government without implicitly implying 
that the 1975 legislation was intended to disadvantage the National Party.247 Brian 
Talboys, on the other hand, dismissed entirely the proposition that changes to the 
electoral law made by any government intending to advantage itself ever substantially 
altered the will of the electorate anyway:248 
 
Right – let us go back to 1972, when we went into an election under most of the 
provisions that the Government is now proposing. Who won the election? The 
Labour Party won ... so what is the use of that argument?... The next election was 
held under the conditions that the Labour Party insists should be in the Act. Who 
won that election? In 1975 the National Party won, and now the National 
Government wants to change the act. 
 
 
After an acrimonious debate that went into the early hours of the morning, punctuated 
by frequent points of order and Speaker’s rulings, the Bill was read a third time, with 
the House divided along party lines.  
 
1977, however, did not mark the end of an argument that has continued into more 
recent times. In 1985, the Lange Labour Government reverted the three month 
residential requirement to one month. On this occasion, the government argued the 
change was a necessary technical measure as the result of the merging of the General 
and Local Body electoral rolls. David Caygill told the House that, with a residential 
qualifying period of one month, “the Post Office will find it easier to keep track of 
electors.”249 The Bill was introduced, read a first time, and referred to the Electoral 
Law Committee on a division along party lines. The committee considered the issues 
contained in the Bill during six meetings and eight hours of discussion.250  The debate 
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on the Committee’s report to the House was as acrimonious as it had been in 1975. 
Again, the main accusation was self-interest. The bill was called a blatant attempt to 
help the Labour Party perpetrate electoral fraud,251 and that it would give Labour the 
opportunity to stack electorates in its favour.252 Parliament split along party lines for 
the ensuing readings and the Bill was passed by a division on the third reading. A 
matter relating to residence requirements arose again in 1989 when the Labour 
Government introduced legislation that overturned the decision in the famous 
Wairarapa electoral petition.253 Controversially, the Electoral Amendment Act 1989 
was divided from the Local Government Reform Bill 1989 during its committee 
stages, when the two acts had nothing to do with one another. National opposed the 
measure, claiming it would open wide the determination of where an individual voter 
may exercise his or her vote in a general election and allow parties to gerrymander 
election results.254 The Bill was passed after an acrimonious debate about process and 
split along party lines. The final alteration of the enrolment requirements by the 
Fourth Labour Government occurred when legislation was passed allowing qualified 
electors to enrol up to the day before the election.  
 
While the National Party members of the select committee did not actively oppose the 
change, which was only one of a number of changes in the legislation, in 1993 the 
Bolger Government again reversed the change through the Electoral Amendment Act 
1993. That Act closed the electoral rolls for enrolment on Writ day, which was 
usually four weeks prior to a General Election. As National’s Doug Graham pointed 
out in the Bill’s introduction, in eleven out of the twelve elections between 1956 and 
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1990, the rolls had been closed on Writ Day.255 This was an issue that had divided 
National and Labour for many years. Self-interest was the main theme of the debate. 
Labour’s Pete Hodgson called the legislation “a day of shame” and pledged to oppose 
it “down to the wire”.256 It was claimed the government was shifting the goalposts by 
disenfranchising 20,000 people. Graham’s argument that the date had been 
recommended in the report of the Electoral Law Committee on the 1990 General 
Election should be viewed in the knowledge that National held a majority on that 
committee. The Electoral Amendment Act 1993 displays again the differences in 
approach between the major parties: the National Party focussed on an elector’s 
statutory duty to enrol within one month after becoming qualified to do so, and a 
Labour Party focussed on the government’s role to assist electors in doing so. The 
opinion of National member Tony Ryall was typical of that expressed by many 
National MPs: “It is a small gesture to the democratic system to require people to 
enrol themselves at an appropriate time before an election.”257 The last time issues of 
enrolment were raised in Parliament was in 1995, when Jonathan Hunt introduced a 
Private Member’s bill to move the latest day on which electors could register to vote 
back from Writ Day to the day before polling day. National Members defeated the 
bill on introduction. While 1975 to 1995 saw substantial disagreement on these 
issues, the Labour Government led by Helen Clark, elected in 1999, did not attempt 
to alter the law during its administration. The ‘one month’ requirement seemingly has 
emerged as a settled compromise between National and Labour. 
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The areas discussed in chapters four and five all saw both disagreement and 
consensus between 1927 and 2007. The length of the parliamentary term, the number 
of Members of Parliament in the House, the qualifications to be a Member of 
Parliament, the formation of government, electorate boundaries and the franchise, all 
go straight to the heart of electoral law in New Zealand. Parliament has devoted no 
less time, however, to two other substantial areas of the electoral law. Chapter six 
now examines the administration of elections and the rules surrounding campaigning. 
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Chapter Six 
Election Administration and Electioneering  
 
The rules surrounding the administration of elections and the conduct of election 
campaigns can have a direct effect on the election success (or otherwise) of parties at 
election time. It is no surprise, then, that many of these rules caused a significant 
amount of controversy between 1927 and 2007. 
 
Election Administration 
Numerous issues relating to the administration of elections were altered by 
Parliament over the last eighty years. The majority of these changes were 
uncontroversial. The Electoral Amendment Act 1948, for example, clarified a number 
of ambiguities in the law that had arisen over several elections. The Electoral 
Amendment Act 1954 amended the Electoral Act in order to remove an ambiguity in 
the section of the Electoral Act 1927 that dealt with by-elections and the vacancy of 
seats. In 1972, the National Government introduced an electoral amendment bill to 
prevent a candidate from being nominated under a new name assumed under a deed 
poll less than six months before nominations closed. Returning officers had some 
discretion to waive the new rule.258 The bill was introduced in response to several 
incidents: in one, a man attempted to change his name to the name of a Walt Disney 
character in order to stand for Parliament; in another, a person changed his name to 
Jesus Christ; and, in another, a person who attempted to change his name to the exact 
name of another candidate for Wellington Central in order to stand against him.259 
When these sorts of bills have arisen, and have presented no obvious advantage to 
                                                     
258
 381 NZPD 3487, 19 October 1972. 
259
 381 NZPD 3487, 19 October 1972. 
  
 
93 
either side, both major parties have engaged constructively in order to produce a 
workable piece of legislation. 
 
Some of these bills nonetheless generated substantial debate. The Electoral 
Amendment Act 1971, for example, made minor technical changes to the Electoral 
Act. It did not amend any entrenched provisions and was the product of a review by 
the Public Expenditure Committee of the Electoral Act 1956. It was still, however, 
debated at length. Amendments to the process by which the electoral rolls are 
produced, for example, often caused some debate. In 1960, the Labour Government 
introduced legislation to amend the Electoral Act 1956 and facilitate the preparation 
of electoral rolls by a photographic process. In the committee stages, National 
members raised queries about whether the scheme would lead to inaccuracy, cause 
confusion, or whether it was even necessary.260 These objections were, for unknown 
reasons, absent by the bill’s second reading a month later. John Marshall stated “the 
Opposition will be very pleased to facilitate the passing of this Bill, which is a 
technical one to enable the more efficient production of electoral rolls”.261 Whatever 
objections had been made during the first reading, consensus had been reached in the 
interim – possibly due to the Opposition being briefed by the Minister or Ministry of 
Justice. The Bill passed its second and third readings without a division.262  
 
In the aftermath of the Electoral Amendment Act 1975, the late 1970s saw the 
electoral rolls descend into an almost chaotic state due to problems in the 
administration of the rolls. Despite the attempts of the National Government to tidy 
up the rolls, as the 1978 election approached it became clear that the rolls would not 
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be fixed in time. In 1978 no fewer than four private members’ bills seeking to fix the 
situation were debated in the House. The Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2) 1978, for 
example, was a private member’s bill introduced by Michael Connelly, the Labour 
Member for Wigram. In the face of mounting problems with the preparation of the 
electoral rolls for the upcoming election, the bill sought to alter the Electoral Act in 
an attempt to ensure the enrolment of as many electors as possible prior to Election 
Day. The government argued that the bill was poorly drafted,263 and that the reason 
there had been problems assembling the rolls for the 1978 election was that Labour’s 
1975 Electoral Amendment Act had caused chaos.264 Labour Members argued that 
the government was opposing the bill on self-interested grounds and seeking political 
advantage by disqualifying from voting people who did not enrol by a set deadline.265 
National Member Bill Birch summed up well the divide between the National and 
Labour parties on the issue of electoral enrolment:266   
 
The difference between the two parties is that National members consider that the 
individual has a responsibility to register, and by registering he becomes eligible, 
whereas Labour members say they will not worry about the individual’s eligibility 
until after the election, and that everybody should be entitled to go along and vote. 
 
 
The bill was struck off the order paper after its second reading. Undeterred, however, 
Gerry Wall, Labour Member for Porirua, attempted to introduce another three bills 
before the election. The first, the Electoral Amendment Bill 1978, was an attempt to 
embarrass the government over the state of the electoral rolls. It proposed leaving 
enrolment open up until and during a general election and the introduction of an 
immunity clause to “protect people from... prosecution following their failure... to 
fulfil their [electoral] obligations under existing legislation.” The Bill was defeated on 
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introduction. The Voting Rights Protection Bill 1978 was Wall’s second attempt at 
forcing a re-organisation of the rolls just prior to the election. This Bill proposed 
alteration of the Electoral Act 1956 to provide franchise on eligibility to vote rather 
than being listed on the electoral roll. The Bill was voted down along party lines. 
Several months later, and just before the 1978 General Election, Wall introduced 
another bill relating to the preparation of the rolls. The bill sought to alter the 
Electoral Act 1956 so that “there should be no cessation of enrolment after the issue 
of the writs, and that people may legally enrol at the time they cast their votes.”267 
The bill was, in essence, another attempt to introduce the failed Voting Rights 
Protection Bill. The debate over the bill was especially acrimonious – the Opposition 
was concerned about the state of the electoral rolls and the impact of the situation on 
the Labour Party’s prospects at the election, and the government was concerned about 
the state of the electoral rolls and the embarrassment it had been caused. Alongside 
this, the Wall Bill was the fourth electoral amendment bill introduced by an 
Opposition member that year. Accusations of self-interest were thrown at each side 
by the other. National’s Minister of Justice, David Thomson, called the bill a “last-
minute panic measure”,268 and accused Labour of “messing about with the electoral 
law”.269 Labour called Thomson “either grossly incompetent or corrupt”,270 and 
alleged National had “found a situation it can exploit to advantage, not the promotion 
of democratic procedures or of democracy.” 271 
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While it was generally accepted that the rolls were not in a good state, Bruce Beetham 
summed up the difference in ideology that lay behind the approaches of the two 
parties:272 
 
It is well known that complicated and diverse voting procedures tend to penalise 
the aged, the lesser educated, and even busy people, who cannot cope with the 
growing complexities of voting procedures. The complexity of the present system 
favours the National Party, which tends to be supported by people who have the 
time to wend their way through present complicated procedures, allowing their 
votes to qualify.  
 
 
The problems encountered at the 1978 General Election forced the government to 
begin a substantial review of electoral administration law. As part of this process, 
Parliament established a committee chaired by James Wicks to inquire into the 
administration of the Electoral Act.273 The resulting Electoral Amendment Act 1979, 
passed just under a year after the 1978 General Election, attempted to provide a 
temporary fix to the dire situation that had occurred with the electoral rolls at the 
1978 general election. The temporary solution was required due to the upcoming by-
election caused by the death of Bruce Barclay, the member for Christchurch Central. 
The Bill proposed the use of a single roll in that contest.274 Minister of Justice Jim 
McLay said in the House that the bill, while rushed, fitted into the government’s 
programme for a fundamental review of the Electoral Act.275 The 1979 Act provided 
a temporary solution until the Wicks Committee had recommended more substantive 
changes.276 McLay said in the bill’s first reading that he had “discussed the need for 
the Bill and the procedures to be followed in respect of it” with his opposition 
counterpart, Richard Prebble, and the opposition had indicated it would co-operate in 
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the bill’s passing.277 Prebble, however, had a different interpretation, saying that the 
Opposition had pledged only “not to oppose” the bill because “no alternative course 
is open to Parliament.”278 While the Bill had been proposed as a temporary measure, 
the Opposition argued strongly that the bill should go to a select committee. McLay 
agreed to its referral, based on assurance from Labour that the bill would be passed 
before the Christchurch Central by-election.279 Labour Party members raised 
objections to this proposal. Ultimately, Labour overplayed its hand. National MP Paul 
East accused the Opposition of breaching an agreement in order to grandstand.280 
Nonetheless, most opposition was political rather than substantive. The bill was 
introduced and read a first time, and referred to the Statutes Revision Committee.281 
The Committee reported the bill back and recommended it be allowed to proceed 
without amendment.282 Several technical amendments were made during the 
Committee stages and the bill passed without a division. 
 
The Electoral Amendment Act 1980 was the first of several successive acts that arose 
out of the reports of the Wicks Committee and the Electoral Law Select Committee. 
After 1975, it was the second example of the introduction of a bill that was the result 
of select committee proceedings, rather than being drafted before being considered by 
a select committee. The Act aimed to fix the process that had caused such chaos with 
the electoral rolls at the 1978 General Election. On this subject, which formed the 
majority of the bill, government and opposition were united. They were further united 
on the three administrative clauses of the Act that affected entrenched provisions. The 
1980 Bill, however, also introduced several controversial amendments that did not 
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enjoy unanimous support. These included delaying the date of the Maori option by a 
year and removing the name of each candidate’s party from the ballot paper, a move 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
In terms of the precise changes made, the Act made some quite significant changes to 
the organisation of electoral rolls.  It made the Post Office solely responsible for the 
compilation of the electoral rolls, and removed the role of the Ministry of Justice,283 
and the system of census re-registration introduced in 1975 was abolished and 
replaced with 3-yearly roll revisions.284 It introduced a network of computer terminals 
to compile the rolls,285 and set down in statute the “long-standing administrative 
practice” to allow electors’ names not to be published on the electoral roll.286 While 
Labour agreed with “90 percent” of the bill, “10 percent [was] disgraceful.”287 
Indeed, the acrimony over the non-unanimous changes led to the debate on the 1980 
bill becoming the longest debate on Electoral Law legislation in New Zealand to date. 
The second reading debate alone took seven hours.288 The bill also provides the first 
example of a National Government forcing through the House changes to the 
electoral law for which there was not unanimous support, and which were not just 
amendments repealing amendments made by another government (such as National’s 
1977 introduction of the bill repealing parts of the Electoral Amendment Act 1975). 
The opposition opposed the introduction of the Bill in order to make the point that it 
disagreed with a number of the provisions.289 The bill was introduced and referred 
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again to the Electoral Law Committee along party lines.290 The select committee 
made progress on the administrative matters concerning the electoral rolls but tripped 
up on matters of disagreement. Prebble complained of the “arrogant power” on show 
and accused the government of behaving in a partisan manner.291 On the presentation 
of the committee’s report to the House, Labour moved unsuccessfully to send the bill 
back to the Electoral Law Committee.292 The majority of decisions of the select 
committee was unanimous. 293 This is a common thread running through the history 
of amending the electoral law; often several provisions in a bill derailed, or threatened 
to derail, the entire process, including those provisions on which there existed 
agreement. The debate was complicated by the 75 percent support requirement for 
minor changes to three entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act. While these were 
tacitly supported by all sides in the select committee process, the opposition used the 
influence conferred on it by the entrenched provisions to threaten the government. It 
was not until the last minute that Labour informed McLay that it would support the 
entrenched changes. McLay complained that officials had to spend two working days 
drafting alternative proposals to deal with the problems that might have arisen if the 
changes to those entrenched provisions had not been agreed to by a 75 percent 
majority.294 As usual, accusations of self-interest were made. Labour accused 
National of self-interested behaviour for delaying the Maori option and removing the 
names of candidates’ parties from the ballot paper. National accused Labour of self-
interest for opposing both moves.295 Ultimately, the House divided along party lines 
to read the bill a second time. The bill passed with no division being taken on the 
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third reading. The Opposition opposed the clauses it disagreed with individually in 
the committee stages.  
 
The next bill to arise from the recommendations of the Wicks’ Committee was the 
Electoral Amendment Bill 1983. The bill implemented the recommendations 
contained in the third report of the Electoral Law Committee.296 It raised little debate 
and was read a third time with no debate or division.297 The final Act passed in the 
post-1978 review was the Electoral Amendment Act 1985. It was primarily technical 
and all the substantive measures in the Bill were the result of the unanimous 
recommendations of the Electoral Law Committee.298 The Bill had broad support and 
received only one speech from the Minister and from the Opposition for its second 
reading. It was reported without amendment or debate in its committee stages and 
read a third time with no debate. Jonathan Hunt pointed out that the Electoral Law 
Committee had come to play “an essential part in the way electoral legislation is dealt 
with in the House.”299 
 
Despite the introduction of MMP, amendments to the area of electoral administration 
seldom arose after 1985. The work done in the early 1980s was not superseded by the 
change in electoral system. Some matters of controversy did arise at times. For 
example, there was a point of contention between National and Labour in the debate 
over the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995. The act introduced the cross-
matching of immigration data to the electoral rolls. Labour Members, such as David 
Caygill, claimed this would create a disincentive to enrolment.300 Interestingly, one of 
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the first times the new MMP electoral system influenced the passage of an electoral 
law amendment was on a bill dealing with administration. The Electoral Amendment 
Bill 1998 provides a rare example of a government Electoral Bill failing – this Bill 
lapsed, along with a number of others, when the National-New Zealand First 
Government fell apart. The Bill was relatively non-controversial and sought to 
implement the changes recommended by the Electoral Law Committee in its report 
on the 1996 General Election. The Bill had opposition support and, in 2002, the 
Labour Government resurrected the bill from the bottom of the Order Paper and 
incorporated it into the Electoral Amendment Act 2002. 
 
Perhaps the most contentious electoral administration issue during the entire period 
from 1927 to 2007 concerned the method of voting and design of the ballot paper. 
Parliament often acted unanimously in making changes to assist those who might 
otherwise have trouble voting. For example, changes to aid the disabled and elderly to 
vote usually received bi-partisan support. The earliest example of this was in the 
Coalition Government’s otherwise controversial 1934 Electoral Amendment Act 
which made provision for a change of system in the recording of a blind person’s vote  
at a parliamentary election.301 The area where disagreement has most often occurred 
concerned the design of the ballot paper and the method of marking it. As mentioned 
above, one of the more controversial changes in this regard was made by the 
Muldoon Government in 1980 when it removed party designations from the ballot 
paper. This seemingly pointless move caused great dissent from the Opposition, 
which called the move “shameful” and “raw political power at its worst”.302 In 1990 
the Palmer Labour Government returned the names of candidates’ parties to the 
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voting paper, reversing this change. National did not oppose the move.303 The method 
of voting was also changed from crossing out the names of candidates to ticking the 
box of the candidate. This change received the unanimous support of the House. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1993 referendum on the electoral system, decisions had to be 
made on the layout of the new voting paper now that two votes were to be exercised 
on a single paper. In 1995, and just before the first MMP election, Labour and 
National banded together to amend an entrenched provision that concerned the layout 
of the ballot paper. The provision randomised the order of party names on the ballot 
paper and, most controversially, aligned the electorate candidate for each party with 
the party vote column. Understandably, the small parties accused National and 
Labour of self-interest in changing the rule, although it should be remembered that 
their accusations were made out of a move to protect their own interests. Self-interest 
was at work on all sides. United’s Clive Matthewson accused “the two old parties” of 
“overrul[ing] the rights of the minority in this House.”304 New Zealand First and the 
Alliance attempted to send the bill back to select committee to reconsider the ballot 
paper issue, but this move was defeated by National and Labour. Labour and National 
voted together on all divisions; the minor parties obstructed with numerous 
amendments and divisions. Ultimately, however, the provisions passed. The design of 
the ballot paper was not altered after 1995, which was also the last year Labour and 
National banded together to override the objections of minor parties. 
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This chapter has so far examined the administration of elections and the electoral 
rolls. It now turns to the responsibilities placed by legislation on those standing for 
Parliament. 
 
Electioneering 
Election expenses were not frequently debated until after the Second World War. The 
Electoral Amendment Act 1948 raised the limit on candidates’ campaign spending for 
the first time since 1895 – from £200 to £500.305 Throughout the post-war period, the 
limit on candidates’ election expenditure gradually increased: to $2000 in 1975, to 
$4000 in 1977, and to $10,000 in 1990. Disagreement occurred on a number of 
occasions, not just over spending limits, but how election campaigns are financed. In 
1960, for example, the Labour Government’s Political Disabilities Removal Act 
restored the ability of unions to make levies for political purposes. It had been 
repealed under the former National Government in 1950. The National Party strongly 
opposed the bill, which had the direct effect of securing funds for the Labour Party. 
National accused self-interest and Labour Members did not deny it. The Bill, 
however, skirted the edges of what constituted ‘electoral law’, as such. Thus no 
objection was raised by the National Opposition that the bill breached any moral duty 
to seek consensus on the electoral law. In 1960, the topic of campaign funding was 
not yet considered an electoral matter. 
 
Parliament often devoted its attention to matters perhaps not worthy of extensive 
consideration. An example of this is the attention it paid to the use of loudspeakers in 
election campaigns. The argument stemmed from Labour Member Rex Mason’s 1965 
Electoral Amendment Bill 1965 which sought, in the face of increasing use of 
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television and other media for electioneering, to promote the ‘corner meeting’ style of 
campaigning by allowing meetings to be held “without reference to bylaws.”306 It 
seems that Mason was under no apprehension that the bill would be successful. His 
main object was to see his provisions, or provisions along their lines, inserted into the 
government’s own Electoral Amendment Bill, already in front of the House at that 
stage.307 The government adopted a consensual approach to the bill; Hanan said the 
Bill would “receive the most careful and earnest consideration of the Government”,308 
and that the government would “adopt any constructive and useful suggestions 
coming from the opposition.”309 The second reading debate was relatively long and 
one which focussed around the intricacies of the use of loudspeakers, the possibility 
of traffic being held up by political street meetings, the bill’s effect on by-laws and 
the privacy of people in their houses – hardly a fundamental piece of electoral law 
reform in New Zealand’s history. Nonetheless the debate descended into an 
acrimonious two hours of accusations over campaign practices and members’ 
personal integrity. This most insignificant of bills produced a partisan debate in line 
with the acrimony present in the debates on the government’s own Electoral 
Amendment Bill 1965. Aside from questions over the quality of the bill’s drafting 
and its legal complications, the government’s main objection during the second 
reading was whether the bill was necessary. It would further override a number of by-
laws and local government regulations.310 The Bill was defeated along party lines, 
becoming the first unsuccessful electoral bill introduced since the 1930s. The matter 
came up for debate a decade later, when the Rowling Government included a clause 
in the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 overriding the control of local bodies in the 
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matter of electioneering with loudspeakers. National objected for the same reasons it 
had objected to Mason’s bill in 1965. The National Party promised to repeal the law 
and did so in 1977.311  
 
The process through which the regulation of campaigns increased after the 1970s was 
a gradual one. The Electoral Amendment Act 1977, for example, introduced a new 
provision regulating candidate advertisements, requiring them to be authorised in 
writing by the candidate and containing the address of a person responsible for the 
advertisement. This was by far the most extensive provision in this area legislated for 
by the New Zealand Parliament up to that point.312 Several private members’ bills 
sought to regulate government advertising in an election year. The Political 
Advertising Bill 1986, for example, proposed extensive limits on expenditure by 
government on advertising and restrictions on the types of advertising for which 
public money could be used. It was defeated on introduction. In 1988, National MP 
Simon Upton introduced the Public Finance (Restraint of Political Advertising) Bill, 
which sought to force the government to itemise all money spent on advertising 
government policies. The Bill stated that advertising would be defined as political if 
its predominant purpose was the promotion of any Minister of the Crown, Member of 
Parliament, parliamentary candidate, or political party, or if it sought to persuade the 
public of the merits of government policy. The government characterised the bill as 
“ludicrous and senseless” and the House voted along party lines not to introduce the 
bill. In 1995, the Disclosure of Political Donations and Gifts Bill, introduced by the 
New Zealand First leader, Winston Peters, sought to create a register of all substantial 
donations made to political parties or candidates. Labour, the Alliance, United New 
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Zealand and the Right of Centre Party all indicated support for its introduction. The 
National-led Government questioned its necessity, as the issue of donations was 
already before the Electoral Law Committee.313 The Electoral Law Committee, which 
considered the bill, recommended it not proceed on this basis. Labour agreed with 
this step, as the Electoral Reform Bill 1995 had proposed a disclosure regime in the 
interim. 
 
The provisions in the Electoral Reform Bill had emerged from concerns of the 
Electoral Law Committee about the appearance of anonymous election advertising in 
the 1993 election. Doug Graham argued that “such advertising undermines the 
democratic process because voters cannot assess the bona fides of persons promoting 
anonymous election advertisements.”314  The Act made it an offence to publish or 
broadcast any electoral advertisement unless the true name and address of the person 
for whom or at whose direction it was published was contained in the advertisement. 
Importantly, the Act required, for the first time, that parties disclose publicly all 
substantial donations. This was the first time a limit had been set on total party 
expenditure. The parties were substantially agreed on campaign spending limits, and 
the select committee exhaustively debated the issue. As its chair, Tony Ryall, said on 
the report of the select committee to the House:315 
 
Every one of the five parties represented on the select committee has had to give 
ground. Every party has had to compromise. Different combinations supported 
and opposed various clauses. But this Bill shows that we can achieve substantial 
reform through sensible, compromising consensus in the select committee 
environment.  
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The move to regulate campaign spending and electioneering was taken to its extreme 
in the Electoral Finance Act 2007. The Act introduced further restrictions on 
campaigning, electioneering, funding and other activities. It instituted a financial 
agent system with heavy penalties, required the public to register as “third parties” in 
order to participate in a General Election, and significantly reduced allowable election 
expenditure. The Act caused significant controversy in Parliament and the media, and 
protest throughout New Zealand. Ultimately, the Act (which conferred large 
advantages on an incumbent government) may have actually harmed the government 
that introduced it. In 2009, the Labour Party, now in Opposition, admitted that the bill 
had been a mistake.316  
 
The issue of opinion polling was considered by Parliament on a number of occasions. 
The Electoral Amendment Act 1981 banned exit polling, a move which had the 
support of all parties.317 In 2000, the Electoral (Public Opinion Polls) Amendment 
Bill, introduced by Winston Peters, proposed a 28-day period prior to a general 
election or a by-election during which it would be an offence to publish the results of 
a public opinion poll conducted during that period in relation to the general election 
or a by-election. National and Labour both supported the bill to select committee so it 
could be considered there. The bill failed on its First Reading. Interestingly, the 
National Party, which has traditionally been more averse to restrictions on 
campaigning than the Labour Party, supported Peters’ bill. The reasons behind this 
are not clear. Another attempt to regulate opinion polling came in the Clark 
Government’s Electoral Amendment Act 2002. The bill, as introduced, banned the 
publishing of opinion polls before an election. This was despite the government’s 
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opposition to Winston Peters’ bill in 2000. Due to overwhelming pressure, however, 
the offending clause was removed in the committee stages. Green MP Rod Donald 
suggested the government had been pressured into inserting the opinion polls 
provision by Winston Peters threatening not to support other government 
legislation.318 There were foreshadows of the draconian nature of the Electoral 
Finance Act 2007 in this bill. The bill as reported back from select committee 
contained a provision that said journalists would be guilty of a corrupt practice if they 
at any time published or distributed any material or information that may be false. 
National accused the government of “breaking the bipartisan approach that we have 
had to electoral law in this country for many, many years.”319 In truth, that approach 
had been followed somewhat haphazardly since 1975. 
 
Broadcasting 
Broadcasting formed an essential part of election campaigning throughout the period 
studied. While radio broadcasting has formed a part of New Zealand election 
campaigns since the 1930s, state intervention in television and radio advertising only 
began in the late 1980s. The 1989 Broadcasting Act included a provision that 
empowered the Parliamentary Service Commission to allocate six hours of 
appropriated TV and radio advertising among parties. The clause resulted from a 
recommendation in the report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System. The 
Bill was referred to the Planning and Development Committee for consideration. The 
committee made several important changes to improve the Act’s workability, and 
altered a clause to allow the Opposition to appoint a member to the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority when it sat to allocate free advertising time to parties and when it 
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met to consider complaints. National objected to the situation of Parliament 
demanding free airtime from broadcasters,320 and moved in the committee stages to 
have the Parliamentary Service pay for political advertising, instead of the 
broadcasters themselves: this was voted down along party lines. Although National 
disagreed with the clauses concerning election broadcasting, these formed but a 
minor part of the bill, which was read a third time without division. Further major 
change came the following year with the Broadcasting Amendment Act 1990. At a 
very late stage in the committee process, the government introduced amendments to 
the Broadcasting Act passed the previous year. While it introduced a number of 
minor changes recommended by the Broadcasting Standards Authority, it also vastly 
expanded the amount of free-to-air advertising on television and radio stations in an 
election year. 
 
The Opposition claimed that Labour was indulging in self-interested politics and that 
the bill was the action of a divided political party which could not afford to pay for 
election advertising and was thus appropriating free time for itself. At the same time, 
National benefitted from the free advertising. National MP Jim Gerard claimed "the 
Opposition could not vote against the measure while knowing that it would have to 
take the benefit---that would have been totally immoral".321 Despite the controversy, 
the Bill was read a third time without a division. The haste with which changes had 
been made under the Broadcasting Amendment Act 1990 necessitated the 
Broadcasting and Radiocommunications Reform Act 1990, which was introduced by 
the Palmer Government to correct a number of deficiencies in the earlier legislation. 
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The government acknowledged that the legislation had not worked as intended,322 and 
that the new legislation was the result of consulting with broadcasters before passing 
it. As Hunt outlined, the government had “moved away from any imposition of 
obligations on broadcasters... There is no compulsion.”323 Secondly, in line with the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, a small amount 
of publicly-funded election broadcasting was introduced. National opposed the 
legislation on the basis that it introduced political funding of election advertising just 
before an election. Gerard called it a "threat to democracy on the eve of an election 
campaign".324 Labour was further funding its election campaign by use of legislation. 
The bill was read a first time and referred to the Planning and Development 
Committee, which received submissions from most major media organisations. 
National opposed the bill through the committee stages and the bill was passed by a 
divided House on its third reading.  
 
The introduction of MMP necessitated changes to the election broadcasting law. The 
Broadcasting Amendment Act 1996 aimed to adapt the election broadcasting regime 
to suit an MMP environment.325 Most importantly, it transferred administration of the 
electoral broadcasting regime from the Broadcasting Standards Authority to the 
newly established Electoral Commission. Labour supported the move, noting that the 
Electoral Law Committee had recommended it happen on several occasions and that 
bipartisan support had always existed. 326 The minor parties objected to the provisions 
that allowed the government and opposition to each appoint a member to the 
Electoral Commission for the purposes of deciding electoral broadcasting. This was 
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the second bill in two years on which the two major parties had united to make a 
change to the law that helped them in the face of opposition from minor parties. The 
bill also contained a provision that would have allowed parties to use their own 
money to buy further broadcasting. Labour vigorously opposed this move, and the 
government was forced to remove it during the select committee stage under threat of 
delaying tactics from the Labour Members. 327 With this clause removed, Labour and 
National voted for the bill and United, New Zealand First, Alliance and the New 
Zealand Conservative Member voted against it. After the 1996 Act, the broadcasting 
regime in New Zealand remained unamended and relatively uncontroversial. 
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Chapter Seven 
Assessing Trends and Motivations 
 
A number of themes and findings emerge from the analysis in chapters three to six, 
ranging from governments using the mandate as a justification for changing the 
electoral law, to the influence that entrenchment has had on the process by which 
reserved provisions were amended. The chapters covered acts of all levels of 
contention, types of outcome, and subject matter. There were examples of acts 
probably motivated by self-interest and others passed in a spirit of co-operation. 
 
Using this information, chapter seven assesses the processes and motivations behind 
electoral law change. First, some obvious findings are presented. As shown in Table 
8, the higher the level of contention during a bill’s passage through the House, the 
higher the likelihood that its outcome will not be unanimous.  
 
Table 8 – Contention v Outcome of Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or 
National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 
 
Outcome 
Unanimous Not Opposed 
No Multi-
partisan 
Support 
Opposed Totals N = National 
L = Labour 
N L N L N L N L N L 
 
High 
 
- - 2 - - - 2 9 4 9 
 
Moderate 
 
- - 5 3 1 - 2 1 8 4 
 
Low 
 
2 2 7 5 1 - - - 10 7 
 
None 
 
5 3 5 8 - - - - 10 11 
C
o
n
te
n
tio
n
 
Total 7 5 19 16 2 - 4 10 32 31 
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Out of thirteen acts that had high levels of contention, only two were unopposed in 
their third readings.  Of the twelve acts with moderate levels of contention, only three 
were ultimately opposed by the main Opposition. One was opposed only by minor 
parties. Those bills with low and no contention all passed either unanimously or 
unopposed by the main opposition party. No major differences exist when the figures 
are considered by party-majority in a government. Similar amounts of low and non-
contentious legislation was passed under National and National-led, and Labour and 
Labour-led governments. Labour and Labour-led governments saw the passage of 
more highly contentious legislation, although, when the high and moderate categories 
are combined, these figures are similar: twelve high or moderately contentious acts 
under National, and thirteen under Labour. Overall, no major differences emerge 
between the parties here. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 examine, respectively, the levels of contention and the outcome for 
various subject areas of the electoral law. Table 9 shows that the areas of lowest 
contention were: election administration; by-elections; MP Qualification (although 
both parties passed highly contentious acts in this area); referenda; technical 
amendments; and term length. The areas of highest contention were boundaries, 
where significantly more legislation was passed under National and National-led 
governments than under Labour and Labour-led governments; broadcasting, where 
Labour and Labour-led governments passed significantly more legislation; 
electioneering and finance; the method of voting and franchise and registration, where 
virtually all legislation passed under Labour and Labour-led governments was highly 
contentious.  
  
 
Table 9 – Contention v Category of Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 
 
Category 
Admin. Bound. Broad. By-Election Constit. 
Election. 
& 
Finance 
Electoral 
System 
Franch. 
& Reg. Maori 
Method 
of 
Voting 
MP 
Qual. 
Number 
of MPs Ref. Tech. 
Term 
Length 
N = National Govt 
L = Labour Govt 
N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L 
 
High 
 
1 3 2 1 - 2 - - 1 - 2 4 1 - 3 5 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 - - - - - - - 
 
Moderate 
 
4 1 1 - - 2 - 1 - - 1 2 - - 4 - 2 1 1 1 - 2 - - 1 1 - - - - 
 
Low 
 
7 3 2 - 1 1 1 - 1 - 4 - - - 2 - 3 1 2 - 2 2 - - - - 2 - - 2 
 
None 
 
2 2 2 - - - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - - 1 2 2 2 - - 2 3 - - 2 - 2 1 - 1 
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
 
Total 
 
14 9 7 1 1 5 2 2 2 1 7 7 1 - 10 7 8 6 4 2 5 9 1 - 3 1 4 1 - 3 
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Table 10 – Outcome v Category of Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 
 
Category 
Admin. Bound. Broad. By-Election Constit. 
Election. 
& 
Finance 
Electoral 
System 
Franch. 
& Reg. Maori 
Method 
of 
Voting 
MP 
Qual. 
Number 
of MPs Ref. Tech. 
Term 
Length 
N = National Govt 
L = Labour Govt 
N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L N L 
 
Opposed 
 
- 3 1 1 - 2 - - - - 1 4 - - 3 5 1 2 - 1 - 3 - - - - - - - - 
No Multi-
partisan 
Support 
1 - - - 1 - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Not Opposed 
 
11 5 4 - - 3 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 - 6 1 6 4 2 1 4 5 1 - 1 1 2 1 - 1 
 
Unanimous 
 
2 1 2 - - - - 1 1 - 1 - - - 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - - 2 - 2 - - 2 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
 
Total 
 
14 9 7 1 1 5 2 2 2 1 7 7 1 - 10 7 8 6 4 2 5 9 1 - 3 1 4 1 - 3 
 
 
Table 10 shows that only a very few areas of the electoral law were mostly opposed 
by opposition parties in the House.  Only broadcasting, and electioneering and 
finance, approach this status. In both cases, the areas are split evenly between 
opposed legislation and unopposed or unanimous legislation. So while boundaries, 
franchise and the method of voting were often contentious areas, this contention, in 
more cases than not, did not result in opposition on the final vote in the House. 
 
Table 11 compares contention and class. The ‘class’ category, as outlined in chapter 
three, considers the importance of a bill in terms of the scope and effect of each Act 
in comparison to other electoral bills. 
 
Table 11 – Contention v Class of Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or 
National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 
 
Contention 
None Low Mode-
rate High Totals N = National Govt L = Labour Govt 
N L N L N L N L N L 
 
Milestone 
 
- - 1 - - - 1 1 2 1 
 
Major 
 
- 2 2 1 6 3 3 5 11 11 
 
Minor 
 
4 3 4 5 2 1 - 3 10 12 
 
Incidental 
 
6 6 3 1 - - - - 9 7 
C
la
ss
 
Total 10 11 10 7 8 4 4 9 32 31 
 
 
The majority of electoral legislation in New Zealand garnered no or low contention. 
38 acts fall into these two categories, while 25 were moderately or highly contentious. 
The correlation between higher contention and acts with a larger scope or effect under 
their ‘class’ classification is clear. Acts with a broader scope and effect were 
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generally more contentious. There is no relevant delineation to be made along party 
lines.  Both major parties presided over similar amounts of legislation in each type of 
class. While Labour and Labour-led governments presided over the passage of 
slightly more high contention legislation, the figures for legislation of low and no 
contention set against high and moderate contention yield similar results for each 
party. 
 
 
Table 12 – Outcome v Class of Electoral and Electoral Amendment acts passed under National or 
National-led and Labour or Labour-led Governments 1927–2007 
 
Outcome 
Unanimous Not Opposed 
No Multi-
partisan 
Support 
Opposed Totals N = National Govt 
L = Labour Govt 
N L N L N L N L N L 
 
Milestone 
 
1 - 1 - - - - 1 2 1 
 
Major 
 
1 - 5 5 1 - 4 6 11 11 
 
Minor 
 
3 4 5 5 1 - 1 3 10 12 
 
Incidental 
 
2 1 7 6 - - - - 9 7 
C
la
ss
 
Total 7 5 18 16 2 - 5 10 32 31 
 
 
Table 12 compares outcome and class of Act. The figures here clearly show that the 
New Zealand Parliament was, throughout the 1927 to 2007 period, more united than 
disunited on the electoral law. With 12 acts passed unanimously and 34 passed 
without an opposing vote in the House, only 15 were opposed. Even legislation of a 
major class was no more likely to be opposed than it was to be unopposed. Minor and 
incidental acts rarely resulted in a contested vote. Despite often fierce debate about 
the nature and effect of provisions, technicalities, and perceived omissions or 
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unwelcome additions to the electoral law, government and opposition were, more 
often than not, united in terms of a ‘big picture’. 
 
The Impact of Select Committees, Entrenchment and Consensus 
Chapter two discussed the conclusion of Bowler, Donovan and Karp that, while 
rational self-interest is a major feature of parties’ attitudes to electoral institutions, 
attitudes about democracy and political ideology also have a role to play.328 Chapters 
three to six provided a number of examples of governments behaving in a non-self-
interested manner. The evidence in those chapters establishes that select committees, 
the entrenched nature of some electoral provisions, justifications of change based on a 
government’s mandate, and the desirability of a consensual law-making in the 
electoral law area all affected the process by which electoral amendments were 
passed through the House. These factors are now considered in turn. 
 
Select Committees  
The role of select committees evolved dramatically in the period between 1937, when 
the Labour Government’s Electoral Amendment Bill was referred to the Native 
Affairs Committee and became the first electoral bill referred to a select committee, 
and 1985, when Labour Member Jonathan Hunt said that select committees had come 
to play “an essential part in the way electoral legislation is dealt with in the 
House.”329 The first major development was the establishment of the Electoral Act 
Committee to consider the Electoral Bill 1956. It successfully ironed out differences 
between the National and Labour parties, and produced a bill with unanimous support 
that introduced the constitutionally significant entrenched provisions into legislation. 
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As covered in chapter two, the next major development after 1956 was the 
establishment of the select committee on the Electoral Law in 1973, which served as 
an investigative body that could make recommendations to the government for 
subsequent implementation in legislation. The establishment of a committee that 
considered electoral matters before any legislation was drafted was an innovation. 
The 1973 example was followed in 1979. In both the early 1970s and early 1980s, 
electoral legislation emerged based on recommendations from committee.  
 
The select committee process often fostered consensus. In 1981, Social Credit’s 
Bruce Beetham, a member of the Electoral Law Select Committee, achieved a 
concession from the major parties to allow smaller parties to make submissions to the 
Representation Commission. This concession was then incorporated in legislation. 
Another example of the consensus forged by select committees is the Electoral 
Amendment Act 1983. National MP Simon Upton said in his speech on the first 
reading that the Bill had been introduced only after “a full and carefully considered 
report of a select committee that found tripartisan agreement from all present.”330 The 
‘legitimacy’ of the 1983 Electoral Amendment Bill stemmed not from mandate 
theory or consensus in the debate in the House, but rather from decisions made by a 
committee acting in a non-partisan manner beforehand. This was an important 
development in the process by which electoral amendments are passed in New 
Zealand. Another example is the Electoral Amendment Act 1990, which contained 
changes which had the potential to be controversial. While its substantive changes 
related to the preparation of the electoral rolls and had been foreshadowed by the 
latest report of the Electoral Law Committee, it made a number of changes to other 
areas. For example, the form of the ballot paper was altered and election expense 
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limits raised. National’s Murray McCully, speaking for the Opposition on the report 
of the committee, said the committee was operated in a bipartisan fashion, and that is 
a model that could well be adopted in other proceedings of the House”.331 
 
Another important example of the growing importance of the select committee 
process was the increasing willingness of governments to accede to the request of 
oppositions for the House to refer bills to select committee, when doing so had not 
necessarily been an original intention of the government. This first occurred during 
the debate over the Electoral Amendment Bill 1967, which allowed a candidate to 
stand in a European or Maori seat, regardless of the roll on which they were 
registered. This occurred also in the Electoral Amendment Bill 1979, which 
attempted to provide a temporary solution to the chaotic situation that had occurred 
with respect to electoral rolls at the 1978 general election. Governments did not only 
accede on significant electoral issues. In 1996, the government agreed to the demands 
of the opposition to move a motion in the House referring the Electoral Amendment 
Bill 1996 to select committee, although the bill merely amended a single printing 
error that had occurred in the preparation of the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 
1995 for Royal Assent. 
 
If the development of the select committee process increasingly encouraged 
consensus over the period studied, the entrenchment of certain provisions of the 
electoral law in 1956 forced consensus if change were to occur. Where consensus was 
unable to be found, the proposed legislation failed. 
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The Influence of Entrenchment 
Between 1956, when entrenchment was first inserted in the Electoral Act, and 2007, 
the entrenched provisions worked on a number of occasions in precisely the manner 
those who enacted it in 1956 had intended they would work, effectively ensuring bi-
partisan support for electoral amendment bills affecting entrenched provisions. The 
first piece of proposed legislation that saw the entrenchment provisions in action was 
the National Government’s Electoral Amendment Bill 1966, examined in chapter 
five. In that case, despite a select committee process, the bill was withdrawn when it 
became clear that opposition support would not be forthcoming. In 1975, several 
clauses in the Electoral Amendment Bill were defeated during the committee stages 
because the government could not secure unanimity on some provisions. 
 
The entrenchment provisions conferred significant political power on oppositions. In 
1965 and 1980, for example, the Labour Opposition used entrenchment to its political 
advantage to pressurise government over changes in bills with which it disagreed. In 
1980, it only informed the government at the last minute that it would in fact vote for 
the amendments to the entrenched provisions. In 1965, the mere threat of not 
supporting the amendment to an entrenched provision caused a lengthy debate in the 
House. The situation was not resolved until the government leveraged the power of 
the ‘mandate argument’ against the opposition. 
 
The Mandate as Justification 
If the most common criticism by oppositions of governments proposing amendments 
to the electoral law was self-interest, the most common justification used by 
governments in defence of those amendments was the power of the mandate. 
Holyoake’s major criticism of the Labour Party’s initial opposition to the Electoral 
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Amendment Bill 1965 was that the government had a mandate from the electorate to 
make the change, as it had been signalled in its election manifesto. This argument 
was extended substantially by John Marshall, who said that the opposition had a 
“moral obligation” to support the government’s changes.332 In 1950, the Labour 
opposition acknowledged that the National Government had the right to introduce 
legislation amending electoral boundary law because of its mandate from the 1949 
election. 333 
 
In 1934, Labour argued that the government could not change the length of the term 
as it had no mandate to do so. This argument had an interesting corollary, as it 
implied that, if the government had put the matter to the public in an election 
manifesto or otherwise, it would be entitled to pass the legislation with or without the 
support of the opposition. The government, however, on the most tenuous terms, 
claimed it had a mandate from the people for the extension of the term. Forbes 
claimed that the public had been forewarned of the government’s intention to 
lengthen the parliamentary term by the 1932 Finance Act, the Act his government had 
passed to prolong its own term.334 His claim that there existed “a considerable body 
of public opinion favouring the longer term” was undermined by a later statement that 
it was the “duty” of Parliament to “give a lead” to the country in the matter.335 A 
similar argument arose around the Electoral Amendment Bill 1945. National argued 
that, as the change had not been signalled in the Labour Party’s 1943 Election 
Manifesto, it was improper. In 1976 the National Government said that Hunt’s private 
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member’s bill breached convention, as it had not been signalled in Labour’s 1975 
election manifesto. 
 
The promise by an Opposition to repeal or further alter electoral law provisions was a 
common feature of contested electoral debates. Often, these promises were made in 
the House and then reiterated in election manifestos. Such occasions occurred in 
1934, 1945, 1975 and 2007. In 1975, for example, senior National Members made 
clear signals of the party’s intentions for the changes in the Electoral Amendment Act 
1975 with which it disagreed. Brian Talboys said “[t]his 1975 Act will mark the 
division of opinion in the House, and that division will inevitably lead – and notice 
has been given of this – to further changes to the law on the change of government 
that I believe will take place at the end of this year.” 336 Incidentally, this was a move 
that disappointed some. National Member of Parliament Alan Highet was among 
those disappointed, evident in his statement to the House that the promise to alter the 
law on becoming government, while caused by the Rowling Government’s Electoral 
bill, “does not lend itself to stable Government, and I very much regret this move.” 337 
In a sense, this “prior indication” procedure stands adjunct to the theory of the 
mandate.  
 
The Desirability of Consensus, Co-operation and Agreement 
Throughout the period studied, while the entrenched provisions effectively enforced 
unanimity on a number of occasions, the New Zealand Parliament was motivated 
often by a belief in the general desirability of consensus between parties. What 
Marshall called the ‘spirit of 1956’ extended, often voluntarily, to unentrenched 
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provisions. This was especially strong for a 20-year period between 1956 and the 
Electoral Amendment Act 1975. It was still strongly present through until the end of 
the period studied, despite individual examples of legislation that did not manage to 
achieve consensus. 
 
Often, this voluntary search for consensus took the form of consultation between 
governments and oppositions before the introduction of legislation. In 1948, Sidney 
Holland, then Leader of the Opposition, was consulted before the government 
introduced its Maori Roll legislation. The National and Labour parties reached 
agreement on the disqualification exemption acts passed between 1958 and 1963. 
Informal agreement was reached before legislation was introduced lowering the 
voting age to 18 in 1974. A number of examples of this exist in administration acts. 
In 1948, 1954 and 1972, the major parties worked together to find consensus before 
each bill was debated in the House. Other examples of voluntary consensus occurred 
in times of national crisis or substantial electoral change. During World War II, all 
electoral amendment acts, including those postponing elections and by-elections, and 
those preserving the rights of MPs (then fighting in the War) to retain their seats, all 
received unanimous support. In the years leading to the introduction of the MMP 
system, the government often used its majority in the House to allow private 
members bills to progress to select committee and sometimes to second reading, not 
because the government intended to support them through to third reading, but so 
they could contribute to a broader debate about the electoral system.  
 
So the ideal of consensus or bi-partisanship or non-partisanship often served as a 
desirable goal for New Zealand politicians. In effect, the bipartisanship enforced by 
the entrenched provisions transferred, at times, into a ‘best practice’ for other areas of 
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electoral law change. It would not tell the whole story of New Zealand’s electoral 
law, however, to presume altruism and efforts to behave in a non-partisan manner are 
accurate descriptions of all electoral law change.  
 
Motivations: Self Interest and Partisanship 
It is a clear finding from the chapters above that the National and Labour parties 
worked best together on changes to the electoral law that benefited either major 
parties, or disadvantaged minor parties. There are at least five relevant examples of 
this. In 1937, both parties voted to raise the deposit for candidates for election, 
effectively discouraging minor candidates from standing. In 1978, both parties voted 
against Beetham’s bill that sought to gain representation on the Representation 
Commission for minor parties. In 1986 both parties voted against similar legislation 
introduced by NZDemocrats’ MP Garry Knapp. In 1995, both parties overrode the 
concerns of minor parties in order to alter the layout of the ballot paper and ensure the 
party and electorate vote columns were aligned. The minor parties believed this 
discouraged split voting, and thus provided an advantage to the major parties. Finally, 
in 1996, National and Labour combined to allow each party to appoint representatives 
to the Broadcasting Commission, which decided allocations for electoral 
broadcasting. 
 
The New Zealand example, then, provides an addition to Boix’ argument that 
“[a]nticipating the coordinating consequences of electoral rules, any current 
Government (provided it has the monopoly over electoral rulemaking) shapes the 
electoral rules to its advantage.”338 In New Zealand, many governments and major 
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opposition parties shaped the electoral laws to their dual advantage, and to the 
potential disadvantage of minor parties.  Yet the story that emerges from chapters 
three to six is, for all its moments of consensus, often a tale of contention, 
disagreement, dissent and adversarial politics. Furthermore, the accusation of self-
interest formed the major criticism by oppositions of governments changing the 
electoral law across the entire period studied. As outlined earlier in this chapter, on a 
number of issues, such as the franchise, electoral boundaries and the date on which 
rolls should close, the National and Labour parties divided in opinion many times. In 
some examples, such as the Coalition Government’s extension of its own life in 1932, 
it is easy to suggest self-interest as a motivation. In other areas it is harder. The 
veracity and constancy throughout the period of the arguments between the major 
parties on issues such as the closure of the rolls, however, strongly suggest that a 
party will defend, or seek to extend, any perceived advantage inherent in electoral 
legislation. 
 
Chapter two introduced Andrews and Jackman’s argument that, while party leaders 
attempt to behave strategically, it is not clear how they can do so effectively when 
they are faced with uncertainty about outcomes.339 The New Zealand example 
provides some support for this argument. First, governments sometimes 
miscalculated. A prime example of this is the Electoral Amendment Act 1934, where 
an already unpopular group of governing parties, which the following year went from 
holding 48 seats to 19, successfully introduced a law extending the term of future 
Parliaments to four years. The risk for a government is that making a change for its 
own benefit may equally help the opposition once it enters government. There are 
two further interesting examples of this. During the passage of the Electoral Bill 
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1956, the Labour Party’s complaints about the government’s political appointments to 
the Representation Commission, and Labour’s subsequent advocacy of a reformed, 
impartial, Representation Commission was the reverse position to that taken by the 
previous Labour Government. The politicisation of the Commission had occurred due 
to changes made under Labour in the Electoral Amendment Act 1945.  
 
The Electoral Amendment Act 1945 provides another example of a common dilemma 
that faces a government amending the electoral law. Given that most changes to the 
law under which parties are elected to government are going to generate at least some 
level of debate, a government must balance protecting or strengthening its current 
electoral position (or indeed, weakening its opposition’s position) with the risk of 
appearing self-interested to the public. It must balance the prospect of an electoral 
pay-off with the prospect of a backlash. This is not to argue that all changes to the 
electoral law are motivated by self-interest. Because of the special nature of electoral 
law, however, governments will have an interest in not being seen as self-interested 
by the public. Issues of public perception are especially relevant when electoral 
change is effected close to election year. Labour MP Richard Prebble raised an 
interesting argument around this point in 1977 when he said:340  
 
I ask the Government, through you, Mr Speaker, why it has brought in this partisan 
electoral Bill. There have been changes in electoral Bills before. In 1934 the 
Forbes-Coates Government postponed an election for a year, and it was thrown out. 
In 1946 the Labour Government foolishly decided to get rid of the country quota, 
and it was thrown out. In 1956 the National Government decided to change the 
electoral laws, and at the next election it was thrown out. In 1975 the Labour 
Government changed the electoral laws, for reasons which were misunderstood, 
and it was thrown out.  
 
 
Labour actually retained office (albeit with a substantially reduced majority) at the 
1946 General Election.  Nonetheless, Prebble’s analysis illustrates the balancing act 
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of protecting or extending an advantage, and yet not appearing self-interested to the 
public, that faces a government introducing an electoral amendment. Legislation 
introduced by a new government to repeal changes to the electoral law made by a 
previous government almost always has been partisan. The Labour Government’s 
1937 Electoral Amendment Act serves as one of the first examples of a government 
carrying through a threat to repeal a previous government’s electoral legislation. Rex 
Mason set out the government’s motivation in changing the parliamentary term, 
including the current term, back to three years:341  
 
Whatever may be thought as to the question of the proper life of Parliament, as 
far as this Government is concerned, it believes that Parliament is a trustee for the 
people and should not enlarge the life of Parliament except in so far as the people 
have definitely assented to that enlargement. Pursuant to that view, the 
Government is taking steps to restore to the people the right which they 
previously had, a right which, it seems to this Government, was wrongly taken 
from the people. 
 
 
While it is tempting, perhaps, to characterise such moves as altruistic, as outlined in 
chapter four, there is an argument to be made that oppositions that promise repeal are 
then politically bound to carry through on those promises. In both 1934 and 2007, 
both opposition parties had already played an adversarial and partisan role, and made 
political capital out of unpopular moves by the government of the time. Once in 
power, they then had to follow through on their pre-election pledges.  
 
Three ‘Eras’ of Electoral Change? 
It is clear that both self-interest and other factors influenced electoral change in New 
Zealand between 1927 and 2007. As a final piece of analysis, I suggest the history of 
the period can be separated into three broad, yet distinct, ‘eras’.   
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1. 1927 – 1955 Consensus Absent? 
From the start of the period studied to the year before the passage of the Electoral Act 
1956, any preference for changes to the electoral law to be bi-partisan had not yet 
developed. The period saw the passage through Parliament of a number of highly 
controversial acts, none of which involved any suggestion of consensus, such as the 
Finance Act 1932 and the Electoral Amendment Act 1934, which extended the 
parliamentary term, and the Electoral Amendment Act 1945, which abolished the 
country quota and introduced political representation onto the Representation 
Commission. 
 
2. 1956 – 1974 Consensus Gained? 
The second ‘era’ began with the Electoral Act 1956, which was significant both for 
the entrenchment provisions it contained, and for the consensual process by which it 
was passed through Parliament. The entrenchment clauses provided a legislative 
requirement for unanimity on some electoral amendments; an ‘ideal’ of consensus, 
however, spilled over into non-entrenched areas. This was generally a period that saw 
disagreements worked over and compromise sought. Parties, however, did not always 
agree on the detail. The failed Electoral Amendment Bill 1966 provides an example 
of the entrenchment provisions in action. Furthermore, the debate over the Electoral 
Amendment Bill 1965, which altered the number of parliamentary seats, shows that 
some electoral legislation was sometimes still highly contested. Robinson was 
correct, however, when he wrote in 1970 that: “[t]he Electoral Act 1956 has had the 
effect of modifying the partisan nature of electoral reform and of promoting the 
search for a wider degree of consensus than had previously been the case.”342 
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3. 1975 – 2007 Consensus Maintained? 
John Marshall, who, as Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, spearheaded the 
entrenchment provisions in 1956, bemoaned the breakdown in consensus that 
occurred in 1975, saying “it is highly desirable that the effort should be made to get 
back to the position which prevailed in 1956, when both sides were prepared to make 
concessions to the other, and an acceptable balance of interests and advantage was 
achieved.”343 The example of the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 certainly presents a 
breakdown in consensus. The question, however, is the extent to which the period 
after 1975 was coloured by the Act or by the same factors that caused the contention 
surrounding it.   
 
The 1956 to 1974 period saw two decades of an almost uninterrupted search for 
consensus on electoral amendment legislation. In this sense, the period after 1975 
cannot be compared to the earlier period. The later period certainly saw its share of 
bills with broad consensus. The administrative amendments of the early 1980s and 
amendment acts of the early 1990s all enjoyed unanimous support in the House. The 
period was also, however, punctuated by bills introduced by governments and passed 
through the House in the face of major opposition. These included the Electoral 
Finance Act 2007, the electoral broadcasting legislation of the late 1980s, party-
hopping legislation and a number of bills altering the residential requirement and the 
closing date for enrolment. Nonetheless, the active search for consensus that had built 
up since 1956 maintained a level of influence throughout the post-1975 era. It was 
further bolstered by the further development of the select committee system and the 
permanent Electoral Law committee. It was certainly present in the comments of 
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National MP Wayne Mapp and Labour Leader Phil Goff in the aftermath of the 
Electoral Finance Act 2007.344 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the 1927 to 2007 period Parliament was more often united than disunited 
on matters concerning the electoral law. This thesis established that select 
committees, the entrenched nature of some electoral provisions, justifications of 
change based on a government’s mandate, and the desirability of consensual law-
making in the electoral law area all affected the process by which electoral 
amendments were passed through the House. The select committee process often 
fostered consensus, while the entrenched provisions often forced consensus. In the 
entrenched areas, where consensus was unable to be found, proposed legislation 
failed. The bi-partisan approach to changing the electoral law in New Zealand 
emerged under the National Government in the 1950s. The desirability of consensus 
in the area remained strong in the arguments put forward in the House by National 
Party Members of Parliament throughout the period after 1956. The Labour Party also 
had individual Members of Parliament who strongly promoted the bi-partisan 
approach, such as Jonathan Hunt and David Lange. 
 
Where consensus was not present (and, occasionally, when it was), changes were 
most often justified by governments on the basis of an election mandate from the 
public. Oppositions most often attacked these changes as being self-interested. Self-
interest was also an important factor in some change. In government, both major 
parties introduced legislation that benefited themselves, disadvantaged their 
opponents, or combined these two goals. On a number of occasions, the parties 
worked together on changes to the electoral law that benefited the major parties or 
disadvantaged minor parties. 
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In the analysis, several interesting issues emerged that were beyond the scope of the 
thesis and could be worthy of further exploration. One of these is the argument that a 
link can be made between unpopular governments and self-serving electoral 
legislation. The history of the 1927–2007 period provides a number of examples of 
governments passing controversial electoral reform laws in the year of, or in the year 
before, a General Election and losing office. Another question is whether the 
examination of consensus in the electoral law undertaken in this thesis could be 
extended to other areas of legislation. The role of consensus in Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements could be especially fruitful. Another exploration could involve extending 
the focus from the period studied to the period since the New Zealand Parliament first 
sat, including electoral law amendments such as the extension of the franchise to 
women. International comparisons could also be of interest, especially with those 
countries who most closely share New Zealand’s constitutional heritage – Australia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom.  
 
As an overall conclusion, then, although self-interest is an adequate explanation for 
much electoral law change in New Zealand, behaviour during 1927 to 2007 was also 
influenced by the select committee process, the entrenched provisions and a general 
acceptance among parties that changes to the electoral law should be, so far as 
possible, consensual and cooperative. Overall, it is too simplistic to make a general 
observation that amendments to the electoral law are invariably exclusively self-
interested or that they always occur as a result of co-operation and consensus. There 
are examples of either set of motivations at work and, on occasion, examples of both 
in action at the same time. Using the perspective provided by the history of the 1927 
to 2007 period, more recent acts, such as the Electoral Finance Act 2007, can be 
viewed through a broader lens. At the time of the submission of this thesis, the 
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National Government was embarking on a programme of electoral reform. An 
electoral issues paper produced by the Ministry of Justice outlined a number of 
contentious issues,345 especially surrounding electoral finance reform, and public 
meetings were held around the country.  
 
Most significantly, perhaps, the government included in its 2008 General Election 
manifesto a promise to hold a referendum on the MMP system at the 2011 General 
Election. The electoral law in New Zealand is set to remain an area of continuing 
activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
345
 See http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/electoral/electoral-finance-
reform/documents/issues-paper-FINAL.pdf 
Appendix A 
Acts Affecting the Electoral Law 1927 – 2007 (in chronological order) 
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1927 Electoral Act346 
Reform 
Coates Amalgamating Technical Minor None No Unanimous No N/A N/A 
1932 Finance Act347 Coalition Forbes Circumventing Term Length Major High No Opposed No N/A No 
1934 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act348 
Coalition 
Forbes Amending Term Length Major High No Opposed No N/A No 
 
1937 
 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act349 
Labour 
Savage Amending 
 
Term Length; 
Maori 
 
Major Low No Not Opposed Native Affairs N/A 
Yes  
(1934) 
                                                     
346
 Amalgamated existing Electoral law in a single statute 
347
 Extended the term of the current Parliament from three to four years 
348
 Extended the term of all future Parliaments from three to four years 
349
 Set parliamentary term back to three years. Extended the secret ballot and other practices involved with the general roll to Maori. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1940 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act350 
Labour 
Fraser Amending 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
MP 
Qualification 
Minor None No Unanimous No N/A No 
1941 
Prolongation 
of Parliament 
Act351 
Labour 
Fraser Circumventing Term Length Minor None Yes Unanimous No N/A No 
1942 
Prolongation 
of Parliament 
Act352 
Labour 
Fraser Circumventing Term Length Minor Low Yes 
Unanimous
353
 
No N/A No 
1943 
By-elections 
Postponement 
Act354 
Labour 
Fraser Circumventing By-election Incidental None No Unanimous No N/A N/A 
1945 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act355 
Labour 
Fraser Amending 
Boundaries; 
Franchise and 
Registration 
Milestone High No Opposed No N/A No 
                                                     
350
 Extended the franchise to all members of the forces serving New Zealand. Preserved the rights of MPs and Legislative Councillors serving in World War II. 
351
 Delayed the election by a year, due to World War II. 
352
 Delayed the election by a further year. 
353
 Three members – Doidge, Atmore and Lee – supported an amendment for a committee to examine public opinion to the Bill. It was defeated and the Bill’s third reading was 
unanimously supported. 
354
 Prevented the holding of any by-elections until the next general election. 
355
 Abolished the country quota. Altered composition of Representation Commission. Based boundary calculations on adult population instead of total population. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1948 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act356 
Labour 
Fraser Amending 
Administration; 
Electioneering 
& Finance; 
Maori 
Minor None No Not Opposed No N/A No 
1950 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act357 
National 
Holland Amending 
Boundaries; 
Franchise and 
Registration 
Major Moderate No Opposed No N/A Yes  (1945) 
1953 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act358 
National 
Holland Amending 
Administration; 
Boundaries; 
 Maori 
Incidental None No Not Opposed No N/A No 
1954 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act359 
National 
Holland Amending 
Administration; 
Technical Incidental Low No Not Opposed No N/A No 
1954 Patea By-Election Act360 
National 
Holland Circumventing 
Administration; 
By-election Incidental Low No Not Opposed No N/A No 
                                                     
356
 Provided legislative authority for the compilation of Maori electoral rolls. 
357
 Reverted boundary calculations to a total population base, among other changes. 
358
 Short, technical act dealing with Maori boundaries and roll preparation. 
359
 Removed ambiguity in Electoral Act 1927 dealing with by-elections and the vacancy of seats. Technical change to special voting procedures. 
360
 Removed a further ambiguity in the Electoral Act 1927 that had led to a disagreement between Crown Law and the Speaker as to when a vacancy needed to be gazetted. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1956 Electoral Act361 
National 
Holland 
Original; 
Amending; 
Amalgamating 
Administration;  
Boundaries; 
Constitution; 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori; 
Method of 
Voting; 
MP 
Qualification 
Milestone Low Yes Unanimous Electoral Bill N/A No 
1958 Finance Act362 Labour Nash Circumventing 
MP 
Qualification Incidental None Yes Not Opposed No No No 
1958 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act363 
Labour 
Nash Amending 
MP 
Qualification Incidental None No Not Opposed No No No 
                                                     
361
 Consolidated and amended the Electoral Act 1927 and its many amendments. Introduced entrenched provisions. Reverted Representation Commission to apolitical structure. 
362
 Prevented disqualification provisions of the Electoral Act 1956 applying to any payment received by Hon William Fox as a member of the Workers’ Compensation Board 
anytime before 1 October 1958. 
363
 Altered the definition of ‘contractor’. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1959 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act364 
Labour 
Nash Amending Technical Incidental None No Not Opposed No No No 
1960 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act365 
Labour 
Nash Amending Administration Minor Low Yes Unanimous No No No 
1960 
Political 
Disabilities 
Removal 
Act366 
Labour 
Nash 
Amending; 
Original 
Electioneering 
and Finance Major High No Opposed No No 
Yes 
(1950) 
1960 Finance Act367 Labour Nash Circumventing 
MP 
Qualification Incidental Low No Not Opposed No No No 
1961 Finance Act368 National Holyoake Circumventing 
MP 
Qualification Incidental None No Not Opposed No No No 
                                                     
364
 Made a minor change in the name of an organization. 
365
 Allowed for use of a photographic process in the preparation of electoral rolls. 
366
 Restored ability of unions to make levies for political purposes. The Savage Government had introduced such a measure in 1936 but Holland’s National administration had 
repealed it in 1950. 
367
 Prevented the disqualification of Reginald Keeling MP due to payments received for attendance at a conference. 
368
 Prevented the disqualification of William Brown MP due to payments received for the chairing of boards. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1963 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act369 
National 
Holyoake Amending 
MP 
Qualification Minor None No Not Opposed No No No 
1965 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act370 
National 
Holyoake Amending 
Boundaries; 
Number of MPs Major High Yes Not Opposed 
Statutes 
Revision Yes No 
1967 Electoral Poll Act371 
National 
Holyoake Original Referendum Minor None Yes Unanimous 
Statutes 
Revision No No 
1967 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act372 
National 
Holyoake Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori 
Major Low Yes Not Opposed Maori Affairs No No 
                                                     
369
 Introduced as part of a Statutes Amendment Bill and did two things. First, it further amended the troublesome definition of ‘contractor’ from the 1956 Electoral Act. This 
gave an MP, upon his election to Parliament and before sitting as a member, one month in which to disclaim the contract and any payment made (accidentally presumably) 
after that disclamation, will not stop him from continuing to hold office. The Act also repealed subsection 43(7) of the Electoral Act 1956. That provision had stated: “The 
burden of proving that a person against whom proceedings are taken for an offence against this section was not qualified to be registered as an elector at any material time shall 
be on that person.” 
370
 Gave effect to the Government’s election promise to fix the parliamentary representation for the South Island at 25 seats.  The quota of North Island seats was to be worked 
out from the South Island number. Maori representation was left untouched. 
371
 Allowed for a referendum on the length of the parliamentary term to take place concurrently with the Sale of Liquor referendum. 
372
 Allowed a candidate to stand in a European or Maori seat, regardless of the roll on which they were registered. Repealed section 97 of the Electoral Act 1956 (as amended 
by the Sale of Liquor Act 1962). This allowed the sale of liquor on election day. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1969 
By-Elections 
Postponement 
Act373 
National 
Holyoake Circumventing By-election Incidental None Yes Not Opposed No No No 
1969 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act374 
National 
Holyoake Amending 
Franchise and 
Registration Major Moderate No Not Opposed No Yes No 
1969 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act (No 2)375 
National 
Holyoake Amending Administration Incidental Low Yes Not Opposed 
Statutes 
Revision No No 
1971 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act376 
National 
Holyoake Amending 
Administration; 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Minor Moderate Yes Not Opposed Public Expenditure No No 
                                                     
373
 Delayed the holding of by-elections to the time of the general election, which was only weeks away. 
374
 Lowered the voting age from 21 to 20. 
375
 Made a minor administrative change to the law surrounding the position of polling booths on electorate boundaries. 
376
 A reasonably substantial amendment bill, which dealt with a number of issues, including altering voting roll printing procedure for electors resident in the Chatham Islands; 
updating the provision that disqualified electors who were in prison, or had serious mental illness or insanity, to cover a grey area between the two; updating the language used 
in the Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2) 1969, allowing suitable polling places to be appointed as polling places for two districts; updating the Electoral Act 1956 provisions 
concerning scrutineers, to allow for, and regulate the situation of, more than one scrutineer at a polling booth and increasing the maximum amount of election expenses from 
$1000 to $1500. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1972 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act377 
National 
Marshall Amending Administration Incidental None Yes Unanimous No No No 
1974 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act378 
Labour 
Rowling Amending 
Franchise and 
Registration Major None Yes Not Opposed Electoral Act Yes Yes 
1975 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act379 
Labour 
Rowling Amending 
Administration;  
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori; 
Method of 
Voting; 
MP 
Qualification 
Major High Yes Opposed380 Electoral Act Yes Yes 
                                                     
377
 Prevented a candidate from being nominated under a new name assumed under a deed poll less than six months before nominations closed: a response to the situations of a 
man attempting to change his name to the name of a Walt Disney character in order to stand for Parliament; another who changed his name to Jesus Christ; and another who 
attempted to change his name to the exact name of a candidate for Wellington Central in order to stand against him. 
378
 Lowered the voting age from 20 to 18. 
379
 The result of the report of the Electoral Law Committee, which had sat for the prior two years. A long, comprehensive act which created a number of controversial changes 
to the electoral law. Among other things, extended the franchise to prisoners and allowed for variations in the number of Maori seats. 
380
 Some clauses altering entrenched provisions defeated by opposition. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1976 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act381 
National 
Muldoon Amending Maori Major Moderate No Opposed No No Yes 
1977 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act382 
National 
Muldoon Amending 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Franchise & 
Registration 
Major High No Opposed Statutes Revision No Yes 
1979 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act383 
National 
Muldoon Amending Administration Minor Moderate Yes Not Opposed 
Statutes 
Revision No No 
                                                     
381
 Returned the Maori seats to the pre-1975 status quo of four seats instead of a variable number based on population and Maori roll calculations. 
382
 Repealed a number of provisions contained in the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 including reversing allowing school teachers to remain at work while standing for 
Parliament; altering the requirement for residency in an electorate from one month back to three months; prisoners again disqualified from voting; reversed the 1975 provision 
that anybody qualified to vote but who hadn’t registered could vote. Election expenses were doubled from $2000 (from the 1975 act) to $4000; reversed the clause proscribing 
the use of loudspeakers, thus returning control to local authorities. Introduced a new provision regulating candidate advertisements. 
383
 Attempted to provide a temporary solution to the chaotic situation that had occurred with electoral rolls at the 1978 general election. Passed urgently in light of the 
upcoming by-election caused by the death of Christchurch Central MP, Bruce Barclay. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1980 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act384 
National 
Muldoon Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise & 
Registration; 
Maori; 
Method of 
Voting 
Major Moderate Yes Not Opposed Electoral Law Yes 
Yes  
(1975, 1977) 
1981 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act385 
National 
Muldoon Amending 
Administration; 
Boundaries; 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Maori; 
MP 
Qualification 
Minor Low Yes Not Opposed Electoral Law Yes No 
1983 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act386 
National 
Muldoon Amending Administration Minor Low Yes Not Opposed 
Electoral 
Law No No 
1985 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act387 
Labour 
Lange Amending 
Administration; 
Maori Minor Low Yes Not Opposed 
Electoral 
Law No 
Yes  
(1983) 
                                                     
384
 A comprehensive set of amendments to a large number of areas of electoral law. Removed party designations from the ballot paper; extended the vote to permanent 
residents; delayed the exercise of the Maori roll option to a year after a general election, among other things. 
385
 Made a wide range of mostly uncontroversial changes to election administration, recommended by the second report of the Electoral Law Committee. 
386
 Primarily a technical bill. Non-controversial; implemented the recommendations contained in the third report of the Electoral Law Committee. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1985 
Electoral 
Amendment 
(No 2) Act388 
Labour 
Lange Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise & 
Registration 
Major High No Opposed Electoral Law No Yes 
1986 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act389 
Labour 
Lange Amending Maori Incidental None No Not Opposed 
Justice & 
Law Reform No 
Yes 
(1981) 
1986 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act (No 2)390 
Labour 
Lange Amending Constitution Major None No Not Opposed 
Justice & 
Law Reform Yes Yes 
1987 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act (No 2)391 
Labour 
Lange Amending By-election Minor Moderate No Not Opposed 
Electoral 
Law No No 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
387
 Primarily a technical bill; all its substantive measures were the result of the unanimous recommendations of the Electoral Law Committee to remedy “certain problems" 
encountered during the 1984 General Election. Also altered National’s 1983 Electoral Amendment Act and provided that the Maori option would be carried out concurrently 
with the general re-enrolment. 
388
 Reversed the time requirement for residing in an electorate before registration as a voter from three months back to one month; made the dormant file publicly available and 
authorised its updating. 
389
 Provided that Maori electoral boundaries would be promulgated at the same time as general electoral boundaries. Split from larger Law Reform Bill. 
390
 Originally part of the Constitution Bill 1986, which clarified and codified existing convention. Clarified the rules relating to transfer of power after an election in the light of 
the constitutional issues raised when Muldoon left office in 1984. 
391
 Prevented any seat which became empty before the general election to be filled before the general election in a by-election. Note that the Electoral Amendment Act 1987 is 
not listed as it applied to local Government alone. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1989 Broadcasting Act392 
Labour 
Lange 
Original; 
Amending 
Broadcasting; 
Electioneering 
& Finance 
Major Moderate No Not Opposed Planning & Development No No 
1989 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act393 
Labour 
Lange Amending 
Franchise and 
Registration Major High No Opposed No No No 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act394 
Administration;  
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori; 
Method of 
Voting; 
MP 
Qualification; 
1990 
Broadcasting 
Amendment 
Act395 
Labour 
Palmer 
Amending 
Broadcasting 
Major Moderate Yes Not Opposed Electoral Law Yes No 
                                                     
392
 Empowered the Parliamentary Service Commission to allocate 6 hours of appropriated TV and radio advertising among parties. 
393
 Overturned Wairarapa decision on section 37 of the Electoral Act 1956, which dealt with the rules for determining a place of residence within New Zealand. 
394
 Made technical amendments to the Electoral Act 1956 relating to roll revision. Updated penalties. Altered the calculation to determine number of Maori seats; altered the 
ballot paper to voting with a tick (an entrenched provision); election expenses raised to $10,000. Split from the Electoral Reform Bill on its third reading.  
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
Term Poll 
Act396 Original Referendum 
1990 
Broadcasting 
and 
Radiocomm-
unications 
Reform Act397 
Labour 
Palmer Amending Broadcasting Minor High No Opposed 
Planning and 
Development No Yes (1990) 
1991 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act398 
National 
Bolger Amending Boundaries Minor None Yes Unanimous 
Electoral 
Law Yes No 
1991 
Electoral 
Referendum 
Act399 
National 
Bolger Original Referendum Major Low Yes Unanimous 
Electoral 
Law No No 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
395
 Appropriated private commercial radio airtime for political party broadcasts. Split from the Electoral Reform Bill on its third reading. 
396
 Allowed for a referendum on the parliamentary term. Split from the Electoral Reform Bill on its third reading. 
397
 Established a new system and procedures for the handling of parliamentary election broadcasting, after feedback from broadcasters and the public suggested the alterations 
made by the Electoral Reform Act 1990 had been unsatisfactory and required modification. Note this act was split on the third reading and passed as the Broadcasting 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 and the Radiocommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 1990. 
398
 Made minor and non-controversial changes to the make-up of the Representation Commission, as recommended by the report of the Select Committee on Electoral Law on 
the 1987 General Election. 
399
 The Act that set off the process that led to New Zealand’s eventual move to MMP. Note the Act was introduced as the Electoral Poll Bill. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1992 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act400 
National 
Bolger Amending Technical Minor Low No Not Opposed 
Electoral 
Law No No 
1993 Electoral Act401 
National 
Bolger 
Original; 
Amending; 
Amalgamating 
Administration;  
Boundaries; 
Constitution; 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Electoral 
System; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori; 
Method of 
Voting; 
MP 
Qualification 
Milestone High Yes Not Opposed402 
Electoral 
Law Yes Yes 
                                                     
400
 Rectified a legal problem in the Representation Commission’s work after it was found the figures contained in the report of the Government Statistician to the commission 
in order to calculate the Maori seats had not been calculated in accordance with the law. 
401
 The comprehensive act governing elections in New Zealand. Replaced the Electoral Act 1956. The Senate Bill, separated from the Electoral Bill in the committee stages, 
was intended for introduction should the referendum on the electoral system result in the retention of FFP. It did not, and the Senate Bill lapsed. 
402
 Numerous divisions were held during the committee stages on various parts. These were conscience votes. Passed third reading without division. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1993 
Electoral 
Referendum 
Act403 
National 
Bolger Original Referendum Major Moderate Yes 
Not 
Opposed404 
Electoral 
Law No No 
1993 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act405 
National 
Bolger Amending 
Franchise and 
Registration Major High No Opposed 
Electoral 
Law No Yes 
1995 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act406 
National 
Bolger Amending Technical Minor None Yes Unanimous 
Electoral 
Law No No 
1995 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act (No 2)407 
National 
Bolger Amending 
Administration; 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Method of 
Voting 
Major Moderate Yes 
No Multi-
partisan 
Support 408 
Electoral 
Law No No 
                                                     
403
 Provided the legislative basis for the second referendum on the electoral system 
404
 Numerous divisions were held during the committee stages on various parts. These were conscience votes. Passed third reading without division. 
405
 Closed the electoral rolls on Writ Day, as recommended by the Electoral Law Committee in its report on the 1990 General Election. 
406
 Part of Electoral Reform Bill 1995. Clarified any ambiguity there might be that the amendments to the entrenched provisions in section 168 of the Electoral Act could be 
passed only by members elected under the 1993 Act. 
407
 The Government and Opposition voted to alter the form of the ballot paper, to the objection of Parliament’s minor parties. Made changes in four significant areas, as well as 
other minor changes. Implemented a disclosure regime and a limit on the amount that parties may spend on political campaigns. 
408
 Government and Opposition unanimous. For: National, Labour, Christian Democrats; Against: United, NZ First, Alliance, NZ Conservative 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
1996 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act409 
National 
Bolger Amending Technical Incidental None No Unanimous 
Electoral 
Law No Yes 
Broadcasting 
Amendment 
Act410   
1996 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act (No 2)412 
National 
Bolger Amending 
Broadcasting; 
Electioneering 
and Finance 
Minor Low No 
No Multi-
partisan 
Support 411 
Finance and 
Expenditure No Yes 
1996 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act (No 3)413 
National 
Bolger Amending 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori 
Incidental None No Not Opposed Justice & Law Reform No No 
                                                     
409
 Amended a printing error that occurred in the preparation of the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995 for Assent. Changed the national donation figure from $1000 to 
$10000. 
410
 Further amended the Electoral Act 1993, in the light of the Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 1995, to allow the Government and Opposition to each nominate a person to 
serve on the Electoral Commission for the purposes of its jurisdiction under the Broadcasting Act 1989. Made other minor changes to funding and broadcasting spending limits. 
Introduced as Broadcasting Amendment Bill, split into Broadcasting Amendment Bill and Electoral Amendment Bill (No 4) before third reading 
411
 Government and Opposition unanimous. For: National, Labour, Christian Democrats; Against: United, NZ First, Alliance, NZ Conservative 
412
 Split from the Broadcasting Bill 1996 on its third reading. 
413
 Amended s 77(2) of the Electoral Act 1993 to alter the period in which Maori could switch electoral rolls from two months to four months. 
  
 
Year Name 
Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
Effect Area Class Contention 
Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
Major Parties 
Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
2001 
Electoral 
(Integrity) 
Amendment 
Act414 
Labour 
Clark Amending 
MP 
Qualification Major Moderate No Opposed
415
 
Justice & 
Electoral No No 
2002 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act416 
Labour 
Clark Amending 
Administration; 
Electioneering 
and Finance; 
Franchise and 
Registration; 
Maori 
Minor High No Opposed417 Justice & Electoral No No 
2003 
Electoral 
(Vacancies) 
Amendment 
Act418 
Labour 
Clark Amending 
MP 
Qualification Minor High No Opposed
419
 No No No 
                                                     
414
 Prevented ‘party-hopping’. 
415
 For: Labour, Alliance, NZ First; Against: National, ACT, Green Party, United 
416
 Made mostly uncontroversial administrative amendments to the Electoral Act. Originally attempted to ban the publishing of opinion polls before an election, but this clause 
was removed in the committee stages. Controversy arose over the Bill's proposal to count the party vote of those who voted in the wrong electorate, the early counting of 
advance votes and hospital votes, and continuous enrolment.  
417
 For: Labour, Alliance, Green Party; Against: National, ACT, NZ First, United 
418
 Amended the Electoral Act 1993 to save Hon Harry Duynhoven, MP for New Plymouth, from disqualification as an MP for applying for Dutch citizenship. Split from the 
Electoral Matters Bill 2004 on its third reading. 
419
 For: Labour, Green Party, Progressive; Against: National, ACT, NZ First, United; Abstention: Hunt (Speaker) 
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Government 
and Prime 
Minister 
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Prior 
Consultation 
Between 
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Legislative 
Outcome 
Select 
Committee 
Amended 
Entrenched 
Provisions 
Repealed 
Previous 
Amendment 
2004 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act420 
Labour 
Clark Amending 
Administration; 
MP 
Qualification 
Minor Low No Not Opposed Justice & Electoral No No 
2004 
Broadcasting 
Amendment 
Act421 
Labour 
Clark Amending Broadcasting Minor Low No Not Opposed 
Justice & 
Electoral No No 
2005 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act422 
Labour 
Clark Amending Administration Incidental None No Not Opposed 
Government 
Administration No No 
Electoral 
Finance Act423 
2007 
Electoral 
Amendment 
Act425 
Labour 
Clark 
Original; 
Amending 
Broadcasting; 
Electioneering 
and Finance 
Major High No Opposed424 Justice & 
Electoral 
No No 
                                                     
420
 Further clarified the provisions relating to disqualification of an MP and made other small administrative changes to the Electoral Act 1993.  
421
 Made a number of administrative changes to rules surrounding election broadcasting. Repealed the requirement for the Electoral Commission to invite broadcasters to 
provide free or discounted time for electoral broadcasting. Ensured only registered parties eligible for allocations of time and money. Split from the Electoral Matters Bill 2004 
on its third reading. 
422
 Made two minor, technical changes to the Electoral Act 1993. Introduced as part of the Statutes Amendment Bill (No 4) 2004 
423
 A wide-sweeping act that regulated electioneering and electoral finance, and placed extensive limits on election campaigning. 
424
 For: Labour, NZ First, Green Party, Progressive; Against: National, Maori Party, United Future, ACT, Field (Independent). 
425
 Split from the Electoral Finance Bill 2007 on its third reading.  
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Broadcasting 
Amendment 
Act426 
 
                                                     
426
 Split from the Electoral Finance Bill 2007 on its third reading. 
Appendix B 
Unsuccessful Electoral Reform Bills 1927 - 2007 (in chronological order) 
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1929 Preferential Voting Bill427 
Private Member 
J McCombs 
(Labour) 
Original Electoral System None Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
 
1931 
 
Electoral Amendment Bill428 
Private Member 
C Clinkard 
(Coalition) 
Amending Electoral System None Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
1932 Electoral Amendment Bill429 
Government 
G Forbes 
(Coalition) 
Amending Term Length None Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
1932 Electoral Amendment Bill430 
Private Member 
G Black 
(Independent) 
Amending - None Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
                                                     
427
 Sought to prescribe a basic PR system of voting at national referendum polls. 
428
 Sought to introduce a simple version of STV. 
429
 Possibly an aborted attempt to extend the life of Parliament by a year. This was done instead in the Finance Act 1932.The bill did not proceed past first reading and was not 
debated and it has not been possible to obtain details of the contents.  
430
 This bill did not proceed past first reading and was not debated. It has not been possible to obtain details of the contents. 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1932 Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2)431 
Private Member 
C Chapman 
(Labour) 
Amending - None Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
1933 Electoral Amendment Bill432 
Private Member 
E Tirikatene 
(Ratana) 
Amending Maori Low Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
1934 Electoral Amendment (Date of General Election) Bill433 
Private Member 
M.J. Savage 
(Labour) 
Amending Term Length High 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Defeated on Second 
Reading 
No 
1934 Electoral Amendment Bill434 
Private Member 
C Clinkard 
(Coalition) 
Amending Electoral System Low Lapsed after 
 First Reading No 
1965 Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2)435 
Private Member 
R Mason 
(Labour) 
Amending Electioneering and Finance Moderate 
Defeated on Second 
Reading No 
                                                     
431
 This bill did not proceed past first reading and was not debated. It has not been possible to obtain details of the contents. 
432
 Sought to make the Maori ballot a secret ballot. Unlike the European ballot, the Maori ballot was carried out by declaration. 
433
 Sought to bring the current Parliament (extended by the Coalition to four years) to an end after the former three years. 
434
 Again sought to introduce a simple version of STV. 
435
 Sought, in the face of increasing use of television and other media for electioneering, to promote the ‘corner meeting’ style of campaigning by allowing meetings to be held 
“without reference to bylaws”. 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1966 Electoral Amendment Bill436 
Government 
K Holyoake 
(National) 
Amending Franchise and Registration Low 
Lapsed after 
 First Reading Statutes Revision 
1972 Electoral Amendment Bill437 
Private Member 
 C Moyle 
(Labour) 
Amending Franchise and Registration Moderate 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Lapsed after 
 First Reading 
No 
1976 Electoral Amendment Bill438 
Private Member 
J Hunt 
(Labour) 
Amending Administration; Constitution Moderate 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Lapsed after Second 
Reading 
No 
1978 Electoral Amendment Bill439 
Private Member 
B Beetham 
(Social Credit) 
Amending Boundaries Moderate 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Lapsed after Second 
Reading 
No 
                                                     
436
 Proposed that “servicemen who are under 21 years of age will be qualified to vote at a general election if they are serving overseas in a special area as members of the naval, 
military or air forces, and provision is made for this special service area to be declared by Order in Council. It will be an area where there is an imminent threat of war or 
danger or disturbance at the risk of life.” 
437
 Sought to lower the voting age to 18 years and allow the Chief Electoral Officer to actively enrol people to vote. 
438
 Proposed lengthening the sessions of Parliament by requiring it to sit no later than 90 days after the return of the writs following an election. Attempted to even out the 
House’s sitting schedule to make it sit 90 days a year (3 days every 3 weeks of every month). The other provisions extinguished the Governor-General’s powers to prorogue or 
dissolve Parliament without an absolute majority of the House – no doubt a reaction to Sir John Kerr’s actions in Australia. 
439
 Sought to alter the Electoral Commission to include, alongside Government and Opposition representatives, representatives from the Social Credit Political League and the 
Values Party. 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1978 Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2)440 
Private Member 
Connelly 
(Labour) 
Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise and 
Registration 
Moderate 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Lapsed after Second 
Reading 
No 
1978 Elections and Polls Bill441 
Private Member 
G Wall 
(Labour) 
Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise and 
Registration 
High Defeated on Introduction No 
1978 Voting Rights Protection Bill442 
Private Member 
G Wall 
(Labour) 
Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise and 
Registration 
High Defeated on Introduction No 
1980 Electoral Amendment Bill443 
Private Member 
G Wall 
(Labour) 
Amending 
Administration; 
Franchise and 
Registration 
High Defeated on Introduction No 
1980 Second Ballot Bill444 
Private Member 
G Wall 
(Labour) 
Amending Electoral System Low 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Defeated on 
Introduction 
No 
                                                     
440
 Sought to alter the Electoral Act to attempt to ensure the enrolment of as many electors as possible prior to election day. 
441
 Proposed leaving enrolment open up until and during a general election. 
442
 Proposed alteration of the Electoral Act 1956 to provide franchise on eligibility to vote rather than being listed on the electoral roll. 
443
 Proposed leaving enrolment open up until and during a general election; proposed introduction of an immunity clause to “protect people from... prosecution following their 
failure... to fulfil their [electoral] obligations under existing legislation.” 
444
 Proposed that, if an MP failed to be elected by a majority, a second ballot would be held the following Saturday between the top two candidates. 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1986 Political Advertising Bill445 
Private Member 
Cox 
(National) 
Amending 
Broadcasting; 
Electioneering and 
Finance 
Moderate Defeated on Introduction No 
1986 Electoral (Representation Commission) Amendment Bill446 
Private Member 
G Knapp 
(Democrats) 
Amending Boundaries High 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Defeated on 
Introduction 
No 
1988 Public Finance (Restraint of Political Advertising) Bill447 
Private Member 
S Upton 
(National) 
Amending Electioneering and Finance High 
Defeated on 
Introduction No 
1989 Electoral Expenses Bill448 
Private Member 
C Matthewson 
(Labour) 
Amending Electioneering and Finance High 
Lapsed after referral 
to Select Committee Electoral Law 
1990 Proportional Representation Indicative Referendum Bill449 
Private Member 
Mr Terris 
(Labour) 
Original Electoral System Moderate Lapsed after report 
of Select Committee Electoral Law 
                                                     
445
 Proposed extensive limits on expenditure by Government on advertising and restrictions on the types of advertising public money could be used for. 
446
 Sought to alter section 15 of the Electoral Act to “allow the participation of all bona fide political parties in the process of setting electoral boundaries.” 
447
 Sought to make Government itemise all money spent on advertising Government policies. 
448
 Sought to validate the expenditure of Mr Boorman, who had been removed from Parliament as a result of the Wairarapa electoral petition. 
449
 Proposed the holding of two referenda on the voting system: one to determine the question of a change and one to determine the type of change. The Bolger Government 
introduced similar bills after it came to power, and these led to the introduction of MMP. 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1990 Mixed Member Proportional Representation Poll Bill450 
Private Member 
J Anderton 
(NewLabour) 
Original Electoral System Moderate Defeated on Introduction451 No 
1992 Mixed Member Proportional Representation Referendum Bill452 
Private Member 
J Anderton 
(NewLabour) 
Original Electoral System Low Lapsed after referral to Select Committee Electoral Law 
1994 Electoral Reform (Representation Commission) Bill453 
Private Member 
J Anderton 
(NewLabour) 
Amending Boundaries Low Lapsed after referral to Select Committee Electoral Law 
1995 Elector Registration Extension Bill454 
Private Member 
J Hunt 
 (Labour) 
Amending Franchise and Registration Moderate 
Defeated on 
Introduction No 
1995 Disclosure of Political Donations and Gifts Bill455 
Private Member 
W Peters 
(NZ First) 
Amending Electioneering and Finance Low 
Ruled as involving 
an Appropriation; 
Ruled out of order 
after report of 
Select Committee 
Electoral Law 
                                                     
450
 Proposed putting MMP straight to a referendum at the 1990 General Election, without an initial indicative referendum. 
451
 Conscience Vote. 
452
 Proposed the introduction of MMP for the 1993 General Election. 
453
 Sought to remove all political representation from the Representation Commission 
454
 Sought to extend the latest day on which electors may register from writ day to the day before polling day. This would have restored the position to that which applied 
before the enactment of the Electoral Act 1993. 
455
 Proposed a transparent public register of donations to political parties. 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
1997 Electoral (Party Registration) Bill456 
Private Member 
M Cullen 
(Labour) 
Amending MP Qualification Moderate 
Defeated after 
report of Select 
Committee457 
Electoral Law 
1998 Electoral Amendment Bill458 
Government 
J Shipley 
(National) 
Amending Administration None 
Carried over at end 
of session and 
incorporated into 
2002 Amendment 
Act 
Electoral Law 
1999 Broadcasting (Election Broadcasting) Amendment Bill459 
Government 
J Shipley 
(National) 
Amending Broadcasting Low 
Carried over at end 
of session and 
lapsed 
Electoral Law 
2000 Electoral (Public Opinion Polls) Amendment Bill460 
Private Member 
W Peters 
(NZ First) 
Amending Electioneering and Finance High 
Defeated on First 
Reading461 No 
                                                     
456
 Sought to prevent ‘party-hopping’ 
457
 For: Labour, Alliance; Against: National, NZ First, ACT, United, Independent, Donald, Fitzsimons 
458
 Sought to implement, in part, the recommendations of the Electoral Law Committee in relation to its inquiry into the conduct of the 1996 general election. Included 
numerous amendments, of a minor and technical nature, to the Electoral Act. 
459
 Sought to remove the requirement on the Electoral Commission to ‘invite’ all broadcasters to make offers of free or discounted broadcasting time for election programmes. 
460
 Provided for a 28-day period prior to a general election or a by-election during which it would be an offence to publish the results of a public opinion poll conducted during 
that period in relation to the general election or by-election. 
461
 For: National, Alliance, NZ First, United; Against: Labour, ACT, Green 
  
 
Year Name Origin Effect Affected Areas of Electoral Law Contention Outcome Select Committee 
2002 Electoral Options Referenda Bill462 
Private Member 
J Shipley / S 
Power 
(National) 
Original Referendum Moderate Defeated on First Reading463 No 
2002 Electoral (Racially-Based Representation) Referendum Bill464 
Private Member 
Shirley 
(ACT) 
Original Maori; Number of MPs High 
Defeated on 
Introduction No 
2005 Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill465 
Government 
Clark 
(Labour) 
Amending MP Qualification High Lapsed after referral to Select Committee Justice & Electoral 
2006 
Electoral (Reduction in Number of 
Members of Parliament) Amendment 
Bill466 
Private Member 
Stewart 
(NZ First) 
Amending Number of MPs Moderate Defeated on Second Reading467 Justice & Electoral 
2008 Electoral Finance Amendment Bill468 
Private Member 
English 
(National) 
Amending Electioneering and Finance N / A Not Debated N / A 
                                                     
462
 Proposed the holding of two referenda on the electoral system: the first an indicative referendum on whether the electoral system should be changed from MMP, and the 
second a binding referendum on what system should be moved to. 
463
 For: National, ACT, United; Against: Labour, NZ First, Green 
464
 Sought to remove the Maori seats. 
465
 Sought to prevent ‘party-hopping’. 
466
 Proposed a reduction of the number MPs from 120 to 100. 
467
 For: NZ First, ACT; Against: Labour, National, Green, Maori Party, United Future, Progressive 
468
 Sought to alter the requirement for a home address to be used on authorisation statements under the Electoral Finance Act. 
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